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The Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands Dispute: Questions of 
Sovereignty and Suggestions for Resolving the Dispute 
 
Abstract: 
The territorial conflict over the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands sovereignty has dragged on 
since the 1970s. Today, Japan administers the islands, which are also claimed by 
Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China. All claimants use historical evidence to 
bolster the legal strength of their claim. The dispute over the islands is also linked to 
other important factors, such as nationalism in an unreconciled international 
environment and the rights to exploitation of natural resources. The unresolved 
Taiwan / China question puts another burden on its resolution. This particular 
conflict will be compared to other similar remote islands, which already have been 
subject to a legal procedure and, in some cases, resolution. This thesis aims to outline 
the impediments involved in a potential legal resolution without ignoring the political 
and other relevant facts. Given the regional political setting, the only viable 
resolution is likely to be more political than legal. This thesis aims to propose a join-
development scheme on basis of other previously settled territorial disputes.  
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“It is true that the two sides maintain different view of this question… It does not 
matter if the question is shelved for some time, say ten years. Our generation is not wise 
enough to find a common language on this question. Our next generation will certainly 
be wiser. They will find a solution acceptable for all.”1  
 
 
                                                 
1 Deng Xiaoping holding a speech on the Diaoyutai conflict, cited in Chi-Kin Lo, China’s Policy 
Towards Territorrial Disputes: The case of the South China Sea Islands 171-172 (1989); No. 44 
Beijing Review, (November 3rd, 1978), 16  
   
1. Introduction 
The topic of this thesis is: which state has the better title in law to the 
Diaoyutai / Senkaku Islands2 and their resources. It is also proposed to 
suggest ways in which the territorial and hence the title to appurtenant 
resources might be resolved.  
 
The Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands are situated in the Eastern Chinese Sea about 
400 km west of Okinawa and 170 km northeast of Taiwan. These five volcanic 
islands and three rocky outcroppings are subject to a severe dispute between 
Japan, China and Taiwan.3 They are uninhabited islands sustaining scarce 
flora of little economic value, except for some fishing and feather collecting 
activities.4 Their military significance is high as a strategic outpost.5 The 
islands are too small to be delineated on most maps and they sit on the edge 
of the continental shelf of mainland Asia. They are separated from the 
Japanese Okinawa islands by a deep (2270 meter) sea trench.6 
 
The Eastern Chinese Sea is rich in fishing stocks, oil and gas deposits. The 
islands became a celebrity in Asian politics when the rich oil reserves of 
almost 100 billion barrels were discovered in 1969. They represent a value of 
about $ 6 trillion US, which is the equivalent of more than the annual GNP of 
the United States of America. In addition to the oil, 200 billion cubic meters of 
natural gas are located in the area.7 
 
                                                 
2 In order to adapt a neutral stance, the islands are named “Diaoyutai” when analysing the Chinese 
claims, Tiao yu T’ai whenever Taiwanese claims are concerned and they are called the “Senkaku 
Islands” when dealing with the Japanese perspective 
3 All parties of the dispute use the term “islands“ for the agglomeration of uninhabited soil - although 
the question whether they may be regarded as islands is disputed. 
4 Yoshiro Matsui, ”International Law Of Territorial Acquisition And The Dispute Over The Senkaku 
(Diaoyu) Islands”, Vol. 40 The Japanese Annual of International Law (1997), 3 
5 Tao Cheng,”The Sino-Japanese Dispute Over the Tiao-yu-tai (Senkaku) Islands and the Law of 
Territorial Acquisition”, Vol. 14 V.J.I.L. (1973), 265 
6 Daniel Dzurek; The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute, 
www.ibru.dur.ac.uk/resources/docs/senkaku.html, accessed on February 20th, 2007 
7 Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, The U.S. Role in the Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Diaoyu (Senkaku) 
Islands, 1945-1971, No. 161 China Quarterly (2000), 95; Curtin, Sean J, “Stakes rise in Japan, China 
gas dispute”, University of Alberta: 
http://www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/chinainstitute/nav03.cfm?nav03=44057&nav02=43872&nav01=430
92, accessed on July 24th, 2007  
   
The question arises as to whether they are islands in the sense of UNCLOS. 
Are they capable of sustaining human habitation and economic activity? It is 
doubtful that they fulfil these requirements in the strict sense. However, all 
parties of the dispute take their status as islands for granted. The legal 
consequence of this specific status would be that they create their own 
territorial sea, continental shelf, and their own Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ). According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas 
(UNCLOS) the islands are entitled to create an Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) of 40,000 sq km.8 The country holding the sovereignty over the islands 
automatically becomes the owner of the natural resource deposits. If China 
was entitled to a full continental shelf and EEZ, then the PRC could claim the 
shelf up to the Okinawa Trough and an EEZ to an equidistant line with the 
proximate undisputed Japanese Island. On the contrary, provided that Japan 
is the holder of the legal title over the disputed islands, the islands could 
legally generate their own continental shelf and their own EEZ, which would 
put Japan into a position to claim the median line with Taiwan and China.9 
The parties of the conflict have overlapping maritime claims, thus the 
settlement of the territorial question is a precondition for the maritime 
boundary issue.  
 
One has to forget that the disputed should not simply be regarded as another 
conflict about oil. The conflict is a centrepiece for Asian nationalistic ideas; 
governments have a tendency to stir up a conflict with the goal of deviating 
attention away from social problems in their own country. The Chinese 
government is not inclined to alienate domestic anti-Japanese protesters as 
they could easily try to provoke social unrest in mainland China.10  
 
                                                 
8 According to Art. 121(II) UNCLOS islands can create a territorial sea, contiguous zone and Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ); Daniel Dzurek, The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute, 
www.ibru.dur.ac.uk/resources/docs/senkaku.html, accessed on February 20th, 2007 
9 Mark J. Valencia, Yoshihisa Amae, “Regime Building in the East China Sea”, Vol. 43 Ocean 
Development & International Law (2003), 191 
10 Erica Strecker Downs, Phillip C. Saunders, “Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism”, Vol. 23 
International Security (1998), 126 
   
One reason that the conflict has not been settled is the unsolved political 
situation of the two Chinese countries, namely the Republic of Taiwan (PRO) 
and the People’s Republic of China (PRC / China mainland). Both countries 
claim to be the legitimate representative of the Chinese people. In addition, for 
the Taiwanese government the conflict is related to the question of formal 
independence of the country. This dispute also has an effect on other 
unresolved territorial conflicts of the claimant states: Japan is eager to recover 
the Kurile Islands, which are under Russian control,11 and its claim to the 
Liancourt Rocks12 vis-à-vis South Korea.13 Similarly, China has many claims 
in the Southern Chinese Sea, for example, about the Spratly islands. At the 
same time, the mutual economic dependence of all disputants ensures that 
the dispute has not evoked any severe military deployments. It is therefore the 
interest of all parties to keep the dispute at a low level.  
 
All claimants state that they were the first to have discovered and occupied 
the islands. As early as 1372 Chinese Imperial Envoys used the islands as a 
navigation point.14 China argues that even in the 18th century Japanese maps 
showed the islands to be Chinese territory.15 Taiwan’s claim to the islands 
concentrates on the argument that Taiwan had occupied them for a long time 
and that the islands form a natural prolongation of the Taiwanese continental 
shelf. Japan claims that until the end of the 19th century the islands were “terra 
nullius”. Since 1894, the islands have been under Japanese administration.  
 
In the Sino-Japanese war in 1895, China was forced to cede Taiwan and all 
the islands belonging to her to Japan. Later, in the Sino-Japanese treaty of 
1952 the parties signed that as a consequence of the war all prior agreements 
                                                 
11 Terashima Hiroshi, “On becoming an Ocean State”, Vol. 34 Japan Echo (2007), 39 
12 The Koreans call it the “Dokdo” rock and the Japanese refer to them as “Takeshima” island 
13 Serita Kentaro, “The Takeshima Dispute: A Radical Proposal”, Vol. 34 Japan Echo (2007), 35  
14 Tao Cheng, The Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Tiao-yu-tai (Senkaku) Islands and the Law of 
Territorial Acquisition, Vol. 14 V.J.I.L (1973), 253  
15 Sina Xinwen zhongxin, “Zhongguo lingtu diaoyudao dili lishi ziliao”, (25.3.2005); 
http.//news.sina.com.cn/c/2005-03-25/10396192318.shtml., accessed on March 30th, 2007  
   
were hereby null and void.16 After World War II, the U.S. administered the 
disputed islands in conjunction with the Okinawa Islands. In 1972, the U.S. 
returned administration to Japan.17 
 
 
 
 
Source: http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Senkaku-Inseln  (accessed on February 
14th, 2007) 
 
In former times, the significance of a state was determined by its territorial 
space. In modern economy a state’s might is mainly determined by the stake 
it has in the global economy. Since the three claimants’ national economies 
have become more and more entwined and mutually dependent, a bellicose 
outcome of the conflict does not appear very probable because all claimants 
fear domestic struggles as a suite of such a conflict.  
 
                                                 
16 quoted in: Caleb Wan, “Security Flashpoint: International Law and the Islands Dispute in the Far 
East”, The New Zealand Postgraduate Law E-Journal (2/2005), 42, 
www.nzgraduatelawejournal.auckland.ac.nz./PDF%20Articles/Issue%202%20(2005)/1%20Caleb’s
%20Final.pdf ,accessed on March 13th, 2007 
17 Baidu bailiao, “Diaoyu dao”; http://baike.baidu.com/view/2876.htm”, accessed on March 30th, 2007; 
Ericka Strecker, Phillip C. Saunders, “Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism – China and the 
Diaoyu Islands”, Vol. 23 International Security (1998), 125 
   
To sum up, the dispute is not only territorial but also maritime, including legal 
questions of discovery and occupation. If the dispute is to be settled, the 
resolution is likely to be as much political as legal. The political importance of 
the dispute is too critical that the parties of the conflict feel that a purely legal 
strategy contains too many risks. Political factors very often outweigh 
reasonable legal arguments in Asia and international law is perceived as 
Western – influenced. International law is distrusted by Asian governments. 
The Asian approach to dispute resolutions is one which permits both parties to 
save face, for this reason a common political solution is more likely to be 
found than a high risk international litigation strategy. 
 
The proposed solution of this thesis is for a joint development plan. Some 
bilateral fishery treaties will be analysed and will be the basis for the author’s 
own proposal for a solution to the conflict.  
 
1.1. Emergence of the name of the islands 
The first Chinese reference to the name of the islands dates back to the year 
1221.18 The five islands and three rocks all bear their own name. The general 
term originates from the biggest island, which is called the Uotsuri- / Diaoyu 
Island. The Diaoyu name may also be used as a general term, whenever 
someone wants to refer to the group of the Diaoyu / Senkaku islands. In 
Mandarin, the Diaoyu Islands are either called Diaoyu Dao or Diaoyutai 
islands. Both names have a similar meaning: Diaoyu Dao means “fishing 
island”, whereas Diaoyutai means “fishing platform”.19 Taiwanese stick more 
to the word “Tiao-yu-tai,” whereas China Mainland prefers to use the name 
“Diaoyu-dao”.20 As the Pinyin transliteration predominates in mainland China, 
the PRC writers usually write using simplified characters and the 
Romanization of “Diaoyu dao”. The “Taiwanese” characters are romanized by 
the “Wade Giles”- System and thus the transliteration is “Tiao-yu-tai.” 
                                                 
18 Yudi Jisheng, (History of Famous Geographical Locations in China), Wang Xiangzhi, quoted in 
Suganumu, 42 
19 Yu-His Nieh, “Taiwans Seerechtsansprüche“, in:Werner Draghun, Umstrittene Seegebiete in Ost- 
und Südostasien (1rst ed., 1985), 232 
20 Baidu bailiao, “Diaoyu dao”; http://baike.baidu.com/view/2876.htm, accessed on March 30th, 2007 
   
Depending if someone uses simplified Chinese characters (then: Diaoyu) or 
traditional Chinese characters (then: Tiao Yu T’ai) the transliteration in 
Mandarin language alternates. 21  
 
The origin of the Anglo-Saxon word “Pinnacle Islands” does not date back to 
as long ago. In the year 1843, the British naval vessel “Samarang” explored 
the islands and named them to the “Pinnacle Islands.”22 This word was then 
instrumental for the creation of respective term in Japanese language. 
 
Actually, the English word “Pinnacle” literally means a pointed formation such 
as the “top of a mountain” or “peak”.23 This name only dates back to the year 
1900 when the Japanese explorer Tsune Kuroiwa24 published his experiences 
under the headline “Exploration of the Senkaku Islands25.” Kuroiwa was 
inspired to grant this name to the islands by the British translation of the 
“Pinnacle Group” into Japanese language: “Sento Shoto”.26 “Sento” means 
“sharp point” or “peak”; “Senkaku” means the same as “Sento”. For this 
reason, the name Senkaku also means “sharp point” or “peak”.27  
 
Tablet of all names of the islands and rocks:28 
PRC Name Japanese Name Latitude Longitude 
Islands    
Huangwei Yu Kuba-shima or Kobi Sho 25° 58’ 123° 41’ 
                                                 
21 William b. Heflin,”Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Japan and China Oceans Apart”, Asian-Pacific 
Law & Policy Journal (2000), 1; www.hhawaii.edu/aplpj, accessed on July 15th, 2006; Note: The 
simplified Character system is predominantly applied in the People’s Republic of China, whereas 
traditional Characters are the only ones to be applicable in Taiwan  
22 Han-yi Shaw, ”It’s history and an analysis of the ownership claims of the P.R.C., R.O.C. and Japan”, 
No. 3 Occasional Papers 1999, 95  
23 Steven Wei Su, “The Tiaoyu Islands and Their Possible Effect on the Maritime Boundary 
Delimitation between China and Japan”, Vol. 3 Chinese Journal International Law (2004), 385 
24 Tsune Kuroiwa was actually a teacher of the Okinawa Prefecture Normal School 
25 The report was published in the 12th issue of the Geographic Magazine 
26 Zheng Hailin, Tiao-yu-t’ai lieh yu chih li shih yu fa li yen chiu, (1rst ed., 1998), 276; Japanese 
Militarism& Diaoyutai (Senkaku) Islands – A Japanese Historian’s View, by Kiyoshi Inoue, 
www.skycitygallery.com/Japan/ diaoyuhist.html, accessed on September 15th, 2006 
27 Kojen, Great Dictionary of Ideograms, Shinmura Izuru, (1rst ed., 1998); quoted in Suganuma, 92 
28 Toshio Okuhara, Vol. 15 Japanese Annual of International Law, (1971), 106 
   
Chiwei Yu29 Taisho-jima or Akao-sho 25° 55’ 124° 33’ 
Diaoyu Dao Uotshuri-shima 25° 45’ 123° 29’ 
Beixiao Dao Kita Kojima 25° 45’ 123° 33’ 
Nanxiao Dao Minami Kojima or Minami-ko-shima 25° 44’ 123°34’ 
 
 
 Rocks: 
 PRC name: 
 
 Japanese name 
 Dabeixiao Dao  Okino Kitaiwa 
 Dananxiao Dao  Okino Minamiiwa 
 Feilai Dao  Tobise 
 
 
1.2. Location, topography, geological features and vegetation 
The islands group consists of five uninhabited islands and three barren rocks 
situated in the Eastern Chinese Sea. Their exact position extends from 25°40’ 
to 26°00’ north and 123°25’ to 123°45’ east.30 The Eastern Chinese Sea 
borders to the Yellow Sea (northern) and the South China Sea (southern). 
Altogether, they measure a surface area of only 6.3 sq km31 and Diaoyu dao / 
Uotsuri accounts for 3.6 sq km of the total.32 The islands are situated 
approximately 120 nautical miles (nm) northeast of Taiwan, 200 nautical miles 
east of the Chinese mainland and 200 nm southeast of Okinawa. 
 
                                                 
29 The Chiwei Island is also referred to as the Raleigh Rock 
30 Tao Cheng,”The Sino-Japanese Dispute Over the Tiao-yu-tai (Senkaku) Islands and the Law of 
Territorial Acquisition”, Vol. 14 V.J.I.L. (1973), 221 
31 The equivalent would be 2.2 square miles or 1.4 acres 
32 Draghun, Umstrittene Seegebiete in Ost- und Südostasien (1rst ed., 1985), 85; Renmin wang people, 
“Diaoyu Dao Zhengduan de lai long qu mai” (March 2004) ; 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/papers2836/11730/1057574.html, accessed on March 30th, 2007 
   
 
Source: 
www.globaldefence.net/artikel__analysen/artikel__analysen/senkaku__diaoyu
-inseln_18_34.html (accessed on February 14th, 2007) 
 
The largest island is Diaoyu dao / Uotsuri33 with the most of the islets 
surrounding the largest island. The surface area covers eight ha and is 170 
km distant northeast of Taiwan and 410 km west of Okinawa. Two remote 
islets, Kobi-sho / Huangwei Yu and Akao-sho / Chiwei Yu,34 are 31 km and 
108 km from the (main) Diaoyu / Uotsuri Island.35  
 
The elevations of the islands vary considerably. The highest point of the 
Diaoyu dao / Uotsuri measures 383 meters. In comparison, the barren rock 
Dananxiadao only has an elevation of only 13 meters.36 
 
The islands are geographically part of the Taiwanese continental shelf. The 
sea between Taiwan, China and the islands is no deeper than 200 meters.37 
From Japan’s position, a 2270-meter deep underwater Okinawa Trench 
                                                 
33 “dao“ means “island“ in Mandarin  
34 also referred to as the “Raleigh Rock” 
35  “Senkaku Islands” www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/senkaku.html, accessed on July 15th, 
2006 
36 www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/senkaku.html; accessed on July 15th, 2006; Unryu 
Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations (1rst ed., 2000), 12 
37 The Times- Atlas of the world (7th ed., 1985), 76 
   
separates the islands from the Japanese Okinawa Islands.38 This Okinawa 
Trench is situated in the eastern East Chinese Sea between China and the 
Japanese chain of the Ryukyu/ Liu Qui islands39 south of the large Japanese 
island Kyushu.40  
 
Due to their unremarkable geological features, the islands were “forgotten” in 
people’s minds in the first half of the last century. However, this changed in 
the year 1968 when research undertaken by a multinational (South Korean, 
Chinese and Japanese) joint exploration committee. The committee was 
surveyed under the sponsorship of the United Nations Economic Commission 
for Asia and the Far East (UNECAFE).41 It discovered that the seabed of the 
Eastern Chinese Sea could possibly be one of the richest oil and gas deposits 
in the Asian region.42 Although the discovery took place before the first world 
oil shock in 1973, all coastal states were motivated by a perception that their 
own land based mineral deposits were diminishing at that time.43 The offshore 
reserves are comparably easy to exploit as most areas of the Continental 
Shelf in the Chinese Seas are only 60-80 meters deep. In these shallow 
areas, the sea bottom is flat and stable, which makes it easier for the 
prospectors to anchor drilling rigs.44  
 
All the islands bear scarce vegetation with the only plants being palm trees, 
prickly pear and statice arbuscula, which is a rare herb for the production of 
medicine. According to one source, only two islands provide potable water45 
                                                 
38 Han-yi Shaw, ”Its History and an analysis of the ownership Claims of The P.R.C., R.O.C. and 
Japan”, No. 3 Occasional Papers 1999, 96 
39 all these denominations are possible for the Okinawa islands 
40 The Times- Atlas of the world (7th ed., 1985), 76 
41 Today the name has changed to ”United Nations Economics and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific” (UNESCAP) 
42 Wei-chin Lee, “Troubles under the Water: Sino-Japanese Conflict of Sovereignty on the Continental 
Shelf in the East China Sea”, Vol. 18 Ocean Development & International Law (1987), 586; Mark J. 
Valencia, Yoshihisa Amae, “Regime Building in the East China Sea”, Vol. 34 Ocean Development 
& International Law (2003), 192; David G. Muller, China as a Maritime Power (1rst ed., 1983), 196  
43 Choon-ho Park, China’s Maritime Jurisdiction: The Future of Offshore Oil and Fishing, in: Harrison 
Brown (ed.) China among the Nature of the Pacific, 106 
44 David G. Muller, China as a Maritime Power (1rst ed., 1983), 190 
45 Ying-Jeou Ma, “The East Asian Seabed Controversy Revisited: Relevance ( or Irrelevance) of the 
Tiao Yu Tai (Senkaku) Islands Territorial Dispute”, Vol. 2 Chinese Yearbook of International Law 
and Affairs (1982), 7; Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese 
Relations (1rst ed., 2000), 12 
   
and most sources state that there is no fresh water to be found on any of the 
islands.46 The sea surroundings of the islands have fisheries potential.47 Due 
to recent overfishing the stocks in the East Chinese Sea are suffering 
depletion.48 
 
 
 
Source: http://www.answers.com/topic/senkaku-islands  (accessed on 
February 14th, 2007) 
 
The strategic value of the islands is attributed to their location adjacent to 
important waters: Their ownership confers a) either China its most 
northeastern territory in the East Chinese Sea or b) Japan’s most southwest 
point of the Japanese archipelago. The islands lie close to strategic sea lines 
of communication. Japan’s crude oil imports from the Middle East pass 
through the area49 so the country possessing the islands inevitably gains the 
closest spot to erect installations for aerial surveillance and military 
reconnaissance and the title of sovereignty empowers the owner to spy well 
into the neighbour’s territories. In this context it has to be mentioned that the 
PRC’s navy has undergone a fundamental change from a self-restricted 
                                                 
46 Dietmar Ebert, “Pack die Badehose ein”; www.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/oaw/poa/tea/; accessed on 
January 25th, 2007 
47 Choon-ho Park, ”China’s Maritime Jurisdictions: The Future of Offshore Oil and Fishing”, in 
Harrison Brown (ed.), China among the Nations of the Pacific, 106 
48 David G Muller Jr., China as a maritime Power (1rst ed., 1983), 191 
49 Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, “The U.S. Role in the Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Diaoyu (Senkaku) 
Islands, 1945-1971”, No. 161 China Quarterly (2000), 96 
   
coastal “watch-guard” to a powerful navy in the last twenty years.50 This navy 
was deployed in the Taiwan Strait in 1996. Thus, this strategic outpost creates 
also a military link to the unsettled China / Taiwan question. 
 
1.3. Legal question arising from this dispute 
A pure legal solution to this dispute does not seem very likely. According to 
international law, the contesting states’ prior consent is a prerequisite to the 
initiation of proceedings before an international court or tribunal. Nonetheless, 
it must be acknowledged that several legal questions arise in this dispute. 
Under public international law, the conflict may be subdivided into three major 
categories:  
 
1.) The question of the sovereignty of the islands is to be answered.51  
 
2.) The impact of the acquisition of sovereignty over the islands on the 
adjacent maritime zones in the Eastern Chinese Sea is significant. It may 
allow the successful claimant state to generate new, extended maritime 
zones. This gives rise to the question of in which state’s favour the islands 
may be used to construct a baseline for boundary delimitation. It gives rise to 
a further question whether a littoral state owning an island off its mainland and 
contiguous to its neighbouring state is entitled to set up the baseline for its 
200 miles EEZ boundary either from the mainland or the remote island.52   
 
3.) Having resolved the question of ownership and the entitlement of a 
claimant state to create maritime zones, international law must then focus on 
the means by which disputes over maritime delimitations between 
neighbouring countries may be settled. The East Chinese Sea is less than 
400 nm in width; how must one deal with two opposite states’ 200 nm EEZ 
claims?53 The main framework of international law is called the United Nation 
                                                 
50 You Ji, The Armed Forces of China (1rst ed., 1999), 165 
51 Compare, e.g. Prosper Weil, The Law of Maritime Delimitation – Reflections (1rst ed., 1989) 
52 Guifang Xue, China and International Fishery Law &Policy (1rst ed., 2005), 168; Kim Byung  
    Chin, The Northeastern Asian Continental Shelf Controversy (1rst ed., 1980), 54 
53 Guifang Xue, China and International Fishery Law &Policy (1rst ed., 2005), 167 
   
Convention of the Law of the Sea (1982) and it grants only little guidance for 
the settlement of boundary disputes.54 
 
Today, Japan administers the islands as part of Ishigaki City, Okinawa 
Prefecture. Ishigaki is the middle island of the Sakishima-shoto Islands, which 
are part of the Nansei islands.55 The People’s Republic of China however, 
claims the islands as part of Daxi Village, Toucheng Township, Yilan County, 
Taiwan Province.56 
1.3.1. Domestic Maritime legislation 
The PRC government promulgated a Marine Law in 1992. Art. 2 of the 
Chinese Marine Law, which expressly stated that the Diaoyu islands were part 
of the territory of the People’s Republic of China. Japan has so far not 
enacted any national legislation regarding the Senkaku Islands. Since the 
1970s, it has been Japan’s official stance to deny that there is any 
disagreement about their ownership.57 
1.3.2. Legal Effect on national legislation of the Parties of dispute  
Independent from the question of whether the islets may be considered 
islands in the legal sense under Art.121 (I-III) UNCLOS, the sovereignty over 
the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands entitles the owner to 12 nautical miles of 
territorial sea. Thus, the islands’ ownership could also have an impact on 
ships navigating through the territorial sea of the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands. 
Quite separately, the People’s Republic of China and Japan both established 
a national legislation going beyond the international agreement of UNCLOS 
1982. This is even more surprising taking into account that Japan and China 
                                                 
54 The Territorial Dispute Over Dokdo; www.geocities.com/mlovmo/page4.html, accessed on April the 
28th, 2007 
55 The Time - Atlas of the world (9th ed., 2004), 99, Aktuell 2006, 521 
56 Daniel Dzurek, The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute, 
www.ibru.dur.ac.uk/resources/docs/senkaku.html, accessed on January 15th, 2006 
57 Linus Hagström, Japan’s China Policy, (1rst ed., 2005), 129 
   
are both parties of UNCLOS. Taiwan, although it signed the Convention of the 
Continental Shelf in 1958, is not a signatory of UNCLOS.58 
 
According to Art.17 to 26 UNCLOS all ships are entitled to be granted an 
innocent passage within the 12 nautical miles zone. Pursuant Art.6 (II) 
Chinese Marine Law the PRC demands transiting “foreign ships for military 
purposes” to give prior notification of their entry to the zone.59 Furthermore, 
China asserts the right to maintain special fishery zones and certain military 
zones.60 
 
Correspondingly, Japan claims that the movement of vessels carrying nuclear 
weapons through its territorial sea is not “innocent” in the sense of Art. 17 
UNCLOS.61 Even though none of these conflicting claims infringes “ius 
cogens”62 this internal legislation was considered as being excessive and 
unlawful.63 While ratifying the Convention, other littoral countries such as Italy, 
Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom stated that these claims 
are not covered by any interpretation of UNCLOS. Since it also contradicts the 
customary state practice this national legislation must be regarded as 
incompatible with prevailing international law.64  
 
 
                                                 
58 Toshio Okuhara, “The Territorial Sovereignty Over the Senkaku Islands and Problems on the 
Surrounding Continental Shelf”, Vol. 11 Japan Annual of International Law (1967), 103; William B. 
Heflin, ”Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Japan and China Oceans Apart”, Asian-Pacific Law & 
Policy Journal (2000), 1; www.hhawaii.edu/aplpj, accessed on July 15th, 2006 
59 Art. 6 II of the Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone: “Foreign ships for military 
purposes shall be subject to approval by the government of the People’s Republic of China for 
entering the territorial sea of the People’s Republic of China”; See, e.g.: Jerome Alan Cohen, 
Hungdah Chiu, People’s China and International Law (1rst ed., 1974), 533; Ivan Shearer, ”Military 
Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone: The Case of Aerial Surveillance” Vol. 17 Ocean 
Yearbook (2003), 552  
60 Jeanne Greenfield, China’s Practice in the Law of the Sea (1992), 151, quoted in Jonathan Charney, 
“Central East Asian Maritime Boundaries and the Law of the Sea”, Vol. 89 A.J.I.L. (1995), 743; 
Michael Strupp, Chinas territoriale Ansprüche (1rst ed., 1982), 21; Mark J. Valencia, Yoshihisha 
Amae, “Regime Building in the East China Sea”, Vol. 34 Ocean Development & International Law 
(2003), 199 
61 Tsuneo Akaha, “Internalising International Law: Japan and the Regime of Navigation under the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea”, Vol. 20 Ocean Development .& International Law (1989), 113 
62 Jonathan Charney, “Central East Asian Maritime Boundaries and the Law of the Sea”, Vol. 89 
A.J.I.L. (1995), 744  
63 Zou Keyuan, China’s Maritime Legal System and the Law of the Sea (1rst ed., 2005), 78 
64 Zou Keyuan, China’s Maritime Legal System and the Law of the Sea (1rst ed., 2005), 83 
   
2. Political Implications of the Conflict 
 
“Safety and Certainty in oil lie in variety and variety 
alone”65 
 
2.1. Diaoyu / Senkaku relation to oil  
It is often the case that when a scramble for a territory occurs, the clash is not 
rooted solely in a mere legal disagreement, but stems from various other 
motives. The most important of these other motives are economic gain and 
geopolitical security.66 One of the main reasons the Diaoyutai Islands 
attracted political attention was the discovery of oil and gas. After great 
excitement about the discovery, these resources turned out to be not as 
plentiful as predicted at the beginning of the seventies.67 Additionally, oil price 
slipped to a level below $ 20 US a barrel in the mid-eighties.68 In the eighties, 
oil was of no great international concern, but this has changed significantly 
today:   
 
Before the discovery of oil and gas deposits in the area of the islands all three 
governments had a rather inert attitude towards the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands. 
Today though, there is no denial that the Diaoyu / Senkaku conflict is related 
to the presence oil. The amount of mineral reserves and the ability to export 
energy resources determines every country’s role in world politics. Therefore, 
it is in the interest of all the parties of the dispute to become the actual holder 
of the islands. Once the possession of them is completed, the energy 
resources may be used as a handy bargaining chip in international politics. 
 
                                                 
65 First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill after shifting to power source of the British navy from 
Welsh coal to oil; quoted in: Daniel Yergin, “Ensuring Energy Security”, Vol. 85 Foreign Affairs 
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The price of oil has soared due to the increased demand of China, India and 
the United States of America.69 Crude oil prices are now around $ 95 US per 
barrel. The term “energy securitisation” has been revitalized after having been 
shed by many political academics as oil can more than ever be used as a 
bargaining power in word politics.70 Currently, China imports 37% of its oil 
demand from the Middle East, whereas the rate of Taiwan and Japan still is 
about 80%.71 For these reasons, all parties to the conflict strive for a 
diversification of their energy supplies. The islands and their resources are 
part of each country’s “self-reliance” strategy. The following table indicates the 
annual oil consumption in million of tons.72 
 
 Country 1990 2000 2004 
 China 116.6  219.8 308.6 
 Japan 247.7 255.5 250.5 
 Taiwan 26.8 39.8 41.7 
 U.S.A. 779.0 887.8 927.3 
 India 57.9 98.0 115.3 
 
 
The next table gives an overview about the current proven oil resources in the 
mentioned countries. The quantities are measured in millions of barrels 
capable of being explored in 2005 / 2006.73 
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 Country    Oil resources in 2005 / 2006 
 China 18.260 
 Taiwan 2 
 Japan 29 
 U.S.A. 29.300 
 India 5.900 
 
Today, China’s economic growth is about 10% per year. The PRC is 
nowadays the largest importer of crude oil after the U.S.A.74 Between 2000 
and 2004 its oil consumption rose by 40%.75 By 2020, the estimated 
consumption of the PRC will total more than 500 million tons of oil and over 
100 billion cubic meter of natural gas.76 As the government is not at the mercy 
of the public votes, the Communist government can afford to adopt a more 
lenient or “pragmatic” stance towards oil-exporting autocratic regimes.77 
 
The ongoing development of the PRC to one of the most important economic 
global players is limited by her insufficiency of energy resources. Since the 
majority of the oil deposits are situated in the west78 (Xinjiang Province79), 
there is a mismatch between the location of the primary resources of the 
country and the main centres of demand.80  
 
From the writer’s perspective, the fate of the Chinese Communist Party is 
closely linked to the extent to which the “Asian Tiger” may climb to the level of 
the industrialised economies. Possessing almost no natural resources81 
Japan was up to 89.2% dependent on oil imports from the Middle East. 
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Having given up her $ 2 billion US controlling interest in Iran’s Azadegan oil- 
and gas field due to tensions about the Tehran nuclear program, Japan is 
looking to Russia and African countries as possible suppliers.82 Being the 
strongest ally of the U.S. in Asia and being dependant on their military 
protection in case of regional conflict, the Japanese administration shifted its 
focus to the Russian pipeline currently under construction in the Pacific.83  
 
In the Republic of China (ROC) Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) is gaining 
importance every year. Nevertheless, Taiwan’s main energy resources still 
are oil and coal, which all must be imported. As 37% of the coal resources are 
imported from the Chinese mainland, the transit routes for these all-important 
resources pass by territories claimed by communist China. Being an island in 
the South Chinese Sea Taiwan is particularly vulnerable to maritime 
blockades.84  
 
2.2. Diaoyu Islands as a symbol for Sino-Japanese relations 
2.2.1. Diaoyu / Senkaku island as a proxy conflict 
Notwithstanding the importance of the natural resources, the dispute must not 
be regarded as merely conflict about oil. There is far more behind the scene 
than the question as to which of the contesting states the Diaoyu / Senkaku 
islands belong. The conflict also serves as a useful diversion for governmental 
failure in the domestic area. In the past foreign behaviour was primarily 
influenced by domestic dynamics.85   
 
Something, which cannot be underestimated, is that the conflict is a vehicle 
for Chinese and Japanese nationalism. All countries have steadily used the 
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Diaoyutai / Senkaku conflict as a symbol to express their national pride.86 The 
emergence of nationalistic movements and the question of legitimacy are 
closely related to each other.87 For the leaders of each state such a proxy 
conflict may be embraced as it is a handy device to channel or escalate 
national emotions.   
2.2.2. Historical rise of nationalism in the countries 
The present dispute cannot be understood without acknowledging the political 
and historical experiences of the three countries involved. Doing this over 60 
years after WW II it has to be recalled that historical disputes are distorted by 
many persuasive publications, which have been written from a rather 
subjective point of view.   
 
 
Source: http://www.american.edu/projects/mandala/TED/ice/DIAOYU.HTM 
(accessed on February 14th, 2007) 
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2.2.3. Chinese Nationalism 
In the Middle Ages China was the dominating power in Asia. The territory of 
today’s Korea and Japan once were an integral part of China.88 Unlike 
Western powers, the Middle Kingdom never sought to overthrow or colonize 
other territories; instead, as early as in the Han Dynasty (206 B.C. – 220 A.D.) 
the Chinese erected a system of tributary states. These tributary states owed 
political submission to the Chinese emperors in exchange for material 
rewards.89 During that time the Diaoyu Islands belonged to the Ryukyu 
Kingdom, which had been such a tributary state to the Chinese emperor since 
1372.90 
 
In the Song Dynasty (960 –1279) the Chinese government dispatched navy 
vessels into the South China Sea to patrol around the Paracel Islands.91 
Afterwards the Chinese state did not display interest in subduing other states. 
This prohibition was reinforced by the “forbidden to the sea” policy in the 18th 
century when the Chinese were not allowed to go to sea and potential 
perpetrators were deterred by the death penalty.92     
 
China’s Age of Humiliation until WW I 
A proverb of the famous Chinese philosopher Confucius was proven wrong 
when imperial China was deemed as a “grab what you can” country by 
Western powers. Contrary to their own understanding of treatment of other 
countries, the Chinese were appalled to witness the humiliating acts 
committed by Western powers on their own territories.93 The first degrading 
and victimizing experience with Western powers was the Opium War in 1842. 
After having refuted the influx of further Opium traded by the British East India 
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Company, the British declared war on China. The British expeditionary force 
outpaced the combat strength of the Chinese.94  
 
In 1895, after Japan’s military victory in the Sino-Japanese War, the Chinese 
were forced to cede Taiwan and recognize Korea as an independent 
country.95 In the aftermath of this treaty, China had to renounce its 
sovereignty over the Liaodong peninsula where Russia was taking over this 
region.96 
 
In 1900, the Boxer rebellion aimed to overthrow the Qing Dynasty and to 
expel the barbarians by slaughtering thousands of Chinese Christians. The 
final humiliation was the Boxer Protocol which required the Chinese to pay  a 
compensation97 of 67 million pounds of Sterling.98 
 
The year 1911 was a milestone in China’s history. In the course of the Xinhai 
Revolution, the feudal System was formally abrogated. This happened after 
the fall of the Qing Dynasty and the dynasty was replaced by the Republic of 
China.99 On August 14th, 1917, The Beijing government declared war on 
Germany joining the allied forces in World War I. Despite this assistance the 
former German concession Shantung peninsula (Qingdao), Tianjin and 
Hankou were not reverted to Chinese sovereignty. Instead, the territories 
remained under Japanese control.100 As a result, the Chinese delegation at 
the Treaty of Versailles refused to sign in 1919 because the Chinese public 
                                                 
94 This treaty is considered as the first unequal treaty in the history of China; as a result of he war, 
Hong Kong island was ceded indefinitely to the British, the Chinese had to pay a war reparation of 
21 million Silver Dollars and had to grant exterritorial rights to foreigner; see John S Gregory, The 
West and China since 1500 (1rst ed., 2003), 76-87; Richard Hooker, Opium War (1996), 
www.wsu.edu/*dee/Ching/opium/html, accessed on March 22nd, 2007 
95 Hans C. Jakob, Reisen und Bürgertum (1rst ed., 1995), 80  
96 Ibid 
97 The incessant reparations impact were a considerable depreciation of the Chinese currency: The price 
silver plunged whereas the US $ soared- the Chinese exports had less buying power – as a result the 
Chinese economy disintegrated even more. The payments to the victor Japan represented three 
times the state’s annual revenues; compare: Jacques Gernet, A History of Chinese Civilisation (1rst 
ed., 1972), 609 
98 Dick Wilson, China - The big Tiger – A Nation awakes (1rst ed., 1996), 12  
99 Xiao Bin Ji, Facts about China (1rst ed., 2003), 470 
100 Stephen G. Craft, “John Bassett Moore, Robert Lansing, and the Shandong Question” Vol. 66 
Pacific Historical Review (1997), 239 
   
regarded the Treaty as a betrayal.101 The Shantung issue triggered a great 
wave of anti-imperialist and anti-warlord nationalism, which ended in 1919 
with the May 4th incident.102  
 
In 1937, after having occupied Manchuria in 1931 Japan attached eastern 
China causing an enormous disruption.103 It was the time, when China 
suffered more than 200,000 civilian casualties and mass executions of 
prisoners of war.104 After the eight years of conquest, Japan was forced to 
surrender at the end of World War II and semi-colonial China was returned to 
the Chinese people. As in Germany the punishment of the Japanese war 
criminals could not match the sins and atrocities they had committed.105  
 
Popular Chinese nationalism may be traced back to the Chinese humiliation 
complex left by these historic experiences.106 Their ancestors suffering during 
the unlawful dominance of foreign intruding powers is deeply engraved in 
Chinese minds. Former victims equate sovereignty with the recovery of all that 
they had to cede to invading imperialistic powers. After the WW II China was 
able to restore its sovereignty and after having witnessed how their claims 
were cast down in the course of international treaty negotiations the country 
became highly conscious about its new status and willingness to maintain the 
status-quo.107 As a result, the PRC cannot afford any conciliatory stance since 
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this would equate to a “political suicide” in the light of the public’s ardent wish 
to restore the territorial integrity of the country.108 
 
From this perspective it is understandable that territorial questions are 
handled with “sensitive care” – especially if one country (Japan) as a former 
imperial power is involved. Today, the political leaders’ appeals to nationalistic 
ideas should no longer be considered in an anti-imperialistic context, but in 
means to consolidate the regime’s legitimacy as a soft power.109 In such a 
context, the Diaoyu conflict can be useful for Chinese leaders as the rivalry 
about the Diaoyu islands is simply a replay in miniature of China’s wartime 
humiliation.110  
 
In the past twenty years, China has undergone tremendous development from 
an agrarian developing country to a state with an unprecedented economic 
outlook. The disjuncture between the ideological communist idea and 
economic reality in the PRC is more apparent today than ever. Given that the 
Chinese leaders are the inheritors of an ideology that has lost most of its 
appeal the Chinese populace feels alienated from its government.111 The 
CCP’s central problem is to run the tightly controlled system in concert with an 
open-economy while ensuring that the opening process does not cause any 
spill - over effects on the political sector.112 
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For example; China is – even in comparison with other developing countries - 
one of the countries with the most unequal salary level113; low paid migrant 
workers (“waidiren”) often unsuccessfully claim their wages and the 
unemployment rate (more than 230 million) is much higher than in the official 
statistics.114 Corruption is wide - spread115 and administrative confiscation 
regularly occurs without compensation.116 Social unrest may be regarded as 
the biggest threat to the Chinese government.117 Evading questions of its own 
legitimacy by putting the blame on enemies abroad remains an unstable 
“recipe” for the Chinese leaders. In order to forestall any riots the staking of 
claims on islands and making this well known to the public is used for 
sustaining the national integration of the PRC.118  
 
As Chinese nationalism is at the same level a “lubrication apparatus” to 
maintain stable governance and popular Chinese nationalism will, without any 
doubt, shorten the scope of choices faced by Chinese politicians. As losing 
face is deeply entrenched in Asian mentality, the “dual use” of this conflict 
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puts further burden on its solution because all parties will unyieldingly defend 
their positions.119  
2.2.4. Japan’s Nationalism 
Japanese Nationalism is not primarily a veneration of the glorious past, but 
rather a response to what it perceives as a shift of power in the East Asian 
hemisphere. The former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi made a habit of 
paying homage to WW II war criminals by visiting the Yasukuni Shrine.120 
Japan’s Ministry of Education approved a school textbook121 that euphemises 
and downplays the war atrocities committed by the Japanese.122 The 
Japanese Diet passed a law giving official legal status to the country’s de-
facto national flag and the “Kimigayo” national anthem in 1999. Both are 
regarded as emperor worshiping and Japanese militarism of the past.123  
 
The Japanese actions towards the Senkaku Islands must be seen in the 
context of the emergence of China as an economic and military giant. Over 
the last 16 years, the struggling Japanese economy has had a profound 
psychological effect on its citizens.124 Although it has excellent trade relations 
(a 17% rise in 2004), it is foreseeable that China will replace Japan as the 
most powerful regional state.125 China - blaming has become a winning factor 
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in Japan’s domestic politics.126 Lacking “soft power” in the region and being 
dependant on the U.S. in terms of military protection, Japan has to be careful 
about not to be marginalized in the region.127 Japan’s vulnerability and 
subordination to the U.S. needs a “theatre” of nationalism, which is shown by 
the reprisal of nationalism, which denies the debasing truth of the loss of 
power in substance. Therefore it must be celebrated in rituals and in 
symbols.128   
2.2.5. Taiwanese Nationalism 
The Taiwanese claim to the Tiao-yu-tai Islands129 correlates with their 
contention of Taiwan of being the legal representative of the Chinese people. 
For the Taiwanese, laying claim to the Tiao-yu-tai as their own territory could 
effect their formal independence. If an international court were to award the 
islands to Taiwan, this verdict would imply a further recognition of the 
Republic of China (ROC).130  
 
Today, it has been argued that the status of Taiwan is not about right and 
wrong in international law, but about pragmatism is politics.131 After the U.S. 
modified their China policy in 1971-72 Taiwan lost its seat in the United 
Nations.132 Today, Taiwan maintains diplomatic relations with only 25 
countries and thus receives little international recognition. This recognition is 
mainly based on a “dollar diplomacy”, a policy whereby Taiwan buys 
diplomatic relations.133 Only 48 countries have established representative 
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offices in Taipei.134 Legally speaking, Taiwan is today a self-governing 
dominion under the benign of the military occupier U.S.A.. A Taiwanese nation 
does not yet fully exist.135   
 
The President regularly hints at a declaration of independence, which causes 
severe threats from China mainland.136 Taking into account the common 
standards to be applied for probing the independence of a state (such as 
territory, population, government, capacity to enter in relation with other 
states) it must be concluded that Taiwan is not legally an independent state 
and “owns” only de-facto Taiwan and some offshore islands.137 Interestingly, 
Taiwan has not yet claimed its own statehood (declaration of independence) 
and declared that it would actually secede from China. In 1991, the ROC 
recognized mainland China authorities as a “political entity”.138 Although being 
aware of their common roots with the Chinese mainland, today more and 
more Taiwanese people consider themselves as Taiwanese rather than 
Chinese.139  
 
The two Chinas do not grant international recognition to each other. Dealing 
with Taiwan, the Chinese press continuously refers to the Taiwan as the 
“Taiwan province” to make clear that they regard the ROC as a renegade 
island belonging to mainland China.140 As a result, a peaceful settlement of 
the Diaoyu question with participation of the ROC and the PRC has 
realistically to be ruled out until the Taiwan question is finally resolved. A 
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Fen, “Crisis Deferred: An Operational Code Analysis of Chinese Leaders Across The Strait”, in: 
Mark Schafer, Stephen G. Walker (ed.), Beliefs and Leadership in World Politics (1rst ed., 2006), 
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137 Von Glahn, Law Among Nations (7th ed., 1996), 311 
138 Sheng-tsung Yang, “The Right to Participate in the United Nations“, in: Jean-Marie Henckaerts 
(ed.), The International Status of Taiwan in the New World Order (1rst ed., 1996), 127 
139 Andrew Perrin, “What Taiwan wants”, Time (8.3.2004), 
www.time.com/time/printout//0,8816,501040315-598584,00.html ; accessed on March 7th, 2007; 
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Davison, “A Short History of Taiwan–A Case for Independence”, (1rst ed., 2003), 126 
140 The author relies on his own experiences while reading Chinese periodicals 
   
solution could be achieved through a bilateral treaty. Signing such a treaty 
usually implies the recognition of the other partner as a state. Even tough is it 
possible to sign a bilateral agreement without causing an implicit recognition 
of the partner141, the issue is too much about the politics that the PRC will 
consider Taiwan as an equal treaty partner. The current status positions 
(reunification for Beijing and “independence” for Taiwan) do not seem to be 
approachable to each other so at the moment a potential political relaxation 
between the two “Chinas” appears too far-fetched.142 The Taiwan question is 
“hovering” like the Sword of Damocles over the Tiao-yu-tai islands’ dispute.  
 
2.3. Impact on disputes over other islands 
It cannot be ignored that the Diaoyu / Senkaku islands are not the only 
unsettled territorial conflicts that the parties are faced with. If one claimant 
concedes the legal ownership of the islands, this will have an effect on the 
ensuing maritime disputes as well. In dealing with the Diaoyu / Senkaku  issue 
the littoral states are afraid that they might establish a (legal) precedent, which 
could affect other territorial claims: 
2.3.1. Okinotorishima 
The Okinotorishima islets / Coral reefs lie about 1800 km from Tokyo and 
represent Japan’s most remote territory. Typhoons and global warming are a 
menace to the existence of three islets and at high water level, the islets are 
no more than 20 cm above water.143 Their total minute landmass is measuring 
about 10 sq m.144 
 
                                                 
141 Malcom N. Shaw, International Law (5th ed., 2003) 386; see: with special focus to the special 
positions between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Democratic Republic of Germany 
142 Kenneth Lieberthal, “Preventing a War Over Taiwan”, Vol. 84 Foreign Affairs (2005), 61; Zhang 
Changtai, “Les defies strategiques de la Chine”, No. 1 Défense nationale (2006), 65; Dennis Van 
Vranken Hickey, Foreign Policy Making in Taiwan (1rst ed., 2007), 115  
143 www.answers.com/topic/okinotorishima, accessed on January 20th, 2007 
144 BBC News, 15.06.2007; www.news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/hi/asia-pacific/6758271.stm, accessed on 
17th, June, 2007 
   
 
 
Source: http://www.answers.com/topic/okinotorishima  (accessed on February 
14th, 2007) 
 
Japan puts forward that Okinotorishima consists of islands. This status entitles 
Japan to expand its maritime territory to about 430,000 sq km.145 China does 
not call into question Japan’s ownership, but stresses that the legal 
qualification of the barren rock, which cannot sustain human life as islands do 
not comply with the definition by the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea.146 
                                                 
145 Ibid 
146 “Senkaku Islands”www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/senkaku.htm, accessed on August 
15th, 2006; BBC News, 15.06.2007; www.news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/hi/asia-pacific/6758271.stm, 
accessed on June 17th, 2007 
 
   
2.3.2. Kurile Islands Dispute 
 
 
Source: http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurilenkonflikt, accessed on August 16th, 
2007 
 
 
Russia as the “successor” of the former Soviet Union and Japan are arguing 
about the ownership of the islands Habomai, Shikotan, Kunarshiri and 
Etorofu. The U.S.S.R. snatched the islands a couple of days before the 
Japanese final surrender (in August 1945) breaching a neutrality pact signed 
in 1941.147 Due to the Kurile Islands dispute Japan and Russia have never 
signed a peace treaty and still are technically at war.148 The Soviet Union did 
not sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1952 because other allied 
countries were reluctant to include these islands and the southern half of 
Sakhalin into the treaty.149  
                                                 
147 The Kurile Islands Dispute, www.american.edu/projects/mandala/TED/ice/kurile.htm, accessed on 
February the 10th, 207; Ernesto de la Guardia, “La Question des iles Kouriles”, Vol. 37 Annuaire 
Francais De Droit International (1991), 407 
148 David A. Welch, Painful Choices (1rst ed., 2005), 95 
149 Robert E. Ward, “The Legacy of Occupation”, in: Herbert Passin (ed.), The United States and Japan 
(2nd ed., 1975), 35 
   
2.3.3. Takeshima / Dokdo / Liancourt Rocks Islands 
In 1905, Korea and Japan both formally incorporated the Takeshima / Dokdo 
islands into their territory. The two little 0.23 sq km150 uninhabited islets lie 
midway between the landmasses of Japan and Korea.151  
 
 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liancourt_Rocks, accessed on July, 20th, 
2007 
 
The two islets are both rocks that are the remainder of a volcanic crater and 
today serve  as a birds refuge. Dokdo / Takeshima islets are situated about 90 
km off the South-Korean island Ullung and about 157 km northwest of Japan’s 
Oki Island. In the course of the islands dispute a maritime sea space area of 
16,600 square nautical miles is at stake. Since the Korean War South Korea 
is administering the islands on the grounds of the so-called “Rhee line” of 
1952 (boundary line between Japan and South Korea) encompassing the 
Dokdo / Takeshima Islands.152 Originally, South Korea considered the islands 
to be rocks, but then shifted its position and claimed that they were islands.153 
In 1954, Japan suggested to seek a final solution before the International 
                                                 
150 This is comparable to the size of Tokyo’s Hibiya Park 
151 Serita Kentaro, “The Takeshima Dispute: A Radical Proposal”; Vol. 31 Japan Echo (2007), 32; 
Douglas M. Johnston, Mark J. Valencia, Pacific Ocean Boundary Problems – Status and Solutions 
(1rst ed., 1991) 113 
152 “The Territorial Dispute Over Dokdo”, www.geocities.com/mlovmo/page4.html, accessed on April 
28th, 2007 
153 Serita Kentaro, “The Takeshima Dispute: A Radical Proposal” Vol. 34 Japan Echo (2007), 32  
   
Court of Justice, which was declined by South Korea. Japan has always 
interpreted exposed rocks in the middle of the Sea of Japan as islands.  
2.3.4. Torishima / Danjo Gunto 
The Torishima / Danjo Gunto154 islands are two isolated and separate clusters 
situated in the north East Chinese Sea. These islands lie close to Japan’s 
most southern main island Kyushu and are far closer to Japan than to South 
Korea.155 Randomly because of their location, they are separated from the 
main Japanese archipelago by the Okinawa trough.156 In contrast to 
Takeshima / Tokdo conflict, the Republic of South Korea does not call into 
question Japan’s ownership of the Danjo Gunto Islands. South Korea adopts 
the view of denying any legal significance to the islands. Since the islands lie 
on the Korean continental shelf, the islands are discounted for marking the 
EEZ boundary.157 In this (unique) case, the parties are divided only about the 
legal significance arising from the islands’ ownership.158   
2.3.5. Spratly– Paracel- Pratas- Macclesfield Islands / Reefs  
These islands and reefs are all situated in the South Eastern Chinese Sea. 
The islands are rich in natural resources and thus of a high strategic value as 
they – unequivocally stated by all claimants- are islands, which engender an 
EEZ. Japan is not party of any of the conflicts affecting theses islands; in this 
case, China and Taiwan are in dispute with the Philippines, Indonesia, 
Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei.159  
                                                 
154 Another name is “Marcus Island“ 
155 Choon-Ho Park, ”Oil Under Troubled Waters: The Northeast Asia Sea-Bed Controversy”, Vol. 14 
Harvard International Law Journal (1973), 239 
156 Jon M. van Dyke, “The Republic of Korea’s Maritime Boundaries“ (2002); 
www.hawaii.edu/elp/publications/faculty/theRepublicofKorea.doc , accessed on March 12th, 2007 
157 Y.H. Nieh, “Der Streit Um Die Klippeninseln Tiaoyütai Und Das Problem Des Festlandsockels Im 
Ostchinesischen Meer“, Vol. 4 Verfassung in Übersee (1971), 449 
158 Mark J. Valencia, „Ways forward East China Sea Dispute“ (22.9.06), 
www.isn.ethz.ch/news/se/details.cfm?ID=16699 , accessed on March 12th., 2007 
159 Hans Scheerer, Patrick Raszelenberg, China, Vietnam and die Gebietsansprüche im 
Südchinesischen Meer (1rst ed., 2002), 51; Guiqing Wang, Territoriale Streitfragen im 
Südchinesischen Meer (1rst ed., 2005), 17 onward 
   
 
Source: http://www.asiaquarterly.com/content/view/160/, accessed on August 
16th, 2006 
 
2.4. Mutual Economic Dependence   
Despite the range of all the various factors underlying the dispute over the 
Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands the economic interdependence of the claimants 
should not be underestimated: the claimants particularly fear a deterioration of 
their bilateral (trade) relations. These mutual economic networks probably 
represent the biggest incentive for each of the governments to step back from 
any escalation of the dispute.   
2.4.1. Taiwan – Chinese / mainland trade relation 
Although all the claimants are WTO-members in the most rapidly growing 
economic region in the world, the countries cannot even deploy military forces 
without harming their own economy. In 1996, due to the Chinese / Chinese 
political tensions involving U.S. deployment, the Taiwanese stock market 
   
declined by 27%.160 Despite certain Taiwanese trade restrictions e.g., no 
export of high technology allowed161 and no regular direct flight 
connections162 available Taiwan has to realise that Taiwan needs China more 
than the “mainlanders” need Taiwan.163  
                                                
 
The PRC is not only the number one recipient of foreign direct investments 
worldwide making it the working bench of the globe, but also an expanding 
market for Taiwanese made products. Between 1990 and 2005, Taiwanese 
entrepreneurs had invested more than $100 billion US in the “Middle 
Kingdom”. The export surplus of Taiwan vis-à-vis the PRC is US $ 75 Billion in 
favour of the Taiwanese Island.164 Since the relaxation of cross strait 
investments in 1991 Taiwan has invested 53% of its total foreign investment 
expenditure in China mainland amounting to a sum of 47 billion US $ up to 
2005.165 Taiwan sold 37% (2004) of their exports to their cross-straight 
partner.  
2.4.2. Japan – China / Mainland trade relation  
After a long period of recession, the Japanese economy has managed a 
respectable recovery.166 China’s stake in Japan’s trade volume surpasses the 
 
160 William T. Tow, “US Strategic Capacities and Coercive Options”, 173, in Greg Austin, Missile 
Diplomacy and Taiwan’s Future: Innovations in Politics and Military Power (1rst ed., 1997); Robert 
S Ross, “Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing in East 
Asia”, No. 3 Security Studies (2006)  
161 “WTO says China’s biggest trade deficit is with Taiwan”, Taipei Times (20.3.2006); 
www.taipeitimes.com/NEWS/biz/archives/2006/03/20/2003298344/print, accessed on March 14th, 
2007 
      Note: this has been liberalized; Taiwan has now liberalised the investment legislation: See: 
“Taiwan liberalisiert Barrieren für Investitionen in der VR China” (2.8.06), 
www.china9.denewsticker/taiwan-liberalisiet-barrieren-fur-investitionen-in-vr-china.htm, accessed 
on March 12th, 2007  
162 flights go via Hong Kong or via Macau; Note: The freight has to bypass these cities, too. It is the 
Taiwanese side which imposes theses restriction due to security reasons 
163 Ralph N. Clough, “Growing Cross-Strait Cooperation Despite Political Impasse”, in Donald S. 
Zagoria, “Breaking the China Taiwan Impasse”, 132; Günther Schubert, “Wie viel Chinahandel ist 
gesund?” (2001), www.liberary.fes.de/fulltext/stabsabteilung/00917.htm#E283E4; accessed on 
March 12th, 2007  
164 Roland Rohde, ”Die ehemalige britische Kronkolonie bildet einen wichtigen Brückenkopf” (2007), 
Beilage des “Parlaments“ - “Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte“, 
www.bundestag.de/cgibin/druck.pl?N=parlament , accessed on March 12th, 2007 
165 Taiwanese Bureau of Foreign Trade, Taiwan yearbook 2006 (1rst ed., 2006), 126 
166 Although the current economic boost does so far not affect the unemployment rate of 5,3% 
   
20% margin,167 whereas China accounts for 13% of Japan’s total exports 
(approximately: $100 billion US in 2004).168 For the first time since WW II 
China – including Hong Kong – has become Japan’s biggest trading partner 
surpassing the United States.169 In 2004, Japan invested around $6 billion US 
in Mainland China.170 The Japanese Yen spiralling down in the recent years 
has been favoured by the fact that China and Japan are typically 
complementary developing and developed countries respectively.171  
2.4.3. Taiwanese / Japanese Trade relation 
The Japanese colonized the Taiwanese Island from 1895 to 1945; even 
today, those two countries are not only geographically, but also economicly 
intertwined.172 Taiwan and Japan’s trade relations totalled $60 billion US in 
2005 facing unbalanced trade relations. In 2005, Taiwan’s economy was 
lagging behind and daunted by a rough $20 billion US trade deficit. Moreover, 
the Japanese only invested some $825 million US in Taiwan.173  
 
2.5. U.S. interests in the dispute 
Japan is an unsinkable U.S. aircraft carrier in Asia Pacific and question 
concerning its territorial sovereignty is of considerable strategic interest. 
Under Art. 6 of the Japanese Mutual Defence Treaty of 1955, both the U.S. 
and Japan agree to equate a military attack against the Japanese island with 
an attack against its own domestic ground. 
                                                 
167 J. Sean Curtin, “China-Japan flames scald business”, Asia Times (19.5.2005), www. 
atimes.com/atimes/Japan/GD19Dh03html accessed on March the 14th, 2007 
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www.taipeitimes.com/News/worldbiz/archives/2005/01/27/2003221171, accessed on March 14th, 
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170 Wirtschaft in Japan, Deutsche Botschaft Tokyo www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/diplo/de/Laenderinformation/Japan/Wirtschaft/html , accessed on March 15th, 2007 
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www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2005/07/14/2003263479/print, accessed July 23rd, 
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Information of the Japanese government: www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/taiwan/index.html, 
accessed on May 4th, 2007 
   
 
“The United States and Japan recognize that an armed attack against either 
party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous 
to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the 
common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and 
processes.”174  
 
The Japan-U.S. security alliance refers to the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands as 
well. Because the U.S. adopts a neutral stance to whom the islands belong, it 
is questionable if the U.S. would grant military assistance to Japan in the case 
of a bellicose confrontation. The American diplomat and former Ambassador 
to Japan Walter F. Mondale stated in 1996 though that the U.S. would not be 
“automatically committed to defend the islands in case of an emergency.175 
According to an American think tank, the U.S. has an interest in keeping the 
conflict alive. The islands make Japan drift closer to America.176   
 
My Conclusion: In fact, the ongoing deepening of mutual economic ties 
implies that the price of a military conflict is rising every day. All of the 
governments utter their rhetoric for various domestic, historical and political 
reasons. Nevertheless, the risk of a military conflict has to be regarded as too 
unpredictable as well as being capable of destabilizing the entire region. 
Given that economic interdependence outweighs the risks of any military 
action, no party in the conflict adopts conspicuous or belligerent behaviour. It 
does not appear that the contesting states are motivated solely by their greed 
for oil, but they are interested in keeping the conflict at a low, diplomatic and 
non-military level. Given that the power in the region is incrementally shifting 
from the “allied” U.S. - / Taiwanese- / Japanese - axis to the PRC, the time is 
undoubtedly running in favour of the Communist regime…  
                                                 
174 quoted in: Han-yi Shaw, ”Its History and an analysis of the ownership Claims of The P.R.C., R.O.C. 
and Japan”, No. 3 Occasional Papers (1999), 125 
175 International Boundary Consultants (15.8.1998), www.boundaries.com/US-Asia.htm, accessed on 
July 16th, 2006 
176 O’Hanlon, Michael; Mochizuki, Mike (21.5.2005): “Calming the Japan-China Rift”, The Brooking 
Institution, quoted in Maren Becker, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Washington., 
www.kas.de/db_files/dokumente/7_dkumente_dok_pdf_6791_1.pdf, accessed on February 20th, 
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3. History of the Conflict from 1372 to today 
Most historians who wrote about the islands tend to interpret the historical 
“truth” in their country’s favour.177 In analysing the literature it is undeniable 
that some commentators deviate from a strictly legal interpretation of the 
conflict by mixing the historical truth with their own political convictions. Very 
few Chinese or Japanese scholars cover the question of sovereignty from a 
neutral stance. Most of them argue tendentiously why their country enjoys 
sovereignty over the islands.  
 
3.1. Missions of the Ming Dynasty to the Ryukyu178 
       Kingdom 
The Chinese and Taiwanese claims on the Diaoyu Islands are mainly 
historically - based. As early as 1372 during the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644),179 
the Chinese emperor initiated tributary relations with the Ryukyu kingdom 
whose reign extended from Amami to the Yaeyama islands.180 The Ryukyu 
kingdom maintained these relations with China throughout the Ming and Qing 
eras.181 At that time, every time the investiture of a new king occurred, the 
heir to the throne had to pledge loyalty and await the imperial’s consent. The 
kingdom adopted Confucianism, Chinese classical language and Chinese folk 
music.182 Despite being compelled to pay monetary tributes the kingdom’s 
position as a trading centre and as a bridge to various kingdoms paid off these 
                                                 
177 An appraisable exception own nation loving history interpretation is the late Japanese History 
Professor of Kyoto University who advocates the Senkakus to China: Kiyoshi Inoue, “Japanese 
Militarism & Diaoyutai (Senkaku) Island – A Japanese Historian’s View”, 
www.skycitygallery.com/japan/diaohist.html, accessed on December 7th, 2006 
178 The Chinese name is: Liuqiu kingdom 
179 K. R. Dark, The Wave Of Time (1rst ed., 1998), 205 
180 Yaeyama island is the most southern island of the Okinawa chain being the nearest island to the 
Senkaku Islands 
181 ”Early History of the Ryukyu Kingdom and it’s Relationship with China and Japan”, 
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No. 1084 Academia Sinica Weekly (24.8.2004) ; www.japanfocus.org/products/topdf/2258, 
accessed on March 14th, 2007 
   
feudal obligations.183 The last Ryukyu was dispatched to the Middle Kingdom 
in the year 1874; five years later Japan formally annexed the islands.184 From 
this point of time, the Ryukyu Kingdom paid tribute to China’s emperor as well 
as to Japan’s Tenno.185  
 
During the 500 year (1372-1879) reign over the Ryukyu the Chinese emperors 
dispatched some twenty-four investiture missions to the vassal state. Once 
the missions was completed, the envoys shared their knowledge in written 
reports to the Chinese Emperor. The Chinese reports dealt with the itinerary – 
named the “compass route”-, which the imperial navigators used. The routes’ 
departure location was Foochow in Fukien Province to Naha, which was 
Ryukyu’s capital at that time. These documents were just as useful devices for 
the navigators as beacons and lighthouses would have been. Using Mandarin 
language the travel records provided instructions to determine the vessel’s 
position. All these documents were stored in the government’s archives.186 
The following records were conserved:  
3.1.1. Chen Kan Mission in 1532 
The first imperial envoy was Yang Zai in the year 1372. Before the mission of 
Chen Kan in 1532,187 a total of ten imperial envoys had been dispatched to 
the Ryukyu Kingdom. Due to a fire in the Fujian archives, those records have 
been lost making the data of Chen Khan the oldest still in existence.188 
Nevertheless, it may be presumed that his voyage was taking the same route 
                                                 
183 “Ryukyu kingdom”, www.answers.com/topic/ry-ky-kingdom, accessed on March 13th, 2007; Ta-
Tuan Ch’en, “Investiture of Liu-Ch’iu Kings in the Ch’ing Period”, in: John K. Fairbanks, The 
Chinese World Order (1rst ed., 1968), 136 
184 China also established tributary relationships with Korea, Nepal, Sikkim, Assam, Burma, Andaman 
Islands, Malaya, Singapore, Thailand, French Indochina, Sulu Archipelago of the Philippines, 
Sakhalin Island; see: Greg Austin, China’s Ocean Frontiers (1rst ed., 1998), 14 
185 www.answers.com/topic/ry-ky-kingdom, accessed on March 13th, 2007; Ta-Tuan Ch’en, 
“Investiture of Liu-Ch’iu Kings in the Ch’ing Period”, in John K. Fairbanks, The Chinese World 
Order (1rst ed., 1968), 136 
186 Tao Cheng, “The Sino-Japanese Dispute Over the Tiao-yu-tai (Senkaku) Islands and the Law of 
Territorial Acquisition”, Vol. 14 V.J.I.L. (1974), 254 
187 Other sources date this mission in the year 1534: see: Baidu bailiao, “Diaoyu dao“, 
http://baike.baidu.com/view/2876.htm, accessed on March 30th, 2007 
188 Kiyoshi Inoue, ”Japanese Militarism & Diaoyutai (Senkaku) Island – A Japanese Historian’s view”, 
www.skygallery.com/japan/diaohist.html, accessed on December 7th, 2006 
   
to the vassal state as all of the previous missions had done. Chen Kan wrote 
in his diary: 
 
“We sailed past Pingjia Mountain, then Diaoyu Island, 
Huangwei Island and Chiwei Island, using only one day to 
cover a distance which normally required three days. Kume 
Hill189, which belongs to the Ryukyu (naishu Liuqiu zhe) 
appeared on the evening of the eleventh day…”190 
 
 
Of note is the fact that at that time Chen Kan already used the name “Diaoyu 
Yu”. Most importantly, it was stated in the records that Kume Hill was under 
the rule of the Ryukyu Kingdom. Kume Hill was the closest Ryukyu Mountain 
to the most eastern Chiwei Island being situated only 40 nm west of it. As 
Chen Kan was departing from Foochow (today: Fuzhou), this provides a hint 
that the Diaoyu Islands were not acknowledged to belong to the Ryukyu 
Kingdom.191 In reverse, it means that the boundary at that time lay between 
Kume Hill and the Diaoyu Islands and that the Diaoyu Islands were 
considered to be on the Chinese side.  
3.1.2. Kuo Ju Lin Mission in 1561 
After the death of another king of the Ryukyu Kingdom, Kuo Ju Lin was 
appointed to undertake an investiture mission to the vassal state. Into his 
records, he made the following statement:   
 
                                                 
189 Actually, he confused the Kume Hill with Yebi Mountain. Calling it in the records erroneously 
Yemi Mountain (boundary between Japan and the Liuqiu Kingdom) he lost his way to Naha; see: 
Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relation (1rst ed., 
2000), 54 
190 Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lun Diaoyu Zhuquan de guishu (Considering to whom belong 
the Diaoyu), handed out to the author on July 15th, 2006 by the Chinese embassy in New Delhi ; 
Chen Kan, ”Shi liuqiu Lu (The Record of the Mission to the Liuqiu Kingdom)“ (1970-reprint), 11, 
14  
191 Kiyoshi Inoue, ”Japanese Militarism & Diaoyutai (Senkaku) Island – A Japanese Historian’s view”, 
www.skygallery.com/japan/diaohist.html, accessed on December 7th, 2006 
   
“Chiyu zhe, jie Liuqiu difang shan ye / This is Chiwei 
Island, where there is the boundary with the Liuqiu 
Kingdom”192 
 
This statement can be regarded as a repetition of what Chen Kan wrote down 
29 years ago. The area beyond Kume Hill was Ryukyu’s territory, whereas the 
Diaoyu - including Chiwei – were part of China.193 Suganuma states that the 
word “jie” (boundary) was used in the record. This provides a hint that the 
boundary began just beyond the Chiwei Island. As the Diaoyu Islands 
northern part bore a blue sea (depth 110 – 170 meters), the southern coast of 
Chiwei Island entails the end of the continental shelf reaching a depth of more 
than 2200 meters. This indicates that even in former times, maybe due to the 
changing colours of the seawater, the continental shelf was regarded as the 
delimitation of the boundary. Pursuant Chinese official records a Saint-King 
yellow dragon white fish (shengwang huanglong baiyu) was supposed to live 
in the Oceanic trough. In order to appease the dragon the navigators 
sacrificed pigs and sheep in the course of a trench crossing ritual.194  
3.1.3. Xiao Chong Mission in 1576 
Whilst on another investiture mission to the Ryukyu Kingdom Xiao Chong 
reprinted navigation maps taking into account the experiences and 
descriptions of Chen Kan and Kuo Ju Lin.195 This envoy recorded in 1576 that 
before “having passed the Yebi Mountain (Kume Hill) it took days to enter the 
Kingdom (ruguo)”.196 Xiao Xiong erroneously utilized the Yebi Mountain, 
                                                 
192 Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Lun Diaoyu Zhuquan de guishu” (Considering to whom 
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which his predecessor (Chen) had done, too.197 Interestingly, Xiao Chong 
uses the proper Chinese word (ruguo) for passing the national border.   
                                                
3.1.4. Xia Ziyang Mission in 1606 
At that time, piracy challenged the trade relation between China and the 
Ryukyus. Departing from China Xia wrote in his records: 
 
“In the afternoon we passed Diaoyu Island. The next day 
we sailed past Huangwei Island. At night, the sea became 
rough and the ships shook terribly. Day after day, we 
sailed through an area of deeply black (shenheisede) 
water as if muddy trench (zhuogou) water or dark blue 
water (dianse). On the 29th, when we saw the head of Kume 
Hill, the Ryukyuans were extremely happy as if they were 
at home.”198 
 
Although the second person (Xiao was the first) to draft charts, he was the 
first navigator to describe the China – Ryukyi route in detail: He delineates all 
the navigation aids, such as Meihua Minor Garrison and Jilong Island, which 
the mission leaders utilized at this period of time. He explicitly mentioned the 
Diaoyu Islands and drew the boundary line between China and Ryukyu 
reckoning that the Diaoyu Islands appertained to China. Additionally, he 
stated that the citizenry of Ryukyu greeted the navigators on the Kume Hill, 
which indicates that this was the most remote territory of the kingdom. It can 
be assumed that the king of the Ryukyu kingdom dispatched a “welcome 
committee” to receive the missions so that he could thereby display his 
obsequious comportment. At last, the alternation of the colours coincided with 
the line where he delineated the boundary delimitation. In other words, the 
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Chinese utilized the words trench (gou), which was synonymous with the word 
boundary (jie).199 
3.1.5. Shunfeng Xiangsong Logbook of 1403 
Navigation pilots for the control of tributary systems are of crucial importance. 
The Chinese did not only invent the compass, but were also very advanced in 
terms of editing precise navigation booklets. Already during the Zhou Dynasty 
around the eleventh century B.C., the Chinese invented guidebooks for their 
navigation.200 The Shunfeng Xiangsong Guide Book published around 1403 
depicted the Diaoyu Islands as following: 
 
“…berth with a depth of 15 tuo (one tuo = 6 inches) in 
Diaoyu Island are good for refuelling wood and drinking 
water….” 201 “After passing Pengjia Mountain, the ship 
goes towards Diaoyu Island. The ship leaves Diaoyu 
Islands following the south wind towards the east…”202 
                                                
 
The guidebooks gave instructions to navigators for what purpose the Diaoyu 
Islands could be used. It can be assumed by the instructions that 
disembarkations took place in these early times and sailors touched the 
Diaoyu Islands’ soil. For safety - reasons the Diaoyu Islands served as 
navigation aids as well as a resort to find a safe refuge in case of unstable 
weather conditions.203 
3.1.6. Defence Manuals 
3.1.6.1. Zheng Ruozheng manual of 1561 
In China’s former history, “barbarians” attacked the Middle Kingdom. During 
the Qing Dynasty, Japanese pirates (Wako or Wo kou) endangered the 
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investiture missions when they crossed the navigators’ routes.204 As Zheng 
Ruozeng205 who was appointed military adviser by Hu Zongxian published the 
13 fascicles of Chouhai Tubian in 1561 using the information he had acquired 
from the captured Wako / wo-kou. He also had access to the highest political 
decision makers and documented his insight about the deployment of Chinese 
military forces at that time. Thanks to his writings it was reported that the Ming 
Dynasty built up a military defence system extending from the northern 
Shantung province to Canton province. In the Choubai Tubian defence 
manual, the Diaoyu Islands are documented to be appurtenant to the Fujian 
garrison defence system.206  
3.1.6.2. Military relation between China and the Ryukyu  
Contrary to the wo-kou, it must be stated regarding military affairs that no 
territorial disputes between China and the Ryukyu Kingdom could be 
historically observed.207 At no point of time did the Ryukyu Kingdom did object 
the Chinese conception that the Diaoyu Islands belonged to them.208  
 
3.2. Missions to the Ryukyu Kingdom in Qing Dynasty 
The Qing Dynasty lasted from 1644 to 1911.209 In this time-period the 
investiture missions were continued. 
3.2.1. Records of Zhang Xueli mission in 1663   
Zhang Xueli was the first chief envoy of an investiture mission during the Qing 
Dynasty. One major circumstance regarding the Ryukyu regime occurred: In 
1609, the Japanese took advantage of the uprisings and the social disorder at 
the end of the Ming Dynasty by subduing the Ryukyu Kingdom. From thereon, 
                                                 
204 see: Samuel Couling, Encyclopaedia Sinica (1rst ed., 1917), 255  
205 Note: Other possible spelling is: Cheng Jo-tsung 
     This seafarer is not to be confused with Zheng, the great seafarer of the Ming Dynasty 
206 Tao Cheng, “The Sino-Japanese Dispute Over the Tiao-yu-tai ( Senkaku) Islands and the Law of 
Territorial Acquisition”, Vol. 14 V. J. I.L. (1974), 256; Baidu Bailiao, “Diaoyu Dao”, 
http://baike.baidu.com/view/2876.htm, accessed on March 30th, 2006, Zheng Hailin, Tiao-yu-t’ai 
lieh yu chih li shih yu fa li yen chiu (1rst ed., 1998), 11 
207 Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relation (1rst ed., 
2000), 70 
208 Kiyoshi Inoue, “Japanese Militarism & Diaoyutai (Senkaku) Island – A Japanese Historian’s view”, 
www.skygallery.com/japan/diaohist.html, accessed on December 7th, 2006 
209 K. R. Dark, The Wave Of Time (1rst ed., 1998), 205 
   
the kingdom had to pay tribute to emperors. In Zhang recordings though, no 
observation of islands was retained. In fact, he lost his orientation on its way 
to the Ryukyu Kingdom. Being lost in the East China Sea they could only 
verify that they transited the boundary by the colour of the ocean water.210 
 
“The colour of water began to change from blue to dark 
blue. “Hey! We entered the ocean”, shouted the captain. 
There is a white water line crossing between south and 
north. ”Here, therefore, is (jiezhongwai) the boundary 
between China and a foreign country,” stated the captain. 
Thereafter we witnessed many schools of fish.”211  
  
Based on this rather unrefined piece of information it is not possible to prove 
whether the boundary is in vicinity of the Chiwei Islands. The core information 
does not deprive the reader of the significance of the changing colours of the 
water. It meant that the trench was equated to the national boundary.212  
3.2.2. Records of Wang Chi in 1683 
In the year 1682, the Ryukyu Crown Prince Shangzhen pledged for a Chinese 
investiture mission. The next year Wang Chi executed the Ryukyu’s request. 
After his return to China the seafarer, Wang disclosed some hitherto unknown 
facts. As the preceding mission lost its way, some Ryukyu citizens helped him 
to seek his orientation. The outcome was that his voyage lasted only three 
days until their arrival in Nasha. He documented his experiences by 
complementing the “Shi Liuqiu Lu” by five facsimiles.213 From this record, it is 
possible to derive his awareness about the location of the maritime boundary:  
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“For some unknown reasons, we arrived at Chiwei Island 
without passing by Huangwei Island. In the evening, the 
ships went through the jiao or guo (trough) to celebrate 
the Haishenji (ritual to the sea god) or guogouji 
(crossing trough ritual). Along with rice, live pigs and 
sheep were sacrificed to the sea god. ”What does “jiao” 
(suburbs/outskirts) mean asked Wang Chi. ”This means that 
there is a zhongwai zhi jie (the boundary between China 
and foreign country)”, replied the captain.” “How do you 
distinguish the boundary?” asked Wang again. “I believe 
the boundary is located here, But this does not mean that 
everyone can guess this location. Nor is my belief 
irresponsible”, replied the captain.214 
 
Reading the previous records of Khan or Xiao it may be assumed that the 
Diaoyu islands could have been in theory terra nullius (soil not belonging to 
anyone). The terminology clarifies this quite far-fetched idea utilizing the 
phrase “the boundary between China and foreign country”: Thanks to this 
document, it is no longer deniable that the Diaoyu islands were considered to 
be located on the Chinese side of the boundary.215 As consequence, the idea 
of terra nullius can be eliminated.         
3.2.3. Xu Baoguang Mission in 1709 
The investiture missions were continued in the Ming Dynasty. Xu Baoguang’s 
records (Zhong shan zhuan xin lu) were quoted in the navigation guide of Tei 
Junsoku. This document was called “Shinan Kogi” (Broad Interpretation of 
Navigation Guide). This pamphlet meticulously describes the existing marine 
condition a voyage faced on its way from China to the Ryukyu.216 The guide 
reveals one striking piece of information: 
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“After sailing 10 geng (one geng= 18, 6 miles), vessels 
pass Diaoyu Island…. After sailing 6 geng, vessel will 
arrive at Kume Hill, where is located the southwest 
boundary between the Ryukyu Kingdom and China (liuqiu 
xinanfang jieshang zhenshan).”217 
 
Whereas the first two navigators equivocally stated the Diaoyu islands did not 
belong to the Ryukyu Kingdom, Xu and Wang Chi stated clearly that between 
Chiwei Island and Kume Hill was China’s boundary. In addition, Xu Baoguang 
drew a comprehensive map (Chungshan Mission Records) of the Ryukyu 
Kingdom in 1719 depicting all its thirty-six islands. None of the Diaoyu islands 
were claimed as belonging to the tributary state.218  
 
It is noteworthy that at the end of an explanatory footnote on the Ishigaki and 
the eight other areas of the Yaeyama archipelago (which are the closest 
islands to the Diaoyu islands) it was stated that were “the south-western most 
boundary of the Ryukyu.”219 A long time ago Chungshan Mission Records 
were edited in a Japanese edition. This edition, according to Chinese 
interpretation contributed largely to the Japanese understanding of the 
Ryukyu Kingdom.220 As the Chungshan Mission Records were influenced by 
the great scholar Cheng Shun Tse and by many other Ryukyu people - 
including high rank officials of the court of the Ryukyu king - one must attach 
legal value to them.221 According to the Japanese historian Inoue, it may be 
assumed that records document the genuine opinion of the Chinese and the 
Ryukyu state at the same time. 222   
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3.2.4. Zhou Huang Mission in 1755 
After having returned to China, the Chinese Envoy Zhou Huang renewed the 
previous shilu by enriching them by important historical, political, social and 
cultural knowledge about the Ryukyu Kingdom. Zhou named the kingdom’s 
major cities. Sailing the compass route he included the Diaoyu Islands as 
practical navigation aids in his records. As did all his predecessors, he 
celebrated the ritual of the trench crossing (guogouki) as he passed the 
Ryukyu Trough.223 
3.2.5. Geographer’s point of view 
3.2.5.1. Hayashi Shifei    
In a reputed book called ”Sangoku Tsuran Zusetsu” the Japanese geographer 
Hayashi Shifei analysed the Ryukyu Kingdom. Relying on Zhongshan 
Chuanchin Ku by Xu Baoguang, he illustrated the known world’s geography 
using altitudes and latitudes. He also revealed that the Ryukyu Kingdom was 
composed of thirty-six islands not comprising the Diaoyu Islands.224 
3.2.5.2. Cheng Shuntse in 1708 
A crucial point for the Chinese claim to the islands might be that as early as in 
the eighteenth century Japanese scholars believed the Senkaku Islands 
belonged to China. Cheng Shuntse stated in his booklet “General Guide Book 
for Navigation” in 1708 that “the Kume Shima is the western boundary 
mountain of the Ryukyus.”225 
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3.2.5.3. Lin Tzu-ping in 1785 
A reputed Japanese cartographer named Lin Tzu Ping published a map about 
the Ryukyu. In his publication “An Illustrated General Map of the three 
Countries,” he accounted the Diaoyu Islands to be Chinese territory.226 
3.2.6. Location for gathering herbs and fishing 
During the second half of the nineteenth century, Chinese pharmacists in 
quest of herbs extended their range to the islands. At that time, Chinese 
began to catch fish in the surroundings of the islands. The Chinese asserted 
that the islands were used as shelters for Chinese and Taiwanese fishermen 
in case of an emergency. Being aware that private fishermen could not have 
occupied the islands in the legal sense, the Chinese rely on a subtle 
contention behind it: The fishermen of Taiwan never operated in non-Chinese 
waters at that time indicating a special geographic and economic link to China 
at that time. This provides a strong hint that the Diaoyu Islands were 
considered to be within the Chinese domestic waters.227 
 
3.3. Japan’s discovery of the Diaoyu Islands 
3.3.1. Japan’s Invasion to the Ryukyu Kingdom 
As already mentioned, from the year 1609 on the Ryukyu Kingdom was a 
tributary state to both countries: China and Japan. The last Chinese envoys to 
the kingdom were noticing that the Ryukyuans were becoming more and more 
japanized than their own people once sinicized them. Apparently, they felt the 
pressure to “respect” the Japanese more than to honour the Chinese 
explaining that they started Ryukyu (or Japanese) names to identify the 
Diaoyu Island as Uotsuri.228 In 1872, the Japanese government set up the 
“Ryukyu han” subjugating the Ryukyuans under the jurisdiction of the Foreign 
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Ministry. After the Botan tribe incident the Japanese compelled the Ryukyu to 
break ties with the Chinese Emperor. In 1876, the jurisdiction for the former 
independent kingdom was delegated to the Home Secretary.229 
3.3.2. China’s - Japanese Mediation as a suite to Japan’s Invasion 
Having been invaded the government of the Ryukyu Kingdom sent envoys to 
the Middle Kingdom so that they could request military assistance. Being 
weakened by internal disorder the Qing court could not do much in favour of 
the Ryukyuans.230 Actually, the former U.S. President Ulysses S. Grant had 
led negotiations between China and Japan in a private meeting. In this 
mediation, Japan proposed that from the Okinawa Islands to the north all 
territories should become Japanese. All the territories belonging to Miyako-
Yaeyama islands should remain Ryukyu / Chinese. In this peace negotiation, 
the Diaoyu Islands were not subject to any discussions indicating that they 
were not considered Ryukyu territory. In 1881, the Qing government finally 
turned in and signed the treaty to divide the Ryukyu Kingdom into two parts 
following the Japanese proposal. The Qing emperor withheld his imperial 
assent to this humiliation.231      
3.3.3. Japan’s Discovery of the Islands in 1884 
In the year 1884, Tatsushiro Koga, a native businessman from the Fukuoka 
Prefecture discovered the Senkaku Islands for the Japanese. He tried to 
cultivate the barren soil of the Senkaku Islands.232 In 1894, he sent an 
application for a leasehold contract of the islands to the Okinawa prefecture 
government. The local Prefecture turned down his application as “it was not 
clear at that time whether the islands belonged to the Japanese empire” Being 
dissatisfied with the results, he then adressed the request directly to the Home 
Ministry and the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce in Tokyo. The outcome 
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was the same: On the grounds that the ownership of the islands was 
“uncertain”, he could not lease the Senkaku Islands.233 
3.3.4. Japan’s acquisition of the Senkaku Islands  
3.3.4.1. Background of Japan’s tardiness 
Thanks to the enforced opening of Japan in 1868, the Meiji Restoration 
reforms were instrumental in expanding the nation’s influence. The Ryukyu 
Kingdom was not the only country to be subdued: Korea was coercively 
“opened” by Japan in 1874.234 The Senkaku Islands were thereafter as well 
on Japan’s agenda.235 The Japanese had already insinuated to be willing to 
extend the territory to the Senkaku Islands by 1879.236 Japan’s acquisition of 
the Ryukyu Kingdom did not coincide with the final incorporation of the 
Senkaku Islands in 1895.  
 
The reasons for such tardiness are subject to manifold interpretations: 
According to Japanese officials the Japanese government was rather 
reluctant to seize the islands due to their smallness, their proximity to China 
and the fear of triggering negative publicity in the Chinese media.237  
 
The Governor of the Okinawa Prefecture made a request to the central 
government on Tokyo in 1885 and 1890 that the Senkaku Islands should be 
designated as part of his prefecture.238 Actually, it is not clear if the Magistrate 
acted on behalf of a secret order from the Home Secretary or if he 
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independently submitted the request.239 In 1894, the central government 
reacted to his third submission of 1893 and conferred the islands to the 
Okinawa Prefecture. On January 14th, 1895, the Japanese government 
eventually instructed the prefecture to erect landmarks on the islands.240 All 
these cabinet decision were secretly made; they were declassified and were 
published no earlier than in March 1952 (Japan Foreign Affairs 
Documents).241 The details of Japan’s reluctance are to be mentioned: 
3.3.4.2. First Letter of Okinawa Prefecture Magistrate in 1885  
Apparently, there must have been some “turbulences” while incorporating the 
Senkaku Islands. The Magistrate of Okinawa, Nishimura Sutezo reported in a 
letter dated September 22nd, 1885 his concerns about the incorporation to the 
national Home Secretary. This letter was formally declared as a “petition”.242  
 
“Because Kumeseki-shima, Kuba-shima and Uotsuri-shima 
have since ancient times been the names used by this 
prefecture to refer to them, and since they are 
uninhabited islands close to the islands Kume, Miyako, 
Yaeyama under the jurisdiction of this prefecture, there 
should not exist any difficulties hindering their 
incorporation into this prefecture. Yet, due to their 
differences in terms of topography from the earlier 
reported islands Daitojima, the possibility must not be 
ignored that they are the same islands recorded as 
Diaoyutai, Huangweiyu, and Chiweiyu in the Zhongshan 
Records. If they truly are the same islands, then it is 
obviously the case that the details of the islands have 
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already been well-known to Qing envoy ships dispatched to 
crown the former Zhongshan King and already given fixed 
(Chinese) names and used as navigation aids en route to 
the Ryukyu Islands.”243 
 
After the reception of this letter, the Home Secretary Yamagata Aritomo 
forwarded this letter for the final approval to the Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru. 
In this request, the Home Secretary attached the Magistrate’s 
acknowledgements asserting that they were not relevant in the legal sense.244 
The Foreign Minister could not consent to the Home Minister and appealed for 
much more caution on October 21rst, 1885: 
3.3.4.3. Letter of the Foreign Secretary in 1885 
The Minister proposed to delay the incorporation of the islands to a more 
suitable point of time: 
 
“Most recently Chinese newspapers have been reporting 
rumours of our government’s intention of occupying 
certain islands owned by China located next to Taiwan, 
demonstrating suspicion towards our country and 
consistently urging the Qing government to be aware of 
this matter. In such a time, if we were to publicly place 
national markers on the islands, this must necessarily 
invite China’s suspicion towards markers on the islands; 
this must necessarily invite Chin’s suspicion towards us. 
In regard to the matter of placing national markers and 
developing the islands, it should await a more 
appropriate time.”….”Moreover, the investigations of the 
above-mentioned islands should not be published in the 
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Official Gazette or newspaper. Please pay attention to 
this.”245 
 
The “lowest denominator”, which even all pro-Japanese advocates must abide 
by, is that there must have been fear within the Japanese government of 
creating diplomatic hardships with the Chinese in case of an publicized 
incorporation of the islands.246  
3.3.4.4. Second Okinawa Magistrate’s letter in 1885 
After having been informed about the unfortunate timing of the incorporation 
the Home Secretary received a second letter from the Magistrates submitted 
on November 24th, 1885 reiterating that the rightness of the claim could be 
dubitable: 
 
“In regard to construction of national markers…, since 
the matter is not unrelated to China, if problems do 
indeed arise, I would be in grave repentance for my 
responsibility.”247 
3.3.4.5. Response of the Home Secretary 
In conjunction with the Foreign Secretary Inoue Kaoru, the Home Secretary 
Yamagata Aritomo signed a letter on December 4th, 1885 that the erection of 
landmarks should be forborne. The confidential letter reads as following: 
 
“Based on the reasons given in your previous letter of 
inquiry, please acknowledge that the construction (of 
national markers) shall currently not be undertaken.”248 
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Up to the end of Word War II, the Japanese government kept silence about 
the envisaged incorporation in order not to stir up anti-Japanese sentiments in 
China. The pending issue was just postponed. The Chinese scholars take all 
the preceding statements of Japanese officials as evidence, which Japan’s 
administration deemed the islands to appertain to China.249  
3.3.4.6. Further letters of request of Okinawa’s Magistrate 
In the year 1890, the Magistrate of Okinawa, Maruoka Kanji, submitted a 
subsequent request to the Home Secretary. After Okinawa’s second request 
was declined the succeeding Prefecture Governor Narahara Shigeru renewed 
the request in 1893 by submitting a third “petition” to the Tokyo government. 
Nevertheless, all these attempts of the Okinawa Prefecture were doomed to 
failure. The politically suitable time had not yet arrived.250   
3.3.4.7. Decree of Empress Dowager Cixi of 1893 
In 1893, the Empress Dowager Cixi granted the Diaoyu Islands to Sheng 
Xuanhuai who was the Chief Minister of the Court of Imperial sacrifices at that 
time. Being also a businessman in the pharmaceutical sector, he was keen on 
harvesting the plant “statice arbuscula” on the islands. The Chinese used 
these herbs to manufacture pills to prevent high blood pressure and relieve 
pain because of dampness. Being thrilled about the effectiveness of the pills 
the Dowager Cixi awarded three of the disputed islands to the Chinese 
pharmacologist.251 This decree carried the imperial seal thereby making it 
official:  
 
“The medical pills submitted by Sheng Xuanhuai have 
proved to be very effective. The herbs used in making the 
pills are said to have been collected from the small 
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island of Diaoyutai, beyond the seas of Taiwan. It has 
come to my knowledge that the said official’s family has 
maintained for generations pharmacies offering free 
treatment and herbs to destitute patients. This is really 
most commendable. The three islands of Diaoyutai, 
Huangwei Yu, and Chiwei yu are hereby ordered to be 
awarded to Sheng Xuanhuai as his property for the purpose 
of collecting medicinal herbs.252   
     Seal of Queen Mother Cixi 
 
By virtue of this imperial act the three mentioned islands could have become 
Chinese “property”. At least the Qing Dynasty recorded officially the existence 
of the islands.  
3.3.4.8. Information of Okinawa Prefecture in 1894 
Until the 1894, the Japanese could not make any progress regarding the 
incorporation of the islands. In a letter of response to the Director of the 
Prefecture Administration Bureau of the Ministry of Home Affairs Egi Kazuyuki 
the Okinawa Prefecture Governor stated that no investigation had been 
carried out so far on the islands. In his request, Mr. Kazuyuki wondered as 
well whether there was evidence such as old records or folklore that 
demonstrate the islands belong to our country. The answer of the Okinawa 
Prefecture was the following: 
 
“…there exist no old records related to the said islands 
or any transcribed evidence or folklore and legends 
demonstrating that the islands belong to our territory”253  
 
This secret letter conveys a different idea of what is the official Japanese 
contention published on the web page of the Japanese Foreign Ministry 
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(Mofa): “From 1885 on, surveys of the Senkaku Islands had been thoroughly 
made by the Government of Japan through the agencies of the Okinawa 
Prefecture and by way of other methods.”254 The question if the official 
internet information contains factual distortions255 can be left open – at least 
the contention is not beyond reasonable doubt. 
3.3.4.9. Sino - Japanese War 1894 / 1895 
The advent of the Sino-Japanese War was instrumental for the Japanese 
government regarding the incorporation of the Senkaku Islands. The long 
awaited “suitable moment” had finally arrived. After the outbreak of the war on 
August 1rst, 1894, China’s military defeat enabled the Japanese Tenno to 
impose harsh peace condition upon the struggling Qing Dynasty. China lost its 
territory in Taiwan and on the Liaodong peninsula.256 An indemnity of 200 
million Liang – equivalent to 4.5 annual imperial Japanese budgets- instigated 
the other occidental powers to precede their annexation greed.257 The victory 
of Japan was achieved not so much thanks to superior military or navy tactics, 
but because of the sheer technological underdeveloped equipment of the 
Chinese military, which could not match the Japanese level. By the end of the 
war in March 1895, the Chinese were compelled to realize that their cultural 
isolation from the West in their “sinical world order” was a significant 
impediment to combat the “barbarians.”258   
3.3.4.10. Cabinet Decision on January 14th, 1895 
On January the 14th, 1895, the Japanese cabinet enacted the decisive 
resolution to incorporate the islands. Upon request of the Home Secretary, the 
Prime Minister gave his final consent one week later. In conjunction with the 
discovery and the Imperial Decree, this Cabinet decision is the main pillar for 
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the Japanese claim. Surprisingly though, the Cabinet decision omitted the 
Chiwei Yu Island on the verge of the continental shelf. This means that this 
cabinet decision raises doubtful questions.259 This Cabinet took the decision 
under secrecy and no other country – not even the concerned China was 
informed.260   
 
“The Home Minister has requested a cabinet decision on the following matter: 
the islands, Kuba-shima (Huangwei yu) and Uotsuri-shima (Diaoyu-yu), 
located north-westward of Yaeyama Islands under the jurisdiction of Okinawa 
Prefecture, have heretofore been uninhabited islands. Due to recent visits to 
the said islands by individuals attempting to conduct fishing related business, 
and such matters may require regulation, it is decided that the islands be 
placed under the jurisdiction of Okinawa Prefecture. Based on this decision, 
the Okinawa Prefectural Governor’s petition should be approved.”261 
 
An analysis of the Cabinet’s decision may lead to the following presumptions: 
 
1. Interestingly, the cabinet decision’s wording reinforces the idea that 
Japanese officials did not conduct the surveys rather they were rather private 
expeditions. If the surveys were privately run, then these action cannot by 
accredited to the Japanese government. As a result, this might be a second 
hint that the Japanese standpoint contradicts its historical records.   
 
2. The second peculiar point about the incorporation bill of the Cabinet is that 
they apparently by mistake omitted the third island Chiwei Yu. The Japanese 
may argue that the Japanese denomination Uotsuri-shima was supposed to 
comprise all the islands. This again raises the question why they explicitly 
have enclosed the Kuba-shima Island into the cabinet bill. The Japanese 
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government and their scholars are taciturn about this inadequacy, which does 
not dissolve the doubt why Chihwei islands was not included in the bill.262   
3.3.4.11. Treaty of Shimonoseki of April 17th, 1895 
Taiwan was a part of Imperial China from 1887 to 1895, when the following 
treaty entered into force converting Taiwan into a Japanese colonial 
possession.263 The victorious Japan was able to dictate onerous conditions in 
the Treaty of Shimonoseki signed on April 17th, 1895. The crucial clause 
referring to the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands was sealed in Art. 2: 
 
“a) China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the following 
territories, together with all fortifications, arsenals, and public property 
thereon: 
b) The island of Formosa (Taiwan), together with all islands appertaining or 
belonging to the said island of Formosa.”264 
 
The exact wording of the treaty does not give a clue about whether the Diaoyu 
/ Senkaku Islands were adjudged to belong to Taiwan. This question has lead 
to the most fervent debates between pro-Japan and pro-China irredentist 
scholars. The pro-Chinese advocates argue that the Diaoyu islands were an 
integral part of the wording “islands belonging to China.”265 This treaty 
consolidated the disintegration of the Middle Kingdom implying that the 
Chinese were no longer much concerned about these tiny islands.266 
3.3.4.12. Imperial Decree No. 13 on March 5th, 1896 
The Cabinet decision in the previous year was possibly seconded by the 
imperial decree No. 13. It can be arguably put forward that this Imperial 
decree implemented the Meiji Government decision of January 21rst, 1895. 
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This decree, which was not publicised at that time, enunciated the formation 
of Okinawa Prefecture: 
 
“ Art.1 Imperial Decree: 
“Excluding the two areas of Naha and Shuri, the rest of Okinawa Prefecture is 
to be divided into the following five counties: 
 
Shimajiri County  Each magiri (traditional regional unit) of Shimajiri  
 Kume-Jima; Kerama Islands group; Tonaki-jima;  
 Aguni-jima; Iheya-jima Islands group, Torishima and 
 Daito-jima. 
Nakagami County Each magiri of Nakagami 
Kunigami County Each magiri of Kunigami; and Ie-jima 
Miyako County Miyako Islands group 
Yaeyama County Yaeyama Islands group 
 
Art. 2 Imperial Decree: 
In the event that the boundaries or names of the counties need to be 
changed, they shall be decided by the Home e Minister.”267 
 
The Imperial Decree nowhere mentions the Senkaku Islands. This indubitable 
fact did not impede the Okinawa civil government from publishing an article268 
in 1970 stating that “these islands have been made Japanese territory on April 
1rst in the 29th year of Meiji under the administration of Ishigaki village, 
Yaeyama District, Okinawa Prefecture, by virtue of a Cabinet decision and on 
the basis of Imperial Decree No. 13”.269 This Imperial decree raises the 
following questions: 
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1. Why was the imperial assent granted to the aforementioned Cabinet 
decision ten month after they had passed the bill? Was the nearby end of the 
Sino-Japanese war a coincidence or were political reasons behind it? 
 
2. It is striking that in Art. 1 (Shimonoseki Treaty) under Shimajiri county all 
the islands belonging to it are listed. If the Japanese side puts forward that the 
Senkaku Islands were implicitly counted to the Yaeyama County; why were 
the Japanese bureaucrats so careless about mentioning the Senkaku 
Islands?270 Why are they so silent about this contradiction? 
 
3. Why did the Japanese government deviate from its previous incorporation 
proceedings? The Cabinet Decision about the incorporation of the Ogasawara 
Islands was made public in the Official Gazette bearing the Imperial Decree 
No.190 including the exact names, coordination and the local authorities. On 
the contrary, the Cabinet Decision about the Senkaku Islands’ incorporation 
was conspicuously made. Additionally, the concerned states were neither 
notified about Japan’s incorporation nor were any formal acts carried out, 
which could have been regarded as Japan’s symbolic incorporation.271 How 
can the Japanese explain these clashing differences of procedure?   
3.3.4.13. Taiwanese Consul General in Nagasaki 1920 
In the year 1920, a vessel carrying thirty-one fishermen and their families from 
Fuzhou suffered a breakdown. Because of this incident they were obliged to 
land on the main Diaoyu Island. Four rescuers from the Japanese Ishigaki 
Village took them back to Japan where they received proper treatment.272 
Following this event, the Taiwanese General Consul of Nagasaki Feng Mian 
expressed his thanks in a letter of gratitude to the rescuers. He wrote that “the 
31 fishermen from Fujian Province in 1920 who were wrecked… within the 
Senkaku Retto of the Yaeyama County of Okinawa prefecture, the Great 
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Japan.”273 It should not be forgotten that Taiwan was occupied the by the 
Japanese at that time. For this reason, it is doubtful this act of state is 
imputable to Taiwan.274 
3.3.4.14. Koga ran Japanese business on the island until 1920s 
The Sino-Japanese War in 1894/1895 was very advantageous for the 
Japanese businessman Koga who discovered the islands for the Japanese in 
1884. In 1896, he obtained the rights from the Japanese government to use 
four of the islands / islets (Uotsuri, Huangwei dao, Bei Xiaodao and Nan 
Xiaodao) for thirty years. Investing considerable money on the islands he set 
up devices so that his some thirty subordinates could make a living on the 
islands. He built houses, wharves, reservoirs, drainage and sanitary facilities. 
His goal was to collect feathers and guano of albatrosses, which could be 
exported to European hat makers and which were useful fertilizer in the 
agriculture. The islands’ climax in terms of habitation was achieved in 1909 
when some 99 families consisting of 148 people lived on the islands.275 After 
the death of Koga in 1918, his son Zenji Koga took charge of the business. 
The free lease ended as a result and he seized the chance of purchasing the 
islands. He paid 1.825 Yen for Diaoyu, 247 Yen for Huangwei Dao, 47 Yen for 
Nan Xiaodao, and 31.5 Yen for Bei Xiaodao.276 By this means the islands 
were transferred into private ownership. Koga conducted his business until 
1941 marking the last Japanese activity on the islands until the 1950s. From 
1958, the American Civil Administration of Okinawa transferred money to 
Koga’s son to pay for the right to use these islands.277   
3.3.4.15. Tokyo Court Ruling 1941-44 
In the last year of the WW II, the Tokyo Court presumably had to decide about 
a court procedure between the Okinawa district government and the Thaihoku 
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prefecture (Taipei prefecture) about a Senkaku-related fishing trade problem. 
In this case, the Taipei prefecture took legal action in order to retain its fishing 
grounds around the islands. The Tokyo court allegedly ruled that the Senkaku 
islands under the jurisdiction of the Taiwan province.278 To the Chinese, this 
represents a Japanese admission that the Japanese judiciary itself did not 
consider the Diaoyu Islands as belonging to their own jurisdiction. The Court’s 
decision is neither known nor does the Court’s procedure have a solid legal 
value. Children of former witnesses reported about the Court procedure. The 
Court procedure, which has only allegedly taken place, lacks reliable sources. 
But it cannot be proven that the procedures took place or that a ruling was 
given.  
 
3.4. The Islands status in the post-war era 
3.4.1. Cairo Declaration 1943 
World War II in Asia was initiated by the outbreak of the Second Sino-
Japanese War in 1937. By 1939, the Japanese military had occupied the 
entire Eastern Chinese coast and the islands in the South China Sea including 
the Xisha- and the Nansha archipelagos. In the same year, the Chinese 
communist leader Mao Zedong described the Ryukyu Islands as one of the 
many territories and dependencies stripped away from China by the 
imperialists.279 The Japanese military success came to a standstill soon after 
the attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941. From this moment on, the U.S. joined the 
Allies against the German-Japanese-Italian axis. On November 27th, 1943 the 
President of the United States, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill from Great Britain and first President of the future Taiwan, Chiang 
Kai-shek assembled in Egypt’s capital to issue the famous “Cairo 
Declaration”:280 
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“Japan shall be stripped off all the islands of the Pacific which she has seized 
or occupied since the beginning of the First World War I, and that all the 
territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria ( Northeast 
China), Formosa (Taiwan), and the Pescadores (Penghu Archipelago), shall 
be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other 
territories which she has taken by violence and greed.”281 
 
It has to be stated that the Diaoyu Islands in contrast to many other occupied 
islands were not explicitly referred to in the Cairo Declaration. Thus, the 
Japanese may draw a “reverse conclusion” arguing that the Diaoyu islands 
were not integral part of this proclamation. 
3.4.2. Yalta Conference 1945 
The Yalta Conference did not deal specifically with Diaoyu Islands. The Allies 
agreed upon a solution to the Kurile Islands after Japan’s defeat. Stalin, on 
the other hand, “promised to render assistance to China with its armed forces 
for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.”282 
3.4.3. Potsdam Declaration in 1945 
A couple of days before the U.S. Air Force dropped an atomic bomb on the 
Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan’s post-war fate was 
subject to one important proclamation. In July / August 1945, the three 
victorious political leaders of the U.S.S.R., U.S.A. and Great Britain convened 
the Potsdam Conference. There they stipulated the post-war order, which 
existed until the fall of the iron curtain in 1989 / 1990. Regarding the 
“Proclamation Defining Terms for the Japanese Surrender,” Art. 8 stated: 
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“The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese 
Sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, 
Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.”283  
3.4.4. Japanese Surrender August 15th, 1945 
On August 15th, 1945, the Japanese declared their unconditional surrender to 
the Allied Forces marking the conclusion of World War II. This step 
represented Japan’s acceptance of the loss of Taiwan and other territories 
“stolen from China”.284 On September 2nd, 1945, the Japanese signed the 
formal instrument of surrender at Tokyo Bay: 
 
“We, … hereby accept the provisions set forth in the declaration … issued at 
Potsdam.”285  
 
Thus, through the reference to the Potsdam Declaration the Cairo Declaration 
became part of the Japanese surrender by incorporation.286  
3.4.5. Decree 667 of the U.N. 
On January 29th, 1946 the recently founded United Nations published decree 
667. It stated that Japanese territory should be limited to the five major islands 
including the Ryukyu Islands north of 30° degree of north latitude. As a 
consequence, the U.N. did not make any provisions to account the Diaoyu / 
Senkaku Islands to be Japanese territory.287        
3.4.6. American occupation 
3.4.6.1. American Maps 
Official publications of the U.S. underpin the idea that the U.S. considered the 
Senkakus as belonging to the Ryukyu chain. In April 1947 the U.S. 
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Department of State published the book “Atlas and Gazetteer” depicting the 
Senkakus as part of Yaeyama county in Okinawa prefecture. By the end of 
the same year, an American SCAP (Supreme Commander for the Allied 
Forces) map included the Sakishima group (Senkakus are part of them) as an 
integral part of Taiwan.288 
3.4.6.2. Ordinance No. 22 in 1950 
During the time of occupation from 1945-51 the SCAP was the only governing 
authority over Japan.289 Before the enactment of the two peace treaties the 
U.S. administration regulated in Art. 1(d) Ordinance No. 22 that the 
administration of the Yaeyama Islands comprised the Senkaku Islands.290  
3.4.7. Background of the two separate treaties 
At this time, the U.S.A. was at the brink of the Korean War and American 
leadership was increasingly being challenged by the USSR, which resulted in 
the Korean War. This Korean War triggered American “containment policy” in 
South-East Asia by relying on Japan and Taiwan as allies in Asia-Pacific. At 
this time, the main goal for the U.S. administration was to limit the expansion 
of communism in the world. Therefore, the U.S. had to respect the political 
views of the Tokyo and the Taipei governments.291 
 
The final peace agreement with Japan was not settled until 1951.292 The 
reversion of Chinese sovereignty to the PRC or Taiwan was ill - fated from its 
beginning. Taiwan’s claim to the Tiao-yu-tai Islands cannot be understood 
without highlighting the creation of the Republic of China (Taiwan). The 
Chinese Civil War caused that the nationalist Chinese under the leadership of 
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Chiang Kai-shek were expelled from mainland China. They had to flee to 
Taiwan. As a result, the People’s Republic of China was established on 
October 1, 1949. As the United Kingdom had leased territories on mainland 
China, they quickly recognized the PRC in January 1950. The U.S. on the 
other hand continued to recognize the government in Taipei as the sole 
legitimate Government of China.293 As the political stances of the U.K. and the 
U.S. were opposed, neither side could enter into negotiations with the 
Chinese to find a viable solution. The two Chinese governments did not 
recognize each other, either. Thus, the only possible approach was to have 
separate treaties. Pressured by Britain, the Japanese did not “return” 
sovereignty to Taiwan, but they merely “renounced” any claim to 
sovereignty.294 This implies that the question, to whose jurisdiction Taiwan 
belonged, had purposely been left open in the treaties. U.S. President Harry 
Truman remarked in 1950 that Taiwan’s status “remains to be determined.”295      
3.4.7.1. San Francisco Treaty in 1951 
The San Francisco Treaty was signed between Japan and 48 allied 
signatories. It went into effect on April 28th, 1952.296 Neither the ROC nor the 
PRC were part of this treaty. The USSR did not sign the treaty and informally 
terminated their martial legal situation towards Japan through a joint “peace 
declaration.”297 Regarding Chinese territories, Japan was forced to make the 
following concessions: 
 
“Art. 2 (b): 
Japan renounces all rights, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores” 
 
Art. 3) 
                                                 
293 Gary D. Rawnsley, Taiwan’s Informal Diplomacy and Propaganda (1rst ed., 2000), 11 
294 Steve Tsang, “Putting Chinese Unity and the Relations between China and Taiwan into a Historical 
Context”, Günter Schucher, Margot Schüller (ed.), Perspectives on Cross-Strait Relations : Views 
from Europe (1rst ed., 2005),28; Qiang Zhai, The Dragon, the Lion, and the Eagle (1rst ed., 1994), 
40  
295 Quoted in: James Wang, The Taipei Times (May the 9th, 2002), 
www.taipeitimes.com/News/archives/2002/05/09/0000135297, accessed on March 23rd, 2007 
296 Robert E. Ward, “The Legacy of Occupation”, in: Herbert Passin (ed.), The United States and Japan 
(2nd ed., 1975), 35 
297 Robert E. Ward, “The Legacy of Occupation”, in: Herbert Passin (ed.), The United States and Japan 
(2nd ed., 1975), 35 
   
Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place 
under its trusteeship system with the United States as the sole administering authority, 
Nansei Shoto south of 29 degree north latitude (including the Ryukyu and the Daito 
Islands), Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan (including the Bonin Island, Rosario Island 
and the Volcano Islands) and Parece Vela and Marcus Island. Pending the making of 
such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United States will have the right 
to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the 
territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters.” 
 
The San Francisco Treaty circumnavigated the question of the ownership of 
the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands. Although the Taiwanese were not part of the 
negotiations, they should have urged the incorporation of the islands into the 
Taipei Treaty. No matter which treaty one looks at, no matter which language 
was used, the question about the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands was totally 
omitted.298 Only the PRC leader Zhou Enlai has contested the legality of the 
San Francisco Treaty in August 1951 on the grounds of the lack of Chinese 
participation, although this did not happen in regard to the Diaoyu Islands. 
 
“the inviolable sovereignty of the People’s Republic of China over the Spratly 
Islands and the Paracel Archipelago will by no means impaired, of whether 
the American British draft for a peace treaty with Japan should make any 
stipulation and of the nature of any such stipulation.”299 
 
The ROC missed the historically unique chance to strip of the islands from 
Japan.300 The PRC performance in the process was no less ill-fated. The 
PRC could not sign the treaty despite the fact that the Soviet Union requested 
their participation. Other evidence of the Chinese oblivion about the Diaoyu 
Islands is the amendment offered by the USSR regarding Art. 2 (b), which 
was more than likely introduced at the behest of the PRC: 
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“Japan recognises full sovereignty of the Chinese People’s Republic over 
Manchuria, the Island of Taiwan (Formosa) with all islands adjacent to it, the 
Pescadores, the Pratas Islands, as well as over the Islands of Sishatsuntao 
and Chunshatsuntao and Nanshatsuntao Islands including the Spratlys, and 
renounces all right, title and claim to the territories named herein.”301 
 
In 1949, Communist China arose and leading American officials realized the 
significance of keeping the Ryukyu south of 29° north latitude. Following 
Japanese advice the draft peace treaty changed the wording of “Ryukyu 
Islands south of 29° north latitude by the wording of “Nansei Shoto south of 
29° north latitude. The difference in this choice of words has to be seen on the 
grounds, that Nansei Islands is a geographic, not an administrative term302; it 
refers to the arc of islands lying between the southern end of Kyushu and 
Formosa. As the Senkaku Islands were part of Okinawa prefecture and were 
geographically seen as part of Japan’s south-west islands, the disputed 
islands were an integral part of the San Francisco Treaty.303  
 
Referring to Art.3 the U.S. State’s Department replied to the question of a 
journalist in 1970: 
 
“The term (Nansei shoto), as used in that Treaty, refers to all islands south of 
29th degree north latitude under Japanese administration at the end of the 
Second World War that were not otherwise specifically referred to in the 
Treaty. The term, as used in the treaty, was intended to include the 
Senkakus.”304  
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Regarding the question of sovereignty over the Nansei Shoto Islands John 
Foster Dulles (Consultant to the Secretary of State) made the following 
statement: 
 
“Several of the Allied Powers urged that the treaty should require Japan to 
renounce its sovereignty over theses islands in favour of United States 
sovereignty. Other suggested that these islands should be restored 
completely to Japan. In the face of this division of Allied opinion, the United 
States felt that the best formula would be to permit Japan to retain residual 
sovereignty, while making it possible for these islands to be brought into the 
U.N. trusteeship system, with the United States as administering authority.”305  
3.4.7.2. Treaty of Taipei 1952 
On April 28th, 1952, in accordance with the San Francisco Peace Treaty the 
Treaty between the Republic of China and Japan was signed. Art. 2 (a) 
pursues the same aim as the San Francisco Treaty does in Art. 2 (a). Quite 
interestingly, the Spratly - and Paracel Islands enriched the list of islands, 
which Japan had to renounce: 
 
“Art. 2(a):  
It recognises that under Art. 2 of the Treaty of Peace which Japan signed at 
the city of San Francisco on 8 September 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the 
San Francisco Treaty), Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa 
and the Pescadores as well as the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands”306 
 
Art. 4: 
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It is recognised that all treaties, conventions, and agreements concluded 
before 9 December 1943 between Japan and China have become null and 
void as a consequence of the war.“307 
 
Due to Taiwan’s unclear status it was not named which state should be the 
recipient of sovereignty over the Taiwanese Islands. The late Taiwanese 
Foreign Minister George Yeh explained the Taiwan’s status before the Yuan 
(Taiwanese parliament) as follows: 
 
“In fact, we control them (Taiwan and the islands) now, and undoubtedly they 
constitute a part of our territories. The delicate international situation, 
however, means that they do not belong to us. In these circumstances, Japan 
has no right to transfer Taiwan and the Pescadores to us. Nor could we 
accept such a transfer from Japan even if she wished to do so”308 
 
This means that the sovereignty over Formosa was in no treaty ever expressly 
allocated to the Taipei government. It still could be argued that the treaties 
ceded back Taiwan’s sovereignty to China without determining which Chinese 
state should be the actual recipient. 
3.4.8. USCAP 27 – of 25th December 1953 
According to Art. 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty the islands were placed 
under American administrative control. This trusteeship under U.S. control 
had the following legal background. The Atlantic Charter of 1941 proclaimed a 
peace settlement without annexation on the grounds of post-war agreements. 
The British and American governments agreed that their countries would not 
seek an aggrandizement of territory. The trusteeship was a compromise 
between the Charter and the American desire to acquire exclusive rights on 
specific Pacific Islands. Providing naval and aerial basis this thorough 
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American legal feature was instrumental for the U.S. forces during the Cold 
War.309 Although the Americans did not install any military devices on the 
Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands themselves, the integration into their trusteeship 
was nevertheless advantageous to the extent that no Communist regime 
could acquire a strategic outpost close to Japan. The San Francisco Peace 
Treaty (“Nansei shoto”) does not expressly include the Diaoyu / Senkaku 
islands. The proclamation of USCAP310 27 (25th December 1953) describes 
the islands as being situated between the latitudes, which are controlled by 
the U.S.311 Drawing a line of the geographical boundaries, the Diaoyu / 
Senkaku Islands form incontrovertibly part of the territory administered by the 
U.S.312 Given that the U.S. airforce used two of the islands for training 
purposes,313 neither Japan nor Taiwan wanted to disturb the U.S. by raising 
the question of the islands’ sovereignty. It has to be recalled that Taiwan and 
Japan were undergoing American de-facto tutelage. Both countries had 
ratified military defence pacts in order to forestall the Communist threat.314 
From this point of view, it was arguably politically speaking wise not to raise 
an artificial dispute about islands administered by the country granting the 
military shield.  
3.4.9. 1954 ROC-US Mutual Defence Treaty 
On December 2nd, 1954 the Mutual Defence treaty between the U.S. and the 
ROC was signed, which immediately prompted a reaction of the Communist 
government.315 The Renmin Ribao stated that the “The Chinese people’s 
determination to liberate Taiwan is unalterable.”316 Since Taiwan lack 
international capacity to contract it cannot be subject to any international 
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treaty.317 Interestingly, the 1954 Taiwanese-American defence treaty might 
have contained a wording implying that the ROC actually controlled the Tiao-
yu-tao Islands. Art. 7 stipulated: 
 
“The government of the Republic of China grants, and the government of the 
United States accepts, the right to dispose of such United States land, air, and 
sea forces in and about Taiwan and the Pescadores as may be required for 
their defence as determined by mutual agreement” 
 
It could be refuted that the word “about” indirectly indicates that the 
surrounding seas are under the control of the ROC. It is possible to assume 
that not only the Japanese granted patrolling rights to U.S. forces, but the 
Taiwanese also could have done so by virtue of this defence treaty.318 On the 
other hand, this inaccuracy is probably a result of Taiwan’s dangerous 
offshore policy (Matsu, Quemoy). In this regard the U.S. was reluctant to 
defend these Taiwanese possessions, which are located directly in vicinity of 
China mainland. 319 The U.S. renounced the Mutual Security Treaty in 1978 in 
order to obtain diplomatic ties with the PRC. In 1979, the Taiwan Relation Act 
was passed into law by the U.S. Congress, which substituted the prior 
treaty.320  
3.4.10. Domestic confusions about the islands ownership 
3.4.10.1. Yearbooks 1951 – 1975 
Until the 1970s, the National Government in Taipei was recognized as the 
“incumbent” legitimate representative of the Chinese people by most 
countries. Up to today, the Taiwanese government edits a yearly compendium 
called the “ROC Yearbook”. This yearbook’s editors were oblivious about the 
Tiaoyu-tai Islands until the 70s. According to the 1962 /1963 issue, Taiwan’s 
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location lies between 21°45’25 and 25°37’53 north latitude and 119°18’3 and 
122°6’25 east longitude. This implies that at that time the islands were not 
counted as being under sovereignty be of Taiwan. In the 1968 edition of the 
Taiwanese yearbook321 it was stated that the northern limit of Taiwan is 
Agincourt Island, which is located approximately 150 km south-west of the 
Tiao-yu-tai.322  
3.4.10.2. Other Taiwanese Publications excluding the Tiaoyu-tai 
In 1965, the book “The outline of Local-Self Government323 in Taiwan 
Province” recalls the Jilong Island as the most northern territory of Taiwan. 
This implies as well that the Tiaoyu-Tai Islands were not deemed as domestic 
territory.324 Simultaneously, the two Taiwanese logbooks, compiled by Xiang 
Da in 1961 stated that “Diaoyu Yu is an island of the Senkaku Gunto on the 
way to Liuqiu from Jilong of Taiwan. Today’s name is Gyocho Jima.” 
3.4.10.3. Chinese Publications 
The official « public relation » organ for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
criticised the administration of the Ryukyu Islands by the U.S.  The periodical 
allocated the islands to Okinawa Prefecture; the newspaper stated that “the 
Ryukyu Islands are located northeast of our Taiwan Islands ... including 
Senkaku Shoto.”325 Today, Chinese contemporary atlas, although delineating 
the maritime borders vis-à-vis other countries, renounce to indicate any border 
in regard to the Diaoyu Dao.326     
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3.4.10.4. Similarities of Chinese and Taiwanese publications 
Obviously, neither Chinese government could remember the exact status of 
the disputed islands. It is again striking that in some Chinese publications the 
Chinese began to adopt the Japanese names. It seems that the former 
“Middle Kingdom” simply did not worry about its own history by just forgetting 
about it.327 As regards to the possible legal recognition of the border, it seems 
that official Taiwanese books intended to exclude the disputed islands, too. 
3.4.10.5. Japanese Textbooks 
According to Takahashis book “Senkaku Retto Noto” the Japanese have 
published altogether ten school textbooks from 1944-1971, which did not 
mention the Senkaku Islands. All these textbooks were subject to an approval 
by the Japanese Ministry of Education.328 
3.4.10.6. Taiwanese Labourers  
It was reported that on August 12th, 1968 forty-five Taiwanese workers 
undertook some works to dismantle a wrecked ship on Minami-kojima 
(Nanxiaodao) Island.329 As they did not have a residency permit of the Ryukyu 
government, Japanese officials deported them from the islands. However, 
they could prove their identity by Taiwanese emigration permits. In order to 
continue their work they subsequently applied for Japanese permission. A 
similar incident took place in 1970. The Japanese contend that their officials’ 
reaction in these incidents amounts to the exercise of sovereign rights and 
that the Taiwanese government did not regard the islands as being subject to 
its sovereignty.330 
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3.4.11. Conclusion 
From the above-mentioned history it must be concluded that all three claimant 
states must have gone through an era of confusion. It seems that none of the 
disputants were entirely cognizant of their own potential claim to sovereignty.  
3.5. The Year 1969 – The Oil Discovery   
3.5.1. Valuable resources next to the islands 
Under the sponsorship of the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia 
and the Far East (ECAFE) geologists of the Republic of Korea and the 
Philippines established a Committee for Joint Prospecting for Mineral 
Resources in Asian Offshore Areas (CCOP). This survey was published in a 
sensational way and altered every coastal state’s domestic perceptions331: 
According to the experts’ report, there was a “high probability existing that the 
continental shelf between Taiwan and Japan may be one of the most prolific 
oil reservoirs in the world.” The response of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan 
was to lay claim to seventeen seabed oil zones in the Yellow and East 
Chinese Sea; thirteen of them overlapped the adjacent state’s claim.332 The 
most valuable part of the region was determined to be a 200,000 sq km next 
to the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands.333   
3.5.2. Japan’s national government’s action 
In May 1969, Okinawa Prefecture erected a national marker on the main 
island of Diaoyu underpinning its claim to the island chain.334 The Japanese 
claim to sovereignty pursued the following objectives: to ensure that the U.S. 
returned the Okinawa islands as soon as possible, to prevent Chinese 
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fishermen from entering the maritime territory and to allocate exploration 
rights to American companies.335 
 
On July 17th, 1970, the Japanese Ambassador to Taiwan delivered a 
diplomatic note to the PRC government claiming the sovereignty over the 
islands.336 This note was a pre-emptive measure towards the Taiwanese 
Yuan, which approved a draft on July 30th, 1970 about the drilling rights of oil 
and gas in China’s territorial waters and the adjacent continental shelf 
enclosing the area of the Tiao-yu Islands.337 
 
In September 1970, Taiwanese protesters hoisted a flag, which Japanese 
authorities removed on the following day. The Japanese foreign ministry 
published the announcement that “there is no question that Japan has 
territorial rights over (the Senkakus) and there is no need to discuss their 
territorial status with any country.”338 The dispute triggered an anti-Japanese 
protest movement called the “Safeguard the Diaoyutai movement,” which 
made the islands into a kind of totem for all Chinese nationals wherever they 
lived.339  
3.5.3. Taiwanese action 
In September 1970, the Taiwanese government made the following 
assertions: 1) the Japanese have no exploration rights on the Chinese 
continental shelf arising from small islands; 2) the predictable reversion of the 
islands from the U.S. to Japan would be a unilateral decision, which would not 
affect the Chinese claims.340 On December 30th, 1971, the Taiwanese 
formally declared the islands to be Chinese territory.341 Soon afterwards, they 
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speedily proclaimed the Continental Shelf following the principles established 
in the Truman Doctrine and they ratified the 1958 Geneva Convention on the 
Continental Shelf. Seeking the political support of their strongest ally, the 
Taiwanese also issued exploration titles to American companies.342 
3.5.4. People’s Republic of China action 
Until 1970, the PRC had been silent about the conflict. This silence might be 
interpreted that the islands still were under U.S. trusteeship; the PRC officials 
did not want to slow down the foreseeable switch of diplomatic recognition.343 
By the end of 1970, the Communist Party’s newspaper stated: 
 
“The Chiang Kai-shek gang is a political mummy, spurned long ago by 
Chinese people. All agreements and contract concerning the exploration and 
exploitation of China’s sea-belt and subsoil resources that gang concluded 
with any country…. are illegal, null and void.” 344  
 
As a result of the Chinese announcement, the U.S. Department of State 
advised American oil companies to disengage their commitment in the area. 
The advent of Sino-Soviet antagonism was another driving force making the 
U.S. shift their stance and to grant more consideration to the Chinese 
position.345  
3.5.5. Other Countries’ Switch of Recognition 1972 / 79 
In the same year U.S. President Richard M. Nixon visited the PRC the 
Taiwanese national government was expelled from its U.N. membership and 
its (permanent) seat in the Security Council in 1972 (U.N. Resolution 2758). 
The Sino-Japanese Communiqué of September 29th, 1972 had established 
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relations at an ambassadorial level between the Japan and China.346In order 
to obtain diplomatic ties with China the Japanese had to announce that 
Japan’s 1952 treaty with Taiwan was null and void. In return, the Chinese 
abandoned their claim to war reparations from Japan.347 The result was that 
China and Japan today do not formally recognize Taiwan as a state entailing 
the consequence that Taiwan cannot claim sovereignty over the Diaoyu / 
Senkaku Islands according to the Japanese perception of international law.348  
 
In 1972, the “Shanghai Communiqué” between the U.S. and the PRC laid the 
basis for the further political cooperation between China and the West. As the 
principle occupying power of Taiwan, the U.S. altered the Taiwanese status 
from “undetermined” to a “part of China” and Taiwan was put on a flight-path 
for eventual reunification with the PRC.349 As a consequence, many countries 
abrogated their recognition of the PRC, which culminated in the U.S. Switch of 
Recognition in 1979. As a pre-condition for the normalisation of diplomatic ties 
with the PRC, the U.S. had to remove its troops from Taiwan and to abrogate 
the 1954 U.S.-ROC Mutual Security Treaty.350  
3.5.6. Japan regains full sovereignty over Okinawa in 1972 
Under the Okinawa Reversion Treaty, which entered into force on May 15th, 
1972 Japan regained full sovereignty over the Okinawa Islands. The Okinawa 
Reversion Agreement reads as follows: 
 
“Considering that the United States of America desires, with respect to the 
Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands, to relinquish in favour of Japan all rights 
and interests under Art. 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the city 
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of San Francisco on September the 8th, 1951, and thereby to have 
relinquished all its rights and interests in all territories under the said Article…. 
Art. 1. 2. For the purpose of this agreement, the term (“the Ryukyu Islands 
and the Daito Islands”) means all the territories and their territorial waters with 
respect to which the right to exercise all and any powers administration, 
legislation, and jurisdiction was accorded to the United States of America 
under Art. 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan other than those with respect to 
which such right has already been returned to Japan in accordance with the 
Agreement of Amami Islands and the Agreement concerning the Nanpo Shoto 
and other islands signed between the United States of America and 
Japan….”351  
 
By virtue of this agreement, Okinawa returned to Japanese control. But as 
compensation to the U.S., the wording was left so loose that President Nixon 
could launch nuclear attacks from Okinawa.352 The Reversion Agreement 
ambiguously included the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands. Referring to the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty of 1952, the agreement hinted that the rights over the 
Diaoyu / Senkaku must have also been reverted. The Okinawa Reversion 
Treaty raised the suspicion of the PRC from the outset and at the same tried 
to secure its interests through the following statement: 
 
“Diaoyu and the other islands have been China’s territory since ancient times. 
There is no question about this whatsoever…. It is even more absurd from the 
United States to want to include China’s territory Diaoyu and other islands it 
has occupied into the area of reversion in accordance with the Okinawa 
Reversion Agreement”353 
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China’s alertness paid off as the U.S. construed the content of the Okinawa 
Reversion Agreement as being different from the 1952 Peace Treaty with 
Japan. According to the United States Department of State 
 
“The United States believes that a return of administrative rights over those 
islands to Japan, from which the rights were received, can no way prejudice 
any underlying claim. The United States cannot add to the legal rights of 
Japan possessed before it transferred administration of the islands to us, nor 
can the United States, by giving back what it received, diminish the rights of 
other claimants. The United States has made no claim to the Senkaku Islands 
and considers that any conflicting claims to the islands are a matter for 
resolution by the parties concerned.”354 
 
The U.S. Secretary of State William O. Rogers reiterated the U.S. 
interpretation, which stated “the reversion treaty does not affect the legal 
status of those islands at all”. In another declaration the U.S. Foreign 
Relations Committee uttered that the Reversion Agreement grants Japan the 
rights of administration and not sovereignty.355 The U.S. held that during the 
trusteeship of the Okinawa Islands Japan still had residual sovereignty over 
the islands.356  
3.5.7. Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty in 1978  
In 1978, the U.S. government determined that it would recognize the PRC 
government as the sole legitimate representative of the Chinese people. This 
decision went into effect on January 1rst, 1979.357 Henceforth, it broke 
diplomatic ties with Taiwan.358 The year 1978 provided though a much more 
important setting for the conflict. China and Japan were to sign a peace treaty, 
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but due to the islands dispute the signing of the treaty dragged on. In Japan, 
the right-wing and pro-Taiwan party Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 
parliament members urged for an inclusion of an anti-hegemony clause, which 
would perpetuate Japan’s claim to the islands. On April 7th, 1978, about 93 
LDP anti-treaty Diet members urged the Japanese government to resolve the 
status of the islands in the friendship treaty.359  
 
Until this point of time, the parties had sidelined the islands’ question in the 
negotiations. Once the pressure of the Diet members had been made public, 
the Chinese no longer could afford to keep silent about it. China’s reaction 
was assertive, instantly dispatching about a hundred armed fishing boats to 
the islands on April 13th. Shortly after the confrontation, the Chinese Vice-
Premier Keng Piao claimed that “the incident was accidental… neither 
intentional nor deliberate”. The incident finally proved to be advantageous for 
the Japanese since they could publicly pressurize Beijing to retreat from their 
confrontational stance. In order to ensure the conclusion of the treaty, the 
Chinese sacrificed their assertive position. Japan acquired thereby at least the 
de - facto ownership of the islands.360  
 
On August 23rd, 1978, whilst signing the treaty, the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands 
dispute was circumnavigated. Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping confirmed the 
omission during his visit in Japan, where he stated that the dispute should be 
shelved to be dealt with by wiser future generations.361 The future Japanese 
Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone accepted that the dispute “shall be 
postponed” and was thus the first Japanese representative to admit that there 
was a dispute over the islands.362 Following this Sino-Japanese 
disagreement, the Japanese private youth organisation “Japanese 
Qingnianshi” refurbished the beacon on the islands, which they had 
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established already little after 1972. In 1978, they proclaimed on behalf of 
Japan sovereignty and the Japanese side constructed a helicopter landing-
pad on the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands in 1979.363 
3.5.8. The Diaoyu islands today 
3.5.8.1. The beginning of the 1990s 
In the year 1990, the Japanese Maritime Safety State agency recognized the 
lighthouse on Diaoyutai as an official beacon. ROC students gave prominence 
to the lighthouse controversy and planted a Taiwanese flag on the Diaoyutai 
Islands. Japanese officials immediately removed this flag.364 Furthermore, the 
Taiwanese government wanted to place an Olympic torch on the islands.  
3.5.8.2. The Mid-1990s 
In the year 1996, the People’s Republic of China announced its willingness to 
conduct a joint exploration of the oil field subject to the prerequisite that Japan 
recognizes China’s sovereignty. Japan declined this proposal arguing that the 
owner of this privately owned land does not object private committees to land 
on the islands. The national government could not legally hinder the private 
activities on the islands. Given these circumstances the Japanese 
government could not concede to something, which is beyond their powers.365 
 
In July, proponents of right wing Japanese Youth Organisation built a 
temporary lighthouse, erected two memorials and returned to repair the 
lighthouse. Anti-Japanese demonstrations took place in Hong Kong and 
Taiwan; Taipei exhorted the Communist government to protect the Chinese 
interest. In one poll five out of six Taiwanese were in favour of military action 
against the Japanese. The government realizing that the dispute could trigger 
a serious clash immediately eased the tensions afterwards.366 In the same 
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year, a Chinese protester drowned in stormy weather conditions when he 
attempted to land on the islands. Since then civil and political groups from all 
claiming states are regularly visiting the islands to demonstrate the 
sovereignty of their domestic government.367 This time, the Japanese 
deviated from their usual arresting of illegal immigrants and they were only 
expelling the activists.368 At the same time, the Chinese government’s 
conduct was quite contradictory. Despite claiming that Japanese intruders had 
“grossly violated” its sovereignty, the Chinese leaders focussed on 
downplaying the incident by declining all applications for any anti-Japanese 
agitations. President Jiang Zemin appealed to public patriotism, but he aimed 
to keep the students off the street. He feared that the protesters would not 
stop at the issue of war crimes, but that they would turn themselves against 
his own autocratic regime.369  
                                                
3.5.8.3. Today and Near Future 
Although all claimants view a joint development and exploitation of the 
resources adjacent to the islands as a possible solution, no progress on this 
matter can be reported.370 In February 2001, China and Japan concluded a 
mutual prior notification agreement stipulating that each side must inform the 
other before entering the waters of an area in which this country “takes 
interest.” Chinese authorities must notify Japan before entering its territorial 
sea, including the surface around the disputed islands. This does not imply 
China’s tacit recognition of Japan’s ownership.371 The agreement cleverly 
avoids any clear stipulations, from which line a notification is required.372 On 
the other side, China has started drilling closer to the disputed territory 
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arousing Japanese suspicion that the Chinese will siphon the gas of the 
Chunxiao / Shirakaba, Duanqiao / Kusunoki, Tianwaitian / Kashi fields, which 
are on the Japanese side of the median line. As these undertakings were 
confirmed by the Shanghai-based Sinopec oil-company, the Japanese 
allowed their national oil company Teikoku Oil to do the same.373 Currently 
the countries have avoided exacerbating the dispute.  
                                                
 
In 2005, Japan’s administration printed marine maps indicating the Japanese 
lighthouse upon it.374 Currently, the claimants have contented themselves with 
maintaining the status-quo. In these days, the new sworn in Japanese Prime 
minister Abe seeks to reinvigorate Sino-Japanese ties, which have 
deteriorated under his predecessor Kiuzumi. As both countries see the 
unsettled territorial status in the Eastern Chinese Sea as their possibly 
greatest security threat, they convened on installing a 24/7 telephone hotline 
in 2007. In case, that the dispute becomes again more acute, the states wish 
to use this device in order to prevent a further escalation.375     
 
For a long-term resolution, the time factor might be decisive: The rising 
economic giant China can increasingly rely on its economic power to claim the 
islands, while Japan can arguably increasingly assert the historical 
consolidation of its territorial title. 
4. Modes of Acquiring and Losing Territory 
The territorial dispute in the East Chinese Sea involves several areas of 
international law. The conflict’s topics includes the different modes of 
acquiring territory, the intertemporal law, the Law of the Sea and the peaceful 
settlement of these territorial and maritime conflicts. The thorough legal 
analysis could be a prerequisite to freezing the dispute.  
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4.1. Subjects in Public International Law 
In any domestic legal system, certain legal subjects, no matter if they are 
individuals or companies, will be regarded as possessors of rights and duties 
enforceable by law.376 The legal subject “state” is the entity of law that is the 
primary entity under international law, which is capable of possessing 
international rights and duties. The state has the capacity to maintain its rights 
by bringing up international claims.377 In Public International Law, the state is 
the primary bearer of duties, whereas individuals can only be subjects of 
obligations and duties in a mediate way.378 On the contrary, the four 1949 
Geneva War Conventions made an exception by granting direct subjective 
rights to individuals.379 
 
4.2. Sovereignty 
All the three disputants contest the sovereignty of the islands. A state cannot 
exist without territorial sovereignty380 and the sovereignty can only be 
exercised by states;381 thus, the concepts of sovereignty, statehood and 
territory are inseparable.382 Oppenheim defined state territory as 
 
“State territory is that defined portion of the surface of a globe which is 
subjected to the sovereignty of the State. A State without territory is not 
possible, although the necessary territory may be very small. The importance 
of State territory lies in the fact that it is the space within which the State 
exercises its supreme authority.”383 
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What does sovereignty of a state actually mean? The word sovereignty 
emanates from the Latin word “super” (meaning over, above), which was 
switched to “superanus” in the Middle Ages and resulted finally in the French 
term of sovereign.384 The late Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) noted in 
his famous oeuvre “De Jure Belli ac Pacis” that sovereignty is 
 
“That power is called sovereign whose actions are not subject to the legal 
control of another, so that they cannot be rendered void by the operation of 
another human will…”385    
 
It can also be stated that sovereignty equates to legal independence.386 
Sovereignty / legal independence grants the state not only the title to territory, 
but also the jurisdictional reach of its state bodies. One of the major 
parameters of statehood is the capacity to exercise judicial, administrative and 
legislative jurisdiction over territory and nationals.387  
 
4.3. The accessory maritime rights 
Under international law, the ownership of maritime space can only be claimed 
on the basis of sovereignty over land territory. In the present disputes, the 
claimants all seek ownership of the Diaoyu / Senkaku islands in order to claim 
not only the territory of the islands themselves, but also the various maritime 
zones, which arise from them. The future owner of the disputed islands is 
entitled to claim the territorial water zone of 12 miles. The dispute over the 
islands does not lie in the question of the territorial water, but it is more the 
Exclusive Economic Zone that the parties of the conflict seek to obtain. The 
islands sovereignty entitles the owner to claim an Exclusive Economic Zone 
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(EEZ) of 200 miles and a Continental Shelf, which mirror the economic side of 
the islands.388  
 
4.4. Distinguishing Acquisition relating to two Chinese 
countries 
Covering the question how a state may acquire territory, one should 
differentiate between the acquisition of territory by an existing state and the 
birth of a new state.389 This question could be vital taking into account that at 
least one of the two Chinese countries might have arisen after the islands 
were possibly already Chinese territory. The acquisition of territory by new 
states is problematic as long as the creation of a new state is not completed, 
there is no legal entity to hold the title to territory.390 Relating to the claim of 
Taiwan the question arises of whether Taiwan’s emergence as a new state is 
already completed. This must be questionable because the Taiwan 
government has never received the title of sovereignty over their territory. The 
Japanese renunciation over Taiwan in Art.2 (b) of the San Francisco Treaty in 
conjunction with the nullification of the Treaty of Shimonoseki arguably implied 
that “China” should be the beneficiary of Japan’s renunciation. The Taiwanese 
legal status, though, remained undetermined.391 On the grounds of Art. 23 of 
the San Francisco Treaty, the U.S.A. was assigned to be the principle 
occupying power of Taiwan Island. Art. 4 (b) granted the U.S. Military 
government the final disposition rights over the territory of Taiwan. Legally 
speaking, Taiwan is not an independent country and it does not hold the title 
of territory over their island.392  
 
Referring to Taiwan this raises the question of whether the National 
government in Taipei can be granted the disputes islands’ territory considering 
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that they are not even holding the legal title of their main Taiwanese island. 
Although these reflections may be dogmatically correct, the sui generis status 
of Taiwan as a quasi independent state recognized unofficially by the entire 
world community does not impede that the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands could be 
attributed to Taiwan. If they are capable of sustaining a de facto state without 
formal title of sovereignty, the same principle shall apply to the disputed 
islands. Thus, the incomplete emergence of the Taiwanese “state” has no 
impact on the question of whether Taiwan may be the “owner” of the disputed 
islands.  
 
4.5. Modes of acquiring the title 
In the Middle Ages the state territory was identified with the private property of 
the monarch. For this reason, the rules of Roman law regarding the 
acquisition of private property were applied to the acquisition of territories of 
the state.393 It has been suggested that these methods developed by the 
Romans are no longer to be applied today.394 The early principles governing 
acquisition of title of territory applied today were developed during the period 
of colonialism at the beginning of the 16th century onwards.395  
4.5.1. Occupation 
Acquisition of territory by occupation derives from the Roman law concept. It 
is an original mode of acquisition and refers to territory, which at the time of 
occupation was not under the sovereignty of any other state.396  
4.5.1.1. Terra nullius 
In former times, in International Public Law many scholars considered every 
territory to be terra nullius, provided that no one lives there or provided that 
the people living there did not belong to a civilized polity.397 This position was 
modified in the Western Sarah Case.  
 
                                                 
393 L. Oppenheim, International Law – Peace Vol. 1 (8th ed., 1955), L. Oppenheim (ed.), 545 
394 Guiqin Wang, Territoriale Streitfragen im Südchinesischen Meer, (1rst ed., 2005), 27 
395 Gillian D Triggs, International Law: Contemporary Principles and Practices (1rst ed., 2006), 212 
396 Surya P. Sharma, Territorial Acquisition, Disputes and International Law (1rst ed., 1997), 61 
397 L. Oppenheim, International Law – Peace Vol. 1 (8th  ed.), Hersch Lauterpacht (ed.), 555 
   
“Whatever differences of opinion there may have been among jurists, the 
state practice of the relevant period indicates that territories inhabited by tribes 
or people having social and political organisation were not regarded as terra 
nullius”398 
 
As a result, during the epoch of colonialism whenever the soil was used by 
indigenous people (e.g. tribes) the territory cannot be regarded as terra 
nullius.  As a matter of a fact, occupation is also possible in the unlikely 
scenario that one state has abandoned the territory prior to the occupation.399 
Today, terra nullius probably does not exist at any place on the globe given 
that even the most remote lands are claimed by at least one country.400 
4.5.1.2. Occupation on behalf of a state 
Unless the terra nullius is not res communis (territory belonging to the 
community) a state, not a private individual, may acquire the territory.401 This 
does not, however, impede a state from authorizing private agents, officials, 
businessmen, diplomats to occupy the territory on its behalf.402 In order to 
assure the state’s liability it does not matter whether the “state seal” is a priori 
or a posteriori placed on the occupation. In the Age of Discovery and until the 
development of modern communication, the ratification of acquisition on 
behalf of the state could only be implemented after the discovery – after the 
existence of the territories could be reported to the Crown.403 On the other 
hand, prior authorisation that any discovery was accrue to the sovereign, 
effectively bypassed this method.  
4.5.1.3. Actual taking possession and the will to possess as a sovereign 
International law lays emphasis on effective control as this factor mirrors the 
core value of stability within the international legal order.404 Today, theory and 
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practice are unanimous about the rule that occupation is rendered effective by 
taking physical possession of the territory and factually administering it. In 
order to demonstrate effectiveness of control it is necessary that territory is 
placed under the sway of the state and that the intention of acquiring 
sovereignty is fulfilled. The requirements of “corpus and animus occupandi” 
can be met by a settlement on the territory, by a proclamation and by hoisting 
a flag.405  
 
A declaration or notification to other states can provide sound evidence of the 
animus occupandi.406 The 1885 Congress of Berlin stipulated in its precise 
terms of its General Act that in regard to African territories the allegedly 
completed acquisition should be notified to the other states.407 A failure to 
notify did not leave the occupied territory open to appropriation.408 Until the 
Convention of St. Germain was signed in 1919, it was not mandatory to notify 
other state parties of the claims.409  
 
Thereupon it can be stated that occupation requires a real element of “corpus 
occupandi” (taking possession) as well as an element of “animus occupandi” 
(the will). Whenever these two prerequisites are fulfilled, the occupied territory 
becomes territory of the occupant state.  
4.5.1.4. Limitation of physical presence 
The physical presence on remote and inhospitable islands or islets might 
represent a considerable challenge in order to exercise effective control on 
these distant territories. The isolated nature of some islands made the courts 
reconsider the strict requirements, which they previously demanded for an 
assumption of effective control.410 
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4.5.1.4.1. Netherlands versa U.S.A. (Islands of Palmas Case of 1928) 
The Islands of Palmas case is regarded as a leading case in this area. Here, 
Judge Huber observed: 
 
“Manifestations of territorial sovereignty assume, it is true different forms, 
according to the conditions of time and place. Although continuous in 
principle, sovereignty cannot be exercised in fact at every moment on every 
point of territory. The intermittence and discontinuity compatible with the 
maintenance of the right necessarily differ according as inhabited or 
uninhabited regions are involved.” 411  
 
In this case, Judge Huber meticulously examined which disputant had the 
better title of sovereignty: He stated that, although the island between 
Indonesia and the Philippines was isolated, it was permanently inhabited so 
that “acts of administration could not be lacking for very long periods.” The 
island inhabitants were subject to Dutch taxation and the Dutch distributed 
flags on the island prior to the moment when the U.S. claimed to have a legal 
title. These unchallenged acts of peaceful display of Netherlands sovereignty 
during the period of 1700-1906 were considered as a sufficient proof of Dutch 
sovereignty.412  
4.5.1.4.2. Clipperton Island Case of 1932 
Situated about 1200 km south-west of Mexico in the Pacific Ocean the 
uninhabited Clipperton Island was declared French territory by a French 
lieutenant in 1858. The lieutenant notified the French consulate in Honolulu. 
Afterwards the consulate informed the government of Haiwaii and made the 
declaration public in a local Haiwaii journal called “The Polynesian”.413 Other 
than granting a guano concession to some U.S. citizens, France did not carry 
out any activities on the territory. Thirty years later, a Mexican gunboat 
disembarked some sailors on the island and claimed the territory on behalf of 
Mexico based on a title of prior Spanish discovery and, by virtue of the law 
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being in force at that time, on the Bull Inter Caetera of Alexander VII. The Bull 
was promulgated on May 4th, 1493 and was underlined by the Treaty of 
Tordessillas in the following year.414 In this case, the sole arbitrator King 
Emmanuel III of Italy stated: 
 
“Thus, if a territory, by virtue of the fact it was 
completely uninhabited, is, from the first moment when 
the occupying state makes its appearance there, at the 
absolute and undisputed disposition of that state, from 
that moment the taking of possession must be considered 
as accomplished, and the occupation is thereby 
completed.”415  
 
Hereby the arbitrator found that France had effectively occupied the islands 
and had displayed no intention of abandoning the island. The case is 
important as it reveals the minimal requirements established for isolated and 
uninhabited islands. The requirements of effective occupation on these 
remote islands are much lower than elsewhere.416 
4.5.1.4.3. Eastern Greenland Case of 1933 
At the beginning of the 20th century, Norway erected a wireless station and 
some of their expeditions wintered in Eastern Greenland causing Danish 
protests.417 The dispute erupted in 1931 when Norway issued a Royal 
Resolution claiming sovereignty over the east coast of Greenland. Soon 
afterwards, Denmark seized the Court and claimed to be the peaceful and 
continuous occupant, which was uncontested on a long-term basis. In 1814, 
Greenland as a whole was assigned to the Danish Crown in the Treaty of 
Kiel.418 Norway admitted that the western, southern and south - eastern part 
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were under Danish rule, but asserted that Eastern Greenland still was terra 
nullius.419 The Permanent Court of International Justice ruled in 1933. 
 
“It is impossible to read the records of the decisions in 
cases as to territorial sovereignty without observing 
that in many cases the tribunal has been satisfied with 
very little in the way of actual exercise of sovereign 
rights…. This is particularly true in the case of claims 
to sovereignty over areas in thinly populated or 
unsettled areas.”420 
 
From a virtual perspective, Denmark had not gained possession of all of 
Greenland, particularly not of the inaccessible eastern part. The Court was 
satisfied by the Danish “animus occupandi,” which Denmark displayed by the 
promulgation of hunting, fishing and other administrative regulations for all of 
Greenland.421  
 
Lauterpacht notably remarks of the Court’s ruling: “The borderline between 
attenuated conditions of effectiveness of occupation and the total 
relinquishment of the requirement of effectiveness has become shadowy to 
the point of obliteration.”422 
4.5.1.4.4. Western Sahara Advisory Opinion of 1975 
In 1975, the General Assembly of the U.N. requested that the ICJ to give an 
advisory opinion on the status of the Western Sahara. Morocco claimed the 
sovereignty over Western Sahara on the grounds of having been the only 
independent country in the region for a long time. Regarding the requirements 
of effective occupation the Court viewed it differently than in the Eastern 
Greenland Case. The Western Sahara, even though scarcely populated, 
contained tribes with coherent social and political structures amongst whom 
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conflicts took place quite frequently. War animosities took place quite 
frequently in the region. The paucity of evidence turned out to be a 
predicament for Morocco in that it could not exhibit sufficient legal ties to claim 
the effective control.423 The ICJ stated as well that the tribes424 living in the 
deserts impeded the territory from being considered “terra nullius”.425  
4.5.1.4.5. Minquiers and Ecrehos Case of 1953 
This case concerned a dispute between the United Kingdom and France over 
some islets and rocks in the English Channel. Both parties based their claim 
on historical titles.426 According to the U.K., William the Conqueror bases its 
title on conquest in 1066. In contrast, France argued the islands were under 
French rule after the Duchy of Normandy was disconnected from England in 
1204.427 The islands belonged to the criminal jurisdiction of the English Jersey 
Island and the few British housing dwellers belonged to taxation of the British 
Empire.428 The Jersey Coroner also has jurisdiction over wrecks and bodies 
washed up on the islands.429 The Court did not disregard the ancient titles, 
but it decided on basis of more recent displays of sovereignty. 
Notwithstanding the historical evidence, the ICJ opined that the actual and 
continuous display of state functions, e.g. local administration, jurisdiction and 
acts of legislative bodies are necessary to confirm a title. Without doubt, the 
state functions were exercises by the United Kingdom, for this reason, the ICJ 
adjudicated the islands to the British claim.430 Thus, an original title suffices, if 
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the sovereignty is not called into question. Whenever the sovereignty is 
disputed, its incessant and positive exercise must be displayed.431  
                                                
4.5.1.4.6. Summary 
The four juridical cases display the crucial factor, which need to be construed 
in the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands’ conflict. It shall be analysed whether the 
islands  
 
- were terra nullius until what point of time? 
- Who discovered at first the islands? 
- was the Chinese investiture mission sufficient to claim an effective   
  occupation? 
- was the effective occupation ever lost by the Chinese? 
 
4.5.2. Acquisitive Prescription  
4.5.2.1. Background of Prescription 
According to International Public law, a recognisable title might be obtained by 
prescription.432 Contrary to the preceding Roman model, today’s prescription 
no longer requires “good faith”.433 Most modern jurists can agree on the idea 
that prescription confers a legal title, which has a close relationship to the 
principle of acquiescence.434  
4.5.2.2. Definition of Prescription 
Prescription means that a doubtful acquisition of territory might be finally 
legitimised and legalized. The arbitrators’ definition of prescription in the 
Grisbadarna case was “that it is a settled principle of the law of nations that a 
state of things which actually exists and has existed for a long time should be 
changed as little as possible.”435  
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Although the occupation might have been illegal at the beginning, the 
possession of the territory for a certain period might grant a legal title to the 
occupant. Prescription implies the necessity of a virtual exercise of 
sovereignty. It is different from occupation insofar as the later can only 
emerge from virgin territory.436 In order to claim the title of prescription the 
occupying state must publicly exercise the possession à titre de souverain, 
which is a familiar element to effective occupation.437 Apart from publicity, it 
has to occupy the territory in an unchallenged, undisturbed and uninterrupted 
way. Thus, acquiescence - express or implied - and the lack of protest are two 
main pillars of prescription. 438 A very controversial question is the amount of 
time required for either the acquisition of a title or the extinction of a title. 
Analysing the literature it must be concluded that a period of twenty or thirty 
years is not sufficient. In the British Guiana – Venezuela Boundary dispute the 
arbitrators considered a period of 50 years as sufficient.439    
4.5.2.3. Prerequisites of Protest 
How must the protest be uttered? Today, it suffices if diplomatic protest is 
expressed and is formally registered on the international stage.440 These 
formalities are called into question; for example Brownlie states: “If 
acquiescence is the crux of the matter one cannot dictate what its content is to 
be, with the consequence that the rule that jurisdiction rests on consent may 
be ignored and failure to resort to certain organs is penalized by loss of 
territorial rights.”441 Nevertheless, the necessity to avoid the completion of 
prescription by diplomatic correspondence is recognized by the state 
practice.442   
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4.5.2.4. Value of a possible claim based on prescription 
There is no decision of any international tribunal, which is expressly based on 
the grounds of prescription.443 Even in the Islands of Palmas Case Judge 
Huber employed the term “so-called prescription”.444 In the Chamizal 
arbitration between Mexico and the U.S. the American claim of prescription 
was denied due to Mexican protest.445 Basing a claim merely on prescription 
might not be advisable as this legal device is quite elastic and unpredictable. 
Each claim to title of prescription needs to be evaluated upon the special 
circumstances of the case (geographical nature of the territory / absence or 
existence of other claims) and no general rules can be established about this 
legal device.446  
4.5.3. Conquest / Annexation 
Conquest, as distinct from occupation is the use of force to take possession of 
alien territory.447 To be implemented the requirements of the actual taking 
over (factum) and the intention (animus) to take over had to be fulfilled.448 
Once the war was finished, the second prerequisite for a valid conquest had 
to be completed. This was possible in a threefold way: a) through subjugation, 
b) through the mere cessation of hostilities, when the parties of the military 
conflict abstain from further bellicose action and hover into a peaceful 
coexistence without regulating expressly their new relation, and c) through a 
treaty of peace.449 
 
It can be observed that the terms conquest and annexation are 
interchangeably utilized in the language of international law books. There is, 
however, one slight difference. The two words vary in terms of transfer of 
sovereignty. In a subjugated state, the sovereignty is not yet displaced until 
the final step of annexation is completed. The annexation can be completed 
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by any expression of the conqueror to regard the territory as his own in order 
to shift the sovereignty to the conqueror.450  
 
Since the 1928 Kellogg Briand Pact the use of force as an instrument of 
national policy (ius ad bellum) is no longer lawful.451 This pact, which had its 
origins in various Hague Conventions of the late nineteenth / early twentieth 
century War Conventions and in the League of Nations Covenant452 certainly 
does not prohibit a state to resort to force in a case of national defence.453  
 
The Romans went even as far as touting the principle of a just war454, 
whereas in modern times the ius ad bellum was recognised principle of 
international law until 1928.455 The 1974 Definition of Aggression stipulates 
that no political, economic, military or any other reason may justify the use of 
force. Art. 2 (IV) of the UN Charta prohibits the “threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state”. The 1970 
Declaration of Principles of International Law concerning the Friendly 
Relations and Cooperation stated that “no territorial acquisition resulting from 
a threat or use of force shall be recognised as legal”456 Thus, the Israeli 
occupation of Palestinian territory after the “Six Day War” in 1967 must be 
deemed illegal as Indonesia’s integration of East Timor was in 1976. This 
point of view was affirmed in the U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 
478.457 This means, territory can no longer be acquired by force although the 
use of force e.g. in the frame of self - defence might still be legal.  
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Because the invalidity of such a territorial acquisition does not retroactively 
apply to conquests made before 1928, ancient tiles acquired by force may be 
valid today.458 Historically, any post war treaty tended to be coerced to the 
defeated state insofar as the victor state, bearing the stronger bargaining 
position, could put almost arbitrary pressure on the subdued state. Under 
traditional law, this compulsory force using “unequal treaties” was accepted as 
a perfect legal way of acquiring sovereignty over territory.459 
4.5.4. Cession 
A state may transfer a part of its territory including sovereignty to another 
state. This is usually done by a cession, which represents the most common 
form of acquiring territory. Cession requires that one state is aggressed to 
transfer its title of sovereignty and another state will take it over. The transfer 
of sovereignty byvirtue of cession is limited because of the inhabitants’ right of 
self-determination. The cession might be implemented by the use of force as 
territorial sovereignty often was transferred from the defeated power after a 
war.460 Pursuant to Art. 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
1969 the use of force implies the treaty to be null and void. Treaties signed 
before 1969 are again protected by the non-applicability of the principle of 
retroactivity. In other words, former coerced cessions, depending on the time, 
still may be regarded as valid under current international law. 461    
 
In Europe, cession is frequently used for facilitating the border delimitation of 
two neighbouring countries by e.g. interchanging parcels of states’ territory. 
One other famous China-related cession was the Sino-British Joint 
Declaration of 1984 where that part of Hong Kong was transferred which 
China had ceded to the U.K. in the middle of the 19th century. Another famous 
example was Russia selling Alaska to the U.S.A. for $ 7.2 US million in 
1867.462  
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4.5.5. Accretion and Avulsion 
Accretion and avulsion, both are put into practice by a geographical process. 
Accretion means the gradual addition of territory. This principle does not 
cause so much trouble as the added territory forcibly belongs to the adjacent 
state.463 There are two modes of accretion to be distinguished: The natural 
and artificial accretion.464 Whereas the artificial accretion of home based 
territory by aggradations (for example, Principality of Monaco), some states 
are setting up artificial islands in the South Chinese Sea.465     
 
Avulsion describes the violent shift of territory through a flood or by the 
creation of new islands. For example, this could be observed in a new volcano 
island, which emerged in the territorial sea of Japanese Iwo Jima. This island 
was henceforth regarded as Japanese territory.466 
4.5.6. Adjudication 
According to some jurists, a state also may acquire territory by adjudication of 
a judicial organ. The verdict of a tribunal surely will ascribe the title of territory 
to a state, but is the adjudication itself cannot be a formal means of acquiring 
a title. The adjudication between two claimants cannot foreclose the possible 
better claim of a third state.467 Again, these examples do not attribute a title to 
territory in the strict sense.  
4.5.7. Discovery 
It has been argued that in the fifteenth and sixteenth century the mere 
discovery of territory conferred the title of sovereignty as well.468 The 
discovery could confer an inchoate title (an option) to the discovering country 
to consolidate their title by exerting the effective occupation in a reasonable 
time.469 According to Arbitrator Huber in the Islands of Palmas Case the 
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ongoing existence of this inchoate title must be confirmed by subsequent 
manifestation of control.470 However, if the inchoate title is not perfected, any 
other country may occupy the territory. As Keller states: 
 
“Throughout this lengthy period (1400-1800), no state appeared to regard 
mere discovery, in the sense of physical discovery or simple “visual 
apprehension” as being in any way sufficient per se to establish a right of 
sovereignty over, a valid title to, terra nullius. Furthermore, mere 
disembarkation upon any portion of such regions… was not regarded as 
sufficient….the formal ceremony of taking of possession, the symbolic act, 
was generally regarded as wholly sufficient per se…”471 
. 
To sum up, the mere discovery does not enable the discoverer to preserve the 
state’s priority to the title.472  
4.5.8. Contiguity 
The principle of contiguity was recognized just in one very peculiar case: 
Rooted in the Trumann Doctrine many states started claiming the continental 
shelf of the sea. The exploitation of the continental shelf though remained the 
sole legal principle where the thesis of contiguity found its recognition as a 
state praxis.473 
 
Although the principle of contiguity was a latent consideration in the 
Permanent’s Court decision of the Eastern Greenland case, the Court was 
willing to accept Denmark’s intention to occupy all of Greenland. Today the 
right of propinquity is just a material fact albeit it does not state a legal 
necessity.474 As Arbitrator and Judge Huber stated in the Islands Palmas 
case:  
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“it is impossible to show the existence of a rule of positive international law 
that islands situated outside territorial waters should belong to a State from 
the mere fact that its territory forms the…. nearest continent or island of 
considerable size.”475 
 
“The principle of contiguity, in regard to islands, may not be out of place when 
it is a question of allotting them to one state rather than another, either by 
agreement of the Parties, or by a decision not necessarily based on law; but a 
rule establishing ipso iure the presumption of sovereignty in favour of a 
particular State, this principle would be in conflict with what has been said as 
to territorial sovereignty… nor is this principle of contiguity admissible as a 
legal method of deciding questions of territorial sovereignty; for the wholly 
lacking in precision and would in it application lead to arbitrary results”476  
 
The Courts have sometimes ruled that little islands within the 12 miles 
territorial sea belonged to the coastal state.477 The validity of the contiguity 
was indirectly denied for example in the 1977 award478 of the Anglo French 
Channel Islands (Guernsey, Jersey, Alderney, Sark, Herm and Jethou). 
Although the British islands lie 6.6 km from the French Normandy coast, they 
are not French territory.479 As the principle of contiguity has arisen to 
determine the effective occupation of the land-locked hinterland the principle 
in relation to islands needs to be regarded as inapplicable.   
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4.6. Loss of territory 
4.6.1. Six modes  
Altogether, there are six modes of losing territory: dereliction, cession, 
operation of nature, subjugation, prescription and revolt.480 They are converse 
to the acquisitive title and describe the way of getting rid of territory. From the 
author’s view, the principle of adjudication is not considered as a mode of 
losing territory because a tribunal’s ruling only makes a legal decision on the 
basis of historical facts. 
4.6.2. Dereliction  
The dereliction is the abandonment of territory resulting in its conversion to no 
man’s land. This device requires the intention to abandon and the actual 
abandonment.481 In the Clipperton award, it was ruled that France never had 
the animus to abandon the islands and the lack of exercise of authority did not 
forfeit the protected title of sovereignty.482 Thus, a definite renunciation must 
be put forward. 
 
4.7. Relativity of title 
In the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands dispute each claimant puts forward different 
theories on how they possibly could have obtained a title of sovereignty. In 
some cases, (Minquiers and Ècrèhos)  the international tribunal equated the 
question of sovereignty with actual possession. Therefore, the title does not 
necessarily mean that its holder will win a potential court procedure. In other 
words, it must be taken into consideration that a title to territory is relative, e.g. 
the state showing the superior claim, even though it might be imperfect, will be 
granted the title.483 The fact that an imperfect title might be superior to a 
perfect one is reflected in the intimate relationship between foreign politics 
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and public international Law.484 In the Rann of Kutch (Pakistan v. India) case, 
the area was adjudicated on the grounds of current actual exercise of 
sovereignty functions. In regard to the historical evidence put forward by the 
parties, the Chairman of the tribunal, however, explicitly stated that this does 
not imply that the disputed territory was historically terra nullius.485  
 
One the one hand the factual political conditions of the acquisition must be 
fulfilled, which might be subject to continuous and gradual modifications. On 
the other hand, the sphere of international law seeking to shelve the political 
issues on a permanent basis represents another aspect.486 In other words, 
international law cannot afford to simply ignore stable political conditions over 
many decades. The Falkland Islands dispute is a useful example in this 
context. The Argentineans arguably own the historical title over the islands, 
but the U.K. can claim to have the superior title because they administered the 
islands for many centuries.487 As a consequence, the U.K. arguably has the 
imperfect, but superior title. 
 
4.8. Applicability of these principles to the Diaoyu / Senkaku 
Islands 
The islands are situated in the middle of the Eastern Chinese Sea. As 
aforementioned, they are uninhabited, bear scarce vegetation and are of 
minor size. It is almost impossible to make a permanent living in the islands 
without onshore food deliveries. The preconditions for leading an elementary 
life are not sufficiently existing, such as grain, water supplies etc. The 
principles laid down in the Islands of Palmas (inhabited) and Clipperton 
(uninhabited) awards can be transferred to this case.  
                                                 
484 compare e.g. the Falkland islands: Although the U.K. occupied them centuries ago when they were 
not terra nullius before, the U.K. is entitled to lay claim on the islands 
485 The Indo - Pakistan Western Boundary Case Tribunal, quoted in: Surya P. Sharma, Territorial 
Acquisition, Disputes and International Law (1rst ed., 1997), 89 
486 Friederich Berber, Lehrbuch des Völkerrechts I. Band (1rst ed., 1960), 336 
487 Raphael Perl, The Falkland Islands Dispute In International Law (1rst ed., 1983), 30; Tim Hillier, 
Principles of International Law (2nd ed., 1999), 115 
   
4.8.1. Principle of Occupation 
All disputants agree that the islands a priori at a certain point of time were 
terra nullius. Only the date, at which the islands were incorporated into the 
claimant states’ territories, is debated. The claimant having acquired the title 
of occupation and being able to prove that it had not lost it by e.g. annexation 
or acquisitive prescription can demonstrate a better title of the Diaoyu / 
Senkaku Islands.   
4.8.2. Extent of Occupation 
The question arises whether the occupation of one of the islands does extend 
to the occupation of the entire group of islands and rocks. In fact, the islands 
lie quite far from each other. The historical evidence is rather scarce in this 
matter. In no mission record or transcription is it demonstrated that voyagers 
disembarked on the little rocks. Certainly, the beacons for orientation were not 
erected on all islands. The literature remains vague. The same applies to the 
legal principles laid down by the international tribunal, which have to be 
considered for adjudging the title of territory of the islands.  
4.8.3. Summary 
The traditional international public law contains five modes to acquire territory. 
From a historical perspective the most important ones are probably 
occupation and annexation. The most decisive principle for assessing the 
ownership of the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands will be without a doubt the 
principle of occupation, annexation and prescription. Analysing the historical 
evidence one must not forget that international law remains deeply influenced 
by factors envisaging political stability, effective governance and practical 
viability.   
 
 
5. Applicability of Intertemporal Law   
5.1. Introduction 
The creation of the principle of the intertemporal law has to be regarded as a 
device for preserving a balance between the stability in state relations and the 
   
gradual development of international law. This principle aims to stabilize 
juridical conditions and to ensure that legal results, such as e.g. the 
adjudication of property, are not subject to changes as a consequence of a 
modification of the law.488 The rule requires the analysis of events in the light 
of the rules in existence at the time the events occurred. This can lead to 
difficult problems as a territorial title of e.g. annexation might be valid under 
the law of the 16th century, but might be invalid under the rules of international 
law prevailing in the 20th century.489 The same principle, which evaluates the 
creation of rights to the law in force at the time the rights emerges demands 
that the continuous existence of the right shall be assessed by the conditions 
required by the evolution of the law.490 
 
5.2. Two-way application of this doctrine 
The principle of intertemporal law was first applied in the Islands of Palmas 
Arbitration. The arbitrator Huber probably erroneously considered - due to 
customary law of the 16th century - the title of the Spanish discovery as 
sufficient. As demonstrated above, at the beginning of the 20th century the 
mere discovery could not grant a title of sovereignty, but only conferred an 
“inchoate title”. Huber ruled: Distinguishing between the creation and the 
continuation of rights Huber required the continuous manifestation of the 
title.491 He stated that 
 
“it cannot be sufficient to establish a title by which the territorial sovereignty 
was validly acquired at a certain moment; it must also be shown that the 
territorial sovereignty has continued to exist and did exist at the moment which 
for the decision of the dispute must be considered as critical.”492   
 
Huber stated thereby that a possible lawfully acquired title might due to lack of 
manifestation, be lost afterwards. In the Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, the ICJ 
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ruled that all feudal titles were dislodged as a consequence of the 
supervening events in the year 1204 when the Duchy of Normandy was 
disconnected from England. According to the Jessup’s admonishing words, 
sovereign title insurance has become impossible. If a state has failed to 
exercise its title and has abandoned the territory, it simultaneously acquiesces 
to the potential claim of a third party.493 This affirms the idea that a continuous 
display of sovereignty is required under international law.  
 
5.3. The evolution of new legal principle 
How does the prohibition of retroactivity correlate with the emergence of new 
legal principles? A noteworthy and important decision was taken in the 
Aegean Continental Shelf case. The question was whether the continental 
shelf of the Greek Aegean Sea is accounted to belong to the wording of a 
treaty of 1928 “disputes relating to the territorial status of Greece”. This 
doctrine of the continental shelf was unknown at that time. The ICJ ruled by 
allowing exceptionally the retroactivity that the continental shelf dispute has to 
be taken into consideration to territorial Greek disputes.494    
 
5.4. The critical date question 
The determination of a critical date establishes an important “crossing” for the 
final decision. Until what point of time shall the facts be analysed? Up to 
today? This option must be ruled out – this would bolster the state’s position, 
which tries to improve its legal position through contrived manoeuvres.495 
Generally, it may be stated that the critical date can be set when the dispute 
arises between the parties. Logically, in the Eastern Greenland case the 
critical date was to be determined in 1931 when Norway proclaimed 
sovereignty and its claim was interfering / crisscrossing for the first time with 
the Danish claim.496  
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The ICJ though has not applied this theory dogmatically: In the Minquiers and 
Ecrehos case the Court held it to impossible to rule out all the circumstances, 
which occurred after the year 1886 and 1888 respectively.497 In the Argentine-
Chile Frontier case the ICJ stated that it ”had considered the notion of a 
critical date to be of little value in the present litigation and has examined all 
the evidence submitted to it, irrespectively of the date of the acts to which 
such evidence relates.”498 Henceforth, it must be concluded that due to the 
peculiarity of the case the critical date must be assumed at a much later point 
of time than when the dispute emerged. The concept of the critical date 
remains relative and being dependant on each individual case. Indeed, there 
might be multiple critical dates in each particular case.   
   
5.5. Provisions of the Vienna Convention of the Laws of 
Treaties 
Art. 28 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties provides treaties may 
not be applied retroactively unless the parties agree on a legal binding 
towards the acts having taken place before the treaty was signed.499 
 
5.6. Relevance to the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands 
The principle of the intertemporal law must be taken into consideration while 
assessing the opposing claims in the Eastern Chinese Sea. The question of 
whether the Chinese discovery of the islands was sufficient to form a root of 
title and if they fulfilled the prerequisites of effective occupation before the 
Japanese occupation of terra nullius can only be clarified by utilizing the 
intertemporal law.   
 
5.7. Important legal principles of international law 
The question of which party might be awarded title to the islands, relies also 
on the claimant’s subsequent behaviour. The three principles of recognition, 
acquiescence and estoppel are almost indistinguishable and overlap to a 
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considerable extent. They are all based on the principles of good faith and 
equity.500  
5.7.1. Recognition 
The pliability of recognition as a precise decision making tool makes it a 
valuable mechanism to establish a title. No matter how weak the title may be, 
recognition by the international community may operate to perfect it. 
Recognition is irreversible: Once a state has uttered its recognition, the 
recognition cannot be revoked anymore.501 Recognition of title does bind third 
states, although it might indicate some evidentiary weight.502     
5.7.2. Acquiescence 
Acquiescence has the same effect as express recognition, but it arises from a 
lack of protest when such a protest is usually to be expected. Acquiescence is 
basically passive and tacit conduct.503 A crucial question is whether 
acquiescence can be imputed when the acquiescing state has no knowledge 
of the relevant facts. In the Islands of Palmas Case Judge Huber inferred that 
a clandestine exercise of state authority over an inhabited territory during a 
considerable length of time would be impossible.504   
5.7.3. Estoppel 
The principles of acquiescence and recognition are rooted in a certain way of 
granting consent. The estoppel does not oblige a state to express its 
intentions. Judge Fitzmaurice stated that “estoppel is essentially a means of 
excluding a denial that might be correct – irrespective of its correctness.”505 
Whenever a state confers express recognition by a bilateral treaty, the state 
will be henceforth estoppeled from denying the existence of the title. The 
same applies to tacit behaviour as may be seen in the Temple case: The 
Thailand governments relied on French maps for more than 50 years 
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indicating that the disputed area of Temple of Preah Vihear belonged to the 
former French colony Cambodia. The Thai government accepted the maps 
and requested some more copies. Noteworthy was that the Court declined 
Thailand’s plea of an error by not recognizing the true border delimitation. In 
addition, the Prince Damrong of Siam took part in an official reception on 
behalf of the Resident Superior in the area. As Thailand did not express any 
reaction of protest, its government was precluded to claim the area. Thailand 
was estoppeled by its conduct to claim the territory although the line of 
reasoning was also propped on implied recognition, peaceful occupation, 
prescription and failure of protest.506 
5.7.4. Legal Device of “Historical waters” 
5.7.4.1. Emergence 
In pre-modern times maritime territory was regarded as territory belonging to 
the community (res communis), but in the 13th century Venice started 
appropriating bays and gulfs adjacent to the land, which they occupied. This 
represented an unlawful act at that time. Nevertheless, according to jurists at 
that time this incorporation of marine territory was done by prescription.507 
Later in the 17th century, the maritime territory was claimed on basis of the 
cannon shot doctrine to extend to the distance cannon could fire at that 
time.508 This distance resulted in the emergence of a three-mile limit of the 
territorial sea of many states.509 As states could only claim the three-mile 
territorial sea until the end of World War II, more than 70 % of the maritime 
area was ownerless.510 The Republic of China (1930) and Japan (1870) also 
adopted this limit into their domestic legislation.511  
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The term “historic rights” refers to a title created in derogation of international 
law through a historical process by which one state has maintained jurisdiction 
originally unlawful, but this title has been - due to a lack of protest - 
acquiesced by the neighbouring states.512 The originally unlawful possession 
is based on the following reasoning: The high sea is to be considered as res 
communis where all states have the same rights of the maritime territory. 
Under Roman law res communis could not be acquired.513 As the high sea 
does not represent terra nullius, it cannot be acquired by occupation. Thus, 
the only way of gaining a sovereign title of this area is to be done by 
prescription.514 It can be concluded that the title of sovereignty is historically 
acquired from the former owner the international community. This title must 
henceforth be consolidated by continuous exercise similar to the prescription.   
5.7.4.2. Anglo-Norwegian Fishery Case  
In the Anglo-Norwegian Fishery Case, the above-mentioned principle was 
judicially applied for the first time. The principles of acquiescence and tacit 
recognition were applied to develop one of the boldest judicial decisions ever 
delivered by an international tribunal.  
 
In the Anglo - Norwegian Fishery case the ICJ ruled that the delimitation of the 
Norwegian territorial sea was measured from a system of straight baselines 
joining the outmost points of the fjords and the skjaergaard. This system might 
be regarded as an act of historical consolidation of Norway’s maritime 
patrimony.515 As a result, the fringing islands aggrandized the Norwegian 
territorial sea. The Court was requested to consider a 100 year old Norwegian 
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decree, which was peacefully exercised without British protest.516 In the long-
term course of a historical consolidation in conjunction with acquiescing 
behaviour of the neighbouring states (e.g. Great Britain), a state may acquire 
maritime territory beyond its territorial sea. Another important factor in this 
judgment was the high level of interconnectedness of the land and the sea to 
such an extent that the land domain dominated the maritime domain.517 This 
interconnectedness was not present in the Tunisia / Libya case. In this case, 
the ICJ stated that historic rights might be relevant in this case in a number of 
ways. The Court was able to settle the dispute without relying on the Libya’s 
historic fishery historic rights. Therefore, the existence of the principle of 
historic rights was simultaneously reaffirmed and circumnavigated.518  
5.7.4.3. Relevance for the Diaoyu / Senkaku Dispute 
The historic water’s principle represents an exception to the general rules of 
international law. Relying on this device the owner of marine territory may 
claim territorial rights by this uncommon method. The geographic features of 
the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands are quite different from the situation of the 
Norwegian coast. Drawing a straight baseline from northern China via the 
islands towards Taiwan would be inadmissible. The shape of the Chinese Sea 
is quite different from the Norwegian Sea to the extend that it does not bear 
any interconnectedness between the landmass and the islands; on the 
contrary the disputed islands are comparatively remote from mainland China.  
 
5.8. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
UNCLOS   
5.8.1. The UN Convention on the Continental Shelf 1958 
In medieval times, the open sea was of such a nature that it did not admit the 
holding of possession of sea territory. The right of free navigation and fishing 
in the open sea was an unalienable right of all men. The Dutch Hugo De 
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Groot (Grotius) expressed this idea of free access to the sea in juridical terms 
for the first time.519 In his treatise, “De Mare Liberum”, he argued that no state 
could appropriate the sovereignty over the sea, which was to immense for 
anyone to effectively occupy. This concept was based on Roman law, which 
advocated the freedom of the seas.520 Contrary to divini iuris and res 
communis, only humani iuris could be susceptible of private appropriation.521 
Between the two world wars the development of ocean technology and the 
states ocean enclosure led to a gradual change of the concept of the freedom 
of the sea. 522 As a result, the freedom of the ocean faced gradual erosion.523  
 
The Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf of 1958 had its origin in the 
Truman Proclamation of 1945, which extended the geographic concept of the 
continental shelf to a legal sphere entitling the owner (coastal state) to claim 
the natural resources of the seabed and the subsoil. According to the 
Convention the Continental Shelf definition was to include “the seabed and 
subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast, outside the area of the 
territorial sea to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where the 
depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural 
resources of the said areas.”524 In the absence of an agreement or special 
circumstances, the 1958 Convention stipulated in Art. 6 the boundary is to be 
determined by the equidistance principle.525 However, the Conference’s 
participants could not agree on uniform provisions about the width of the 
territorial sea (3-6-12 miles).526 
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Lacking international recognition at that time the People’s Republic of China 
did not become a party of this convention. Japan took part in the first 
conference of the Convention, but finally refused to sign the Convention 
fearing it would jeopardize its sedentary fisheries in the North Pacific. Taiwan 
signed the convention at the very most opportunistic moment of 1970 and the 
Taiwanese made some reservations.527 For signatory countries (like Taiwan), 
not having signed the UNCLOS 1982 the Convention of the Continental Shelf 
remains legally effective.    
5.8.2. Ratifying the UNCLOS 1982 in 1996 
The 1958 UNCLOS Conventions caused problems as technology was 
advancing rapidly facilitating the exploration and exploitation of the continental 
shelf to a much greater depth than 200 meters. The exploitation criterion was 
therefore dismissed in UNCLOS IV.528 In 1996, Japan and the PRC ratified 
the UN Convention of the Sea of 1982.529 Due to its special legal status, the 
Taiwanese could not become part to the convention.530 Despite their special 
status, Taiwan proclaimed an EEZ in 1998, which may be interpreted as 
applicable to all of China and not only the island of Taiwan.531 Art. 6(I) 
UNCLOS reads as following: 
 
“The continental shelf of a coastal state comprises the seabed and the subsoil 
of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the 
natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental 
margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which 
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the breath of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of 
continental margin does not extend up to that distance” 
 
During UNCLOS III negotiations, the Chinese favoured the equitable principle 
as the fundamental principle of marine boundary limitation. This principle 
would need to be complemented by mutual consultations. The Japanese 
argued for the median line or equidistance principle for delineating the 
boundary.532 As a consequence of the diversity of legal stances, the 
Convention now provides an arbitrary and not technically geographical 
definition. No mention of the equidistance line is present in the wording of the 
law.533 As Shaw states: “Where the continental shelf does not extend as far 
as 200 miles from the coast, natural prolongation is complemented as a 
guiding principle by that of distance.”534 In the case of delimitation disputes, 
the two different stances again found a compromise in Art 83 (I), which reads 
ads: 
f the International Court of Justice, 
 order to achieve an equitable solution.”  
helf in absence of an agreement, the median 
ne should be the boundary.535  
                                                
re
 
“the delimitation of the continental shelf between States with adjacent or 
opposite coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international 
law, as referred to in Art. 38 of the Statute o
in
 
As a consequence, it must be stated that neither Japan’s nor China’s position 
was duly implemented by UNCLOS 1982. The geomorphologic criterion is 
enriched by the principle of distance measurement. Under the 1958 
Convention of the Continental S
li
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The matter has been even further complicated by the emergence of a new 
device: The enactment of UNCLOS disclosed a new legal method, the so-
called Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) pursuant Art. 55 – 75 UNCLOS. In this 
200 nautical miles zone, the littoral state is granted specific exploration rights 
f natural resources.536 In the case of a boundary disagreement, Art. 74 (I) 
nt on the basis of 
international law, as referred to in Art.38 of the Statute of the International 
territory, which gives rise to 
e specific zones such as for example the EEZ. Regarding the legal status of 
economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are 
                                                
o
reads as follows: 
 
“The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone between States with 
opposite or adjacent coasts shall be affected by agreeme
Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution.” 
5.8.2.1. Islands under Art. 121 UNCLOS 
The islands are held to be territory capable of bearing the state’s rights to a 
territorial sea, a contiguous zone, an exclusive economic zone and a 
continental shelf. The UNCLOS of 1982 states in Art.121 (II) that islands also 
have an exclusive economic zone. Even states’ minor remote islands are 
used as baselines to determine the state’s EEZ causing that relatively small 
countries, like New Zealand, to be able to claim the fourth biggest EEZ 
(1,409,500 nautical miles)537 in the world.538 For this reason in combination 
with the discovered natural resources, the ownership of the Diaoyu / Senkaku 
islands is that much more coveted. It is the land 
th
islands Art. 121 UNCLOS is the crucial provision: 
 
1. “An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is 
above water at high tide. 
2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous 
zone, the exclusive 
determined in accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to 
other land territory. 
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3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own 
s of judicial stability and 
learness because it does not define exactly the prerequisites for how to 
shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.”  
 
The crucial question lies in the determination of whether the Diaoyu / Senkaku 
Islands are capable of sustaining human life according to Art. 121 (III) 
UNCLOS. Independently of its size, any island can be used for drawing state’s 
baselines. This article is not very helpful in term
c
interpret the capability of sustaining human life.539  
 
As the articles travaux preparatoires expressed the wording “human habitation 
and economic life,” the deliberate modified textual approach of “or” provides 
the view that either one prerequisite may be sufficient to create an EEZ.540 
The ordinary meaning of the word supports this view.541 If the criterion for the 
capacity of sustaining human habitation is the existence of fresh water, then 
the disputed islands would not fit this criterion. As a matter of fact, the 
withdrawal of inhabitants dwelling on behalf of the Japanese businessman at 
the beginning of the last century must lead to the conclusion that a capability 
of human habitation seems rather unlikely. It does not seem very realistic that 
the barren rocks’ soil allows an appropriate vegetation to nourish the 
inhabitants. Maritime places, where formerly only fishermen seasonally 
dwelled, are nowadays sustained by military barracks (Spratly Islands). As 
military personal can be stationed almost everywhere, these non-civilian 
wellers shall be discounted for the determination of the sustainability of 
                                                
d
human habitation.542 
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The other alternative (“economic life of its own”) does not appear to fit the 
islands’ feature, either. It seems that complete economic self-sufficiency shall 
not be required for bearing an economic life of its own. In cases, where the 
islands are used as outposts for activities, which are completely in fact rooted 
in a land-based business these activities should not be taken into account.543 
thers are satisfied with regular visits of fishermen on the islands in order to 
id textual 
meaning of Art. 121 (III) UNCLOS, it is hardly possible to present the ultimate 
Islands.  
O
ascribe an economic life of it’s own to the islands.544 
 
This poorly drafted article has led to the awkward state practice of every state 
trying to “upgrade” its reefs and rocks to the legal status of an island.545Some 
countries, such as Maldives, Honduras, India, Myanmar Seychelles and 
Vanuatu, in the past went even so far to claim jurisdictional rights over artificial 
islands.546 Since a common states practice does not follow the rig
resolution for a legal classification of the Diaoyu / Senkaku 
5.8.2.2. Archipelagos according to Art. 46 (b) UNCLOS 
Provided, that the Diaoyu / Senkaku territories might be considered as islands 
they could claim the title of archipelago according to Art.46 (b) UNCLOS. 
According to Art.46 (b) UNCLOS an archipelago means a group of islands, 
which are so closely interrelated that such islands, waters and other natural 
features form an intrinsic geographical, economic and political entity, or which 
historically have been regarded as such. The prerequisite for claiming such a 
legal status is that the ratio between the land and the water space must from 
1:1 up to 1:9 and that the state’s feature bears certain cohesiveness.547 The 
Philippines, consisting of 7,107 islands north of the equator, are a good 
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example of an archipelago.548 Interestingly, the Philippines, despite their 
ratification of 1982 UNCLOS, refuse to implement the Convention’s regime 
into their domestic legislation. This state violates the clear wording of the 
Convention by upholding that they are entitled to maintain their historic rights 
f 140 miles baselines and by demanding authorisation of overflight and 
alls within the definition of an 
chipelago state pursuant Art. 47 (I), Art. 49 (I) UNCLOS, this country does 
ot consider itself having such a status.552 
e islands spread over a 190.000 sq 
                                                
o
navigation in the waters.549  
 
China has more than 6500 islands and the mainland coastline is about 18,000 
km.550 The PRC and Taiwan are without a doubt not archipelago states as 
their territory predominantly consist of land mass, whereas Japan could claim 
to be an archipelago state consisting of the four major islands and some other 
(remote) minor islands. Japan consists of four major islands and about 6000 
lesser islands. In non-juridical booklets, Japan is considered to be an 
archipelago state.551 Although Japan f
ar
n
  
 
6. Comparison to the related Islands conflict 
6.1. Spratly and Paracel Islands in the Southern Chinese Sea 
The Diaoyu Islands are not the only islands that China and Taiwan are laying 
their claim. The two Chinese states also stake their claims on the Spratly- and 
the Paracel Islands553 in the South China Sea. The area comprises some 180 
- 600 small islands, rocks and reefs. All th
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km sea zone comprising a total land mass of just 20 sq km. The number of 
islands varies according to the tide level. 
 
The Spratly Islands ownership is contested by the People’s Republic of China, 
by Taiwan, by Vietnam, by the Philippines, by Brunei and Malaysia. Today, 
each of the claimants administers to some of these marine territories. The 
Chinese administer the most of them.554 The possibility of exploration rights is 
accompanied by the threat of political instability; the overlapping claims makes 
it easy for the parties to concoct belligerent sentiments.555 The islands’ marine 
sea territory lies in between the main transit route of freight and oil ships on 
the way to their Asian destination ports.556 Similar to the Diaoyu Islands, this 
onflict is also linked to the unresolved China –Taiwan question because 
of the Spratlys named Itu Aba (Taiping 
claims on historical reasons.559 Their historic rights all lie within the 1947 U-
shaped line, which encompasses all the islands in the area.560 The islands 
                                                
c
Taiwan occupied the biggest island 
Dao).557    
 
6.2. Disputants Contentions   
Apart from the Japanese during WW II, no country has ever possessed all the 
islands at the same time. Until recently, no human beings resided on the 
islands. Today, except Brunei, which does not possess one single island, 
every country has occupied some of the islands; at least one of the other 
states contests every state’s claim.558 China is again basing its islands’s 
 
554 John Pike, ”Spratly Islands“ (17.12.2006), www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/spratly.htm, 
accessed on April 21rst, 2007; Samuel M. Makinda, “Das Tauziehen um die Spratly-Inseln“ 
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die-spratly-inseln.html, accessed on April 21rst, 2007  
555 Alan Collins, The Security Dilemmas of Southeast Asia (1rst ed., 2000), 144 
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A.J.I.L. (1995), 746 
557 Barbara Schneider, “Die Spratly-Inseln – Krisenherd im Südchinesischem Meer“; 
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had been an integral part of the Chinese sea area as early as during the Han 
Dynasty (200 B.C.).561 Chinese fishermen and merchant left archaeological 
evidence behind. In 1933, France formally incorporated the islands and 
notified this deed to the world, which arouse Japanese and Chinese protest. 
In 1974 - 76 China snatched the Paracel Islands from Vietnam and ousted the 
Vietnamese troops. This incident was followed by another bellicose clash 
between the two countries in 1988, when China violently occupied 6 further 
islands around the Johnson Reef (Spratly Islands) resulting in an interruption 
f diplomatic ties between the states for more than one decade.562  
aipei, by which the Japanese 
nounced the sovereignty of the islands.563  
rocks 
ing in their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) should belong to them.564  
Vietnam’s claim is based on the former French colonial title and on the 
                                                
o
 
Taiwan puts forward, like in the Tiao-yu-tai conflict, mainly the same reasons 
as the PRC does. The San Francisco Treaty obliged Japan to abandon the 
islands without determining to whom they shall be reverted. Since China was 
the only legitimate owner prior to the Japanese annexation, the islands must 
fall back to China. One slight difference to the Chinese claim is that the 
Taiwanese also rely on the Treaty of T
re
 
In this conflict, the Philippines take over Japan’s role by assuming that the 
islands were “terra nullius” before a Filipino citizen occupied them in 1954. 
The archipelago state claims approximately 60 islands in the Spratly region. 
Malaysia is using the contiguity argument that three islands and four 
ly
 
Altogether Vietnam today controls 21 islands, reefs, shoals and cays; 
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Continental Shelf.565 It was Vietnam, which has effectively administered the 
islands since the 18th century. The Chinese military takeover of several 
islands in 1974 and the skirmish with the Chinese in 1988 are not only 
unlawful but also motivated by Chinese hegemonistic policy.566  
 
Brunei does not posses an islands; its position to be a party of the conflict 
derives from their membership of the UNCLOS Convention. Brunei’s 
Exclusive Economic Zone has the shape of a corridor extending to the south 
of the Spratlys. As the islands lie within the Brunei’s marine zone of 200 
nautical miles, the country simultaneously has to stake its claim on the islands 
as well.567  
 
6.3. Comparison to the Diaoyu / Senkaku Conflict 
It is striking how many parallels can be drawn between the Diaoyu / Senkaku 
Islands and the Spratly / Paracel Islands. As Japan is not a party of this 
particular conflict, the main-focus must be laid on Taiwan and China. 
 
a. The first similarity is to be detected in the fact that both Chinese states in 
both conflicts use the identical line of reasoning respectively, because each 
Chinese state claims to be the sole representative of the Chinese people. In 
sharp contrast, Japan having been the former occupation force, is not a party 
of this conflict. 
 
b. Their line of reasoning for the title’s claim is cogent and does not interfere 
with other statements previously released. No matterwhether analysing the 
interpretation of the San Francisco Treaty or the validity of other claimant’s 
incorporation, the Chinese position is in itself sound and coherent in a logical 
line towards the Diaoyu Islands conflict. 
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c. In contrast to the Diaoyu Islands, the Spratly and Paracel Islands were 
expressly mentioned in the San Francisco / Taipei Treaty. This slight 
difference does not affect the major similar dispute behind it, either. Regarding 
both conflicts, the two treaties lacked precision of determining to which 
country the sovereignty of the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands shall be reverted.  
 
d. In both conflicts, China claims to have been the first country that had 
officially put the respective islands under the jurisdiction of its local and 
national government. Historical maps, official records and chronicles of the 
respective time underline the Chinese claim. The Chinese were doubtlessly 
the first who discovered the islands, but the level of effective control over the 
islands was rather limited. Thus, in both cases the crucial question arises 
whether by using the intertemporal law, the Chinese were able to solidify their 
historical claim even before other disputants had gotten aware of the 
existence of the islands. 
 
e. The Spratly / Paracel dispute has led to a military clash between Vietnam 
and China in 1988. In thas year, a sharp difference in regard to the Diaoyu 
Islands arose since China had so far not dared to challenge the Japanese 
forces in the Eastern Chinese Sea conflict. The South Chinese Sea Islands 
conflict led to a deployment of military forces so far unprecedented in the area 
of the Diaoyu Islands, where military personal is not even stationed on the 
barren islands. Notwithstanding this difference, China thrives on a comparable 
hard / soft line in both conflicts. On the one side, Beijing uses the treat of force 
to intimidate its competing claimants in order to get a foothold on the islands. 
On the other side, China utters its willingness to negotiations and to a 
participation of joint development, whenever economic interest overrules the 
prestige of the ownership’s of the islands. However, when China is the only 
country in possession of some islands, like in the case of the Paracel Islands, 
China refuses to seek a compromise.568       
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f. The Chinese political approach is quite similar as well. In both conflicts, the 
Communist Party fears that Taiwan might use the conflict to broaden its 
recognition. For this and other reasons, the Chinese are proponents of 
bilateral agreements and not of multilateral agreements. In bilateral 
agreements the Chinese, being in a more powerful position, they will easier 
achieve a beneficial result for them. The more time that passes will likely 
enhance the Chinese bargaining position. Once China has emerged as a 
powerful global player on the world stage, the other countries will be best 
advised to give up their claims.569  
 
g. The South China Sea islands all lie beyond the Chinese continental 
shelf.570 Contrary to the Diaoyu Islands dispute, the Chinese cannot put 
forward the continental shelf argument in this case. As the continental shelf 
has no legal importance anyhow in determining islands’ sovereignty, one 
should not pay too much attention to this slight contradiction. 
 
h. Last but not least, the islands’ features are rather similar. Although the 
Spratlys entail shoals, reefs and banks, their character is very much alike to 
the one of the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands. The islands bear little intrinsic value. 
In both cases the islands dispute is carried out because of their geo-strategic 
value, their title to nearby oil / gas resources, their symbolic value for 
triggering nationalistic ideas and thereby giving societal glue for the claimants’ 
societies. It is undeniable that all states seek to “beat around the bushes” 
whenever they want to convince the legal world that the islands in their 
possession are able of sustaining human life and may have an economic life 
of their own in accordance with Art. 121 UNCLOS. 
  
6.4. Comparison to the Dokdo / Takeshima conflict 
Similar to the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands, these “islands” bear no value in and 
of themselves. It is the Exclusive Economic Zone, which the claimants seek to 
appropriate. The islands ownership still is disputed, whereas in this region of 
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this world the parties of a territorial marine dispute were able to agree upon 
joint development. Japan and South Korea have undergone such an 
approach by establishing an EEZ of 200 miles. After a couple of years of 
negotiations, the countries consented on fishing quotas and other regulations 
in each other’s zones.571 
6.4.1. Japanese and South Korean Contentions  
Korea’s contention is that Japan unlawfully subjugated the islands in 1905.572 
The Japanese incorporation was closely connected to the overall Japanese 
aggression vis-à-vis their neighbouring countries at the end of the 19th 
century. The 1900 Korean Government Imperial Ordinance No. 41 (land 
survey) is instrumental for the Korean claim insofar as after that point of time 
the islands could no longer be regarded as terra nullius. The Korean records 
referred to the islands as early as 512 AD. According to the Koreans, if the 
Japanese consider their claim lawful based on its occupation in 1905, it must 
return all islands taken by greed and violence by virtue of the stipulations of 
the Cairo Conference.573  
 
The Japanese contend that the islands have to be considered terra nullius 
until 1905 and therefore, the Japanese Shimane Prefecture could enter the 
name in the state land register. South Korea’s independence resulted of the 
1952 San Francisco Treaty stating that its territory included the islands of 
Jeju, Geomun and Ulleung, but it did not mention the Takeshima Islands. As 
the treaty’s draft included the islands to be taken from Japan, its omission 
must be regarded that the Takeshima Islands should remain part of Japan. 
The islands referred to in the 1900 Imperial Edict do not mean the Takeshima 
islands.574  
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6.4.2. Islands effect on the boundary issue 
Although a joint development plan was signed, the boundary issue still raises 
questions. Joint development does not mean though that the boundary issue 
is finally settled. Korea initially took the position of drawing the maritime 
boundary between Korea’s Ullong-do and Japan’s Oki Gunto,575 but now 
Korea takes the views that the equidistance no longer has to be drawn 
between the two countries for the boundary as the islands would affect the 
maritime delimitation. (According to the parties interpretation of Art. 121 III 
UNCLOS)576 
 
Japan has always interpreted the elevation of rocks in the middle of the Sea of 
Japan as islands. Interestingly, the western denomination of the islands is the 
“Liancourt Rocks,” which conveys a historical hint that the outcropping were 
not recognized as islands in former times. China does not claim the 
Takeshima / Dokdo territory but regards them as islands.577  
6.4.3. Comparison to the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands 
It is at first striking that Japan’s claim to both groups of islands dates back to 
the same era as when Japan’s expansionist politics hit its peak. The 
Senkakus were integrated at the very opportunistic moment after the Sino- 
Japanese War; the Takeshima Islands were occupied when Korea became a 
de facto puppet state of China at the beginning of the 20th century. Although 
the islands’ features are very alike and are not islands capable of bearing 
human habitation and vegetation (Art. 121 III UNCLOS) in the proper sense, 
all parties of the conflict regard these territories as islands in the legal sense. 
In both cases the Japanese claim is contested by an opponent’s act of state, 
such as the 1893 Chinese Dowager Empress Decree or the Korean Imperial 
Ordinance of the year 1900.  
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Apparently, the Allies after WW II could not agree on every island in detail; 
whenever a disagreement arouse, they omitted the islands or they just “forgot” 
about them (like about the Diaoyu Islands). The real sharp contrast to the 
Diaoyu / Senkaku conflict is that the claimants could agree on a joint 
development in this case, which possibly needs to be seen as the future crux 
to resolve such territorial problems. Another deviating aspect is that the 
Japanese Foreign Ministry stresses its proposals to submit the legal dispute to 
the ICJ in 1954 and 1962, which was declined by the Koreans.578 Whenever 
Japan does not exercise the effective occupation, it proposes a submission to 
the ICJ. Contrary, Japan is in charge of the administration over the Senkaku 
Islands; in such setting, this proposal has never been made. In order to sum 
up, Japan does not put forward any argument in the Takeshima conflict, which 
deviates from the logical and cohesive Japanese way of contention in the 
Senkaku islands conflict.  
 
6.5. Conclusion 
It is indeed not an easy task to judge to whom the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands 
should be attributed. Before doing that, one needs to recall the essential 
questions, which need to be responded after having assessed the material. 
 
- What is the critical date to start the legal analysis? 
- Fulfilled the Chinese the requirements of occupation prior to 1895? 
- Where the islands included in the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki? 
- What was the islands’ status in the post-war treaties? 
- What is the islands’ juridical status during the trusteeship of the U.S.? 
- Can the Japanese claim be based on prescription, if not on occupation? 
- Relying on previous islands’ solution, what is the most viable way for a  
  solution of this conflict?     
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7. Evaluation of the islands ownership 
Before putting the historical facts in the legal context, one should visualize the 
political, geographical, legal and historical arguments, which the parties of the 
dispute put forward. 
 
7.1. Critical Date for the legal analysis 
Before sticking to the legal analysis, one needs to pay attention to the 
question of the crucial date. Generally, the crucial date is the date when two 
claims clashed for the first time. As in many previous cases, in this conflict it is 
possible to consider two dates as the final limit: either it would be the year 
1895 or the year 1972.  
 
Assuming that the year 1895 is the last temporal resort, this point of view 
would be very favourable to China. Setting up the year in 1895, means that an 
entire historical analysis until this year is required for the judicial award. China 
would argue in a potential court procedure that 1895 is the date of the famous 
Japanese Cabinet decision. In 1895, the two adversarial claims clashed for 
the first time in history because both states claimed the tenure of effective 
occupation at that time. It is the author’s perspective that strictly speaking and 
dogmatically abiding by the principles of the ICJ, the critical date has to be set 
up in 1895.  
 
Notwithstanding the principles, the ICJ has also ruled that the notion of critical 
date might be of little value (Argentine / Chile Frontier Case), whenever the 
peculiarity of a case makes an overall evaluation of the conflict much more 
suitable.579 Japan is more likely to argue that the critical date is to be set at 
the end of the year 1972; in other words after the reversion of the Okinawa / 
Senkaku Islands to Japanese jurisdiction. Japan could put forward that the 
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conflict bearing this particular feature was initiated on the verge of the 1970s. 
Following this interpretation, the tribunal in charge of the conflict would be 
obliged to evaluate all the historical incidents prior to 1972, which would 
considerably enhance the Japanese position.580   
 
One needs to imagine that the Japanese assumption of having occupied terra 
nullius in 1895 possibly fails. Instead, it is conceivable that Japan’s title is 
based on acquisitive prescription. As many precedents give evidence, 
international law tends to favour stability rather than pursuing dogmatically - 
run justice at any price. The ICJ Minquiers and Ecrehos Case of 1953 also 
underpinned this assumption. This case evaded the exact determination of a 
critical date and instead, stressed the importance of current effective 
occupation. 
 
“But in view of the special circumstances of the present case, subsequent acts 
should also be considered by the Court, unless the measure in question was 
taken with a view to improving the legal position of the Party concerned.”581 
 
The Diaoyu Islands dispute is similar to the Minquiers and Ecrehos case: The 
parties (France and England / Japan, China, Taiwan) laid their claim on an 
original title and they all refute that their title was always maintained and was 
never lost. Considering the special circumstances of the case (possible 
Japanese prescription or an imperfect, but superior Japanese claim), it must 
be stated that the conflict crystallized for the first time in the present condition 
with the official communication of the ROC and Japan in 1970.  
 
From the author’s point of view, taking into account the previous ICJ rulings, 
the critical date has to be set in 1972 when the conflict crystallized for the first 
time between the three claiming states including Taiwan. This means that up 
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to 1972 all legally relevant action of the claimants have to be thoroughly 
examined.  
 
7.2. Can Western influenced law be applied in ancient East 
Asia? 
The question must be raised if it is “equitable” to apply Western-influenced 
methods to determine the ownership of the islands. It is noteworthy that the 
Chinese in regard to the Diaoyu Islands use the crucial word of terra nullius in 
their official documents.582 In current days, the Communist People’s Republic 
of China distrusts modern concepts of international public law. The occupation 
of terra nullius is regarded as a disguised way of aggression. From their 
academic point of view, the modes of acquiring territory are residual 
instruments of the colonial epoch embroidered with many bourgeois ideas.583 
This minimal acceptance of international law is complemented by Chinese 
attempts to find “loopholes” in the existing system of the world order to expand 
the Chinese own ideological beliefs.584 
 
Despite the official Chinese stance of distrust, it may be observed that the 
PRC has assimilated their legal framework to almost all western titles of 
territory. Whenever the Chinese claim territories, they rely on the historically 
grown effective administration (prescription / youxiaode guanxia), which is 
embedded in the typical symbolic acts of acquisition. Roughly speaking, the 
official Chinese line of reasoning resembles remarkably a lot to the Western-
influenced international law.585 As Suganuma observes: “China’s behaviour at 
the UN reflects its “pick and choose” attitude; China’s views towards 
international law are often based its own political agenda rather than legal 
considerations, such as judicial decisions of the ICJ and principles of 
international law.586 Utilizing the principle of the “bona fide”, the Chinese are 
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estoppeled of disclaiming the validity of the Western law. If they rely on it in a 
similar way in their official way of reasoning whenever it is favourable to them, 
they also must abide by these rules whenever the judicial award might 
disadvantageous for them.   
 
Contrary to the Chinese resistance to the usage of international law, the 
Japanese receptiveness was much higher throughout the 19th century. 
Therefore, it is very much legal and “equitable” to interpret the Japanese 
historical records in the light of public international law because the first legally 
important Japanese action on the island took place no earlier than 1895.587    
 
7.3. Does Chinese Discovery grant a title? 
Without doubt, it was the Chinese who at first discovered the islands. The 
Japanese even do not dare to call into question this historical fact. As already 
stated above, the mere discovery only granted an inchoate title to the 
discovering nation. Such a title might be easily lost if it was not propped by an 
actual and effective occupation. Although some academics claim that the 
discovery had been sufficient for a title in the 16th century, one needs to 
adhere to the rules set up by the international tribunals. These institutions 
unequivocally demand more than an inchoate title; thus, the mere sighting of 
the islands while the envoys transited to the vassal state Ryukyu cannot be 
regarded sufficient for a lawful title of territory.    
 
7.4. Chinese effective occupation before 1885 
7.4.1. Chinese arguments put forward 
The Chinese lay their islands claim on manifold reasons. The Chinese view 
that their investiture missions from 1372 onwards fulfilled the prerequisites of 
an effective occupation of the islands.588 It was the Chinese envoys on the 
way to the Ryukyu Kingdom who ascribed the islands in official records as 
belonging to China. These reports written by high government officials 
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(comparable to diplomats today), contain the description of their duties, which 
they had to exercise on their missions. Stored in the official archives they 
represent the same value as official documents. The mission exercised a 
boundary trench crossing ceremony, which displayed some rituals and 
ceremonies in regard to their actual territorial possessions. Geographical 
maps published in Japan attributed the islands to the Chinese.589 The 
effective occupation and the will to possess the islands can be found in the 
Chinese acts of state. a) the islands were used as a source of rare herbal 
medicine in the mid 18th century, b) the 1893 Imperial decree conferred the 
title of territory to a Chinese private citizen, c) the islands were instrumental 
for the Chinese coastal defence system d) the islands were used as 
navigation aids and emergency refuge for many centuries. For these reasons, 
the islands could not have been no man’s land prior to 1895 and the 
Japanese government’s behaviour during the process of incorporation proved 
their legal sensitivity as well as their uneasiness about it590 
7.4.2. Taiwanese refutation to the time prior to 1895 
The Taiwanese claim the islands to be theirs on the grounds that they are the 
lawful representative of the Chinese people. There is, however, one rarely 
mentioned historical argument supporting the idea that the islands must be 
solely attributed as Taiwanese islands. A record compiled in 1561 by the 
military officer in charge of defending against Japanese pirates showed that 
the Tiao-yu-tai were part of the five patrol areas of Fuzhou prefecture. In a 
quoted map of the record, three of the islands are represented by Chinese 
names together with Taiwan. Contrarily, in another map showing the border of 
Fujian province drawn before Taiwan was integrated to it, the islands were not 
marked out. This fact is invoked as a strong hind that the islands were 
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deemed to belong to Taiwan.591 Another argument that the Taiwanese put 
forward is that the area around the disputed islands was part of a “historical 
fishing ground.” The concept of a historical fishing ground is claimed to be 
recognized by international law.592 
7.4.3. General Japanese refutations over the islands 
It is striking that in the official line of the Japanese government a dispute over 
the islands does not exist. Whereas Taiwanese and Chinese refutations are 
rather similar, the Japanese line of reasoning is the exact contrast of the 
Chinese standpoint. The Japanese claim that they acquired the title of 
sovereignty by virtue of discovery / occupation. The Tokyo government 
contends that the Japanese explorer Koga Tatsushiro discovered the 
Senkaku Islands. From 1885 onwards, surveys were conducted which proved 
that the islands were uninhabited islands and no trace of Chinese rule could 
be discovered.593 
 
The Japanese deny an effective Chinese occupation prior to 1895. The 
Japanese do not raise doubts about the existence of historical data; it is more 
the legal value, which is debated among the disputing states. As a mater of 
fact, the Japanese object that the missions are of any relevance for the 
acquisition of a valid title to the islands. The Japanese refuse to ascribe any 
legal importance to the missions because a disembarkation of Chinese sailors 
was not recorded in the Chinese archives. The mere sighting and passing of 
the islands does not equate to an exercise of control over the islands in the 
legal sense.594 The Chinese had never publicised any will of occupying the 
islands and they did not leave any symbols of occupation (cross or plaque) 
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behind. The 1893 Dowager Empress Decree cannot be held as a lawful act of 
state. The Japanese call its validity into question because the decree contains 
certain oddities, such as for example, the seal was stamped at an unusual 
place.595 The most remarkable difference between China and Japan is the 
mode of acquisition of title. The Japanese hold the staunch position that the 
Cabinet Decision was the legal provision for the incorporation of territory.596  
7.4.4. Transformation of Chinese notion of sovereignty 
7.4.4.1. Importance and Impact of this Decision  
The decisive question is whether the Chinese acts in the Eastern Chinese 
Sea from 1371 to Japan’s possible acquisition in 1895, granted an islands title 
of territory to the Chinese. If the islands represented terra nullius on January 
14th / 21rst, 1895, the Chinese would have no legal title for their claim. If Japan 
were to be held the lawful owner after the incorporation, all post-war 
agreements would have to be interpreted in Japan’s favour as well. Therefore, 
the most crucial question is whether the Chinese fulfilled the requirements of 
effective occupation prior to 1895.  
7.4.4.2. Transformation of the sino-centric idea of sovereignty 
The problem faced by the Chinese side is that the Confucian world order did 
not acknowledge the conjunction between territory and sovereignty. Their 
philosophical order stemmed from the idea that the fiefs were to show loyalty 
to the Emperor, his administration, and to the imperial hierarchical system. 
The Emperor’s sovereignty was clarified in the rule about the citizenry, but 
was not clearly defined in a geographical sense. The power over areas went 
as far as Emperor-observant people would dwell. Little attention was paid to 
areas lacking human habitation and they were regarded as places without 
civilisation.597 It maybe correctly assumed that in the course of the investiture 
missions the Chinese Imperial Court had more than likely no idea about the 
Western prerequisites to establishing a title of territory. The Chinese had a 
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different understanding of (maritime) sovereignty in ancient times than the 
West. The Emperor was held to be the only person to possess the marine 
territory and the sole landowner who was lending the territory to his fiefs.598  
 
Logically, if sovereignty was rooted in the people’s loyalty to the throne, it was 
arguably difficult to establish sovereignty in the modern sense over 
uninhabited islands. The feature of inhabited space (like the Diaoyu Islands) 
was not akin to the Confucian understanding of government control. The 
Chinese did not develop a comprehension of the High Sea as “res communis”; 
neither did they adhere to coastal state jurisdiction limits as the Western 
Powers did.  
 
How then is the Chinese world order to be made compatible with the Western 
notion of sovereignty? It is clear that the Chinese sovereignty cannot just be 
denied on the grounds that the Chinese were too incompetent at that time to 
have sophisticated knowledge about international law. It would be too 
Western-centred to grant a sovereign title only according to the strict abidance 
to the law of Western Powers. The Eritrea / Yemen Arbitration award 
acknowledged that ”western ideas of territorial sovereignty are strange to 
people brought up in the Islamic tradition and familiar with notions of territory 
very different from those recognized in contemporary international law”.599 
This award adopts a lenient approach to the legal necessities and eases the 
prerequisites for Chinese to have effectively occupied the disputed islands. 
 
As a result, a possible Chinese title cannot be denied, for example, because 
they failed to erect national landmarks on the islands. Given the fact that 
Western Powers used multiple, non-uniform ways for the symbolic act 
(landmark, cross, gunshots),600 no reproach can be made to the Chinese that 
they did not correspond to Western symbolic action. Therefore, typical 
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Chinese symbolic acts, like the Okinawa Trench crossing ceremony, must be 
included in a legal assessment.  
  
After the transformation of the western notion of sovereignty into the Chinese 
understanding of their “sphere of influence” it is conceivable that the disputed 
islands were part of the Chinese rule. From the theoretical point of view, the 
physical power to exclude other states was not regarded as an essential 
element in possession.601 Therefore, it is admissible in such a context to 
define territorial sovereignty in a rather figurative and mental sense.602 Taking 
into account Chinese understandings the Chinese notion of sovereignty must 
be extended to the limit where the Chinese attributed the territories to be 
situated within the border of their sphere of influence.603  
 
To sum up, as it is not equitable to apply the same understanding of 
sovereignty in East Asia for a time-period starting in 1372, one must 
acknowledge that the equally valued Chinese notion of sovereignty was a 
sphere of interest in the people’s minds.  
 
7.5. Chinese Symbolic Acts grant sovereignty to China? 
7.5.1. Chinese corpus occupandi 
The actual taking possession (corpus occupandi) of the islands faces some 
predicaments. The Japanese are insofar right that the investiture missions just 
sighted the islands and no disembarkation on behalf of the state had ever 
been recorded in the archives. This raises the question of whether a 
government can effectively occupy islands in the legal sense, although there 
are not any citizens on the islands who possibly can be subject to their 
effective occupation.  
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7.5.1.1. Chinese lack of settlement on the islands 
Under normal circumstances, possession and effective administration of the 
islands are the two essential facts that constitute an effective occupation. The 
occupying state must take the territory under its sway, which usually requires 
a settlement accompanied by some formal acts. In conjunction, these two pre-
conditions ensure that the state has effectively taken possession of the 
territory.604 Deducing from these requirements a Chinese occupation cannot 
have taken place because they never established any settlements on the 
islands.  
 
As a matter of fact, this legal prerequisite has been updated and modified by 
arbitral and judicial decisions in three cases involving acquisition of island 
territories: the Islands of Palmas Case of 1928, the Legal Status of the 
Eastern Greenland Case of 1933, and the Clipperton arbitration award of 
1932. Since the African Conference of Berlin in 1885, the emphasis among 
the requirements has shifted from the physical taking of possession of the 
land and the exclusion of others to the manifestation and exercise of the 
functions of government in regard to the territorial space. Additionally, the 
legal world was forced to develop juridical concepts for uninhabitable and 
ruffed territories. The law had to be updated so that the deficient inhabitability 
of remote territories would not lead to the consequence that no state could 
take possession of them.605 As a result, since the status of uninhabitable 
islands could not forever persist to be terra nullius, the deficient Chinese 
settlement cannot prejudice a potential Chinese effective occupation. The lack 
of Chinese settlements henceforth has to be regarded as immaterial in regard 
to the question of effective occupation. 
7.5.1.2. Chinese irregular manifestation of possible effective occupation 
The exercise of effective control of the sea area around the disputed islands 
had a low profile; it could happen that the next investiture missions took place 
some decades later. Given this long periods of time it is conceivable that the 
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Chinese acquiesced to abandon the possible title of territory. In the Rann and 
Kutch Arbitration Case (India v. Pakistan) the tribunal held that “…sovereignty 
presents considerable variation in different circumstances according to time 
and place, and in the context of various political systems.”606 In the Clipperton 
award the French inactivity during thirty-nine years was held to be 
irrelevant.607 The particular circumstances (technological development, 
tributary system) made it virtually impossible to annually reaffirm the 
manifestation of sovereignty over the islands. Thus, the irregularity of Chinese 
manifestation of sovereignty must also be considered to be irrelevant.   
7.5.1.3. Display of sovereignty on behalf of the state 
7.5.1.3.1. Investiture missions and defence system 
The display of Chinese sovereignty must be put into effect on behalf of the 
Chinese Emperor who must have authorized the potential effective control 
over the islands. The fishing activities of Taiwanese fishermen cannot be seen 
as belonging to the evidence of Chinese effective occupation. Neither the 
usage of the islands as a source of herbs nor the fishing businesses are of 
any importance. In the Pulau Litigan and Pulau Sipidan Case, the ICJ ruled 
that activities of private people could not be seen as state activities, which 
could engender an effective occupation, unless they take place under 
government authority.608 Comparing this to the Diaoyu islands, the Chinese 
contention that the islands were a source for herbal medicine and a traditional 
fishing region is worthless for making a lawful claim because the Chinese 
fishery activities were privately - run.  
 
Contrary to the private Taiwanese fishermen, the government officials on the 
investiture missions to the vassal state Ryukyu were, without any doubt, 
imperially endorsed. These were diplomat-politicians who conferred the power 
to reign on behalf of the Chinese Emperor to the head of state of the tributary 
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state Ryukyu. These navigation aids became part of official Chinese 
documents and were stored in the official archives. These documents disclose 
that the Chinese attributed the islands to belong to them and not to the 
Ryukyu Kingdom. Moreover, the will to possess is emphasised and reiterated 
by the integration of the islands into the national defence system against the 
wokou pirates in the 16th century. As a result, the investiture missions and the 
integration of the islands in its defence system are due acts of state.  
7.5.1.3.2. Dowager Empress Decree 1893 
The 1893 Dowager Empress Decree sheds the same light on this question. 
The Empress Dowager’s decree of 1893 explicitly grants the exploitation 
rights for collecting herbs on the islands to a private person. In the ICJ Pulau 
Litigan and Pulau Sipidan Case, Malaysia put forward that a Turtle 
Preservation Ordinance was issued for the two islands, which restricted the 
collection of turtles on the islands. A license to collect the animals was also 
granted. The ICJ Court was of the opinion that these two measures must be 
regarded as regulatory and administrative assertions of authority over 
territory. The Court attributed these two islands to Malaysia on the grounds of 
activities, which were 
 
 “modest in number but that they are diverse in character and include 
legislative, administrative and quasi judicial acts. They cover a considerable 
period of time and show a pattern revealing an intention to exercise State 
function in respect to the two islands in the context of administration of a wider 
range of islands.” 609  
 
From this judgment it can be deduced that granting licenses and enacting 
regulations must be interpreted as “effectivités” or effective occupation. The 
same principles apply to the Chinese 1893 decree: Within the Chinese state 
system the Dowager Empress was not only entitled to make decisions about 
geographical sovereignty but she also used this state representation in some 
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cases.610 According to Art. 37 of the Qing Code it did not matter whether an 
Imperial prescript is coming from the Emperor’s paternal grandmother, his 
mother, or whether the Emperor publicized it himself.611 Due to this domestic 
code the Decree of the Empress Dowager must be considered as a lawful act 
of state. In Chinese domestic law the Empress was eventually entitled to edict 
such a decree.612 It needs to be considered that this Decree was publicized a 
long time before the conflict emerged. Although it does inhere some 
abnormalities, such as the seal was stamped in the wrong place and the 
person who issued the decree on behalf of the Dowager Empress remains 
unknown. Notwithstanding theses doubtful questions the decree has to be 
considered a due act of state at that time.613 This means that the Chinese 
state displayed state function just two years prior to the possible Japanese 
annexation.  
7.5.1.4. Chinese exercise of sovereignty was peaceful 
It must be concluded that the Chinese could also exercise their effective 
occupation peacefully. This rule means no more than that the first assertion of 
sovereignty may not be the usurpation of another state’s territory nor be 
contested from the first by competing acts of sovereignty. Once the 
occupation is completed, contrary to the principle of prescription, express 
protests from third states do not alter the peaceful character of occupation. 
Therefore, as the Japanese ignored the islands until 1884, the potential 
Chinese effective occupation must be considered as being peaceful. 
7.5.1.5. Chinese lack of disembarkation on the islands 
Without doubt, it is problematic that the historical data does not reveal any 
Chinese disembarkation on the islands. The judicial practice ruled that 
disembarkation forcibly is not mandatory for an effective occupation, either. A 
symbolic annexation might also be sufficient. Regarding remote and tiny 
islands, in the Clipperton Award the Arbitrator Victor Emmanuel ruled that 
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there might be one exception possible. If an uninhabited territory appears to 
the discovering country, by virtue of its lack of habitation, the state’s absolute 
and undisputed disposition must be considered as accomplished. The awards 
wording could be conducive for the decision of the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands 
dispute: „from the first moment, when the occupying state makes its 
appearance there …the taking possession must be considered as 
accomplished”.614 The line of reasoning of the award was based on the 
appearance and not on the disembarkation of some sailors. In fact, some 
crew - members succeeded in landing on the islands after some attempts 
failed to do so. Once being on the island, they did not leave behind any sign 
of sovereignty.615 Apparently, the arbitrator did not attach any further 
importance to this disembarkation. As they did not set up a sign or plaque, no 
further legal importance can be imputed to the sailors’ disembarkation. As the 
arbitrator’s wording states, the appearance consequently was held sufficient 
per se to establish a title of sovereignty.   
 
Deducing from the Clipperton award it may assumed that the lack of 
proclaiming Chinese sovereignty by the means of official signs could not 
preclude the assumption of Chinese sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. In 
the line of the Clipperton award, one may refute that the actual taking of 
possession by making an appearance in vicinity of the islands may be 
sufficient to establish a title of territory over the islands.  
7.5.1.6. Chinese lack of possessing a incorporation ceremony 
After the Diaoyu Islands had been discovered, the discoverers had to display 
their taking possession of the territories by some symbolic acts. In the age of 
the discoveries, the formal ceremony of taking possession, the formal act, was 
usually held sufficient per se to establish a title of sovereignty over areas 
thereby claimed. The rituals of these symbolic acts varied even among 
Western Powers, although their differences of celebrating them, they all 
granted the same effect to these symbolic acts that the territory claimed from 
                                                 
614 Clipperton Award, reprint in: Vol. 26 A.J.I.L. (1932), 394 
615 Clipperton Award, reprint in: Vol. 26 A.J.I.L. (1932), 391  
   
henceforth would be duly theirs. Similar to the symbolic act of taking 
possession (flags, plaques), the modes and details of these formal 
ceremonies varied remarkably under Western Powers. Finally, the 
ceremonies implied the legal results of the acquisition of the title.616 The 
Chinese saw no sense in setting up a national marker because a) this 
principle was not inherent to Chinese sovereignty and b) no country 
challenged the Chinese view that the islands would be duly theirs.      
 
Chinese historical records do not convey a formal official ceremony by which 
the Chinese incorporated the specific Diaoyu Islands in their domestic 
territory. The only real historical evidence of effective control has to be seen in 
the trench crossing ceremony: If one transfers the Chinese notion of 
sovereignty, the Chinese officials could effectively delineate their outer border 
of their kingdom. The ceremonies though were never held on these islands 
themselves. As their was no common practice among Western Powers to 
celebrate the territory incorporation, the trench crossing ceremony of the 
investiture missions might be a viable means to display the incorporation in 
terms of rituals.617  
 
The change of the water - colours of the sea, shortly after having passed the 
disputed islands, indicated the Chinese outer maritime border. Most Chinese 
investiture missions took great pride in processing the boundary / trench 
crossing ritual; this means that the Chinese were very much aware of the 
delineation of their national boundary vis-à-vis the Ryukyu Kingdom. 
Notwithstanding this idea, this ritual the Chinese seafarers declared that all 
the territories west of the trench were considered to be Chinese. Therefore, 
the trench crossing ceremony must be held as a suitable means to display the 
taking of possession of the space. 
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7.5.1.7. Chinese failure to notify other states 
It might be to the Chinese disadvantage that they failed to notify their 
neighbouring states about their possible effective occupation over the 
disputed islands. Art. 34 of the Congo Act proclaimed at the Conference of 
Berlin in 1885 urged for a notification in regards to an occupation of African 
territories. This requirement cannot be held applicable by analogy in other 
cases.618 The Clipperton award stated clearly that in the year 1885 a rule to 
inform other countries about its assertion of territory did not exist.619 There 
was no explicit rule of law for the notification until the Convention of St. 
Germain620 in 1919 was signed.621 For these reasons, the Chinese 
incorporation of the islands in their sphere of influence in the times from 1371-
1895 must be held as sufficient for an effective occupation of terra nullius.   
7.5.2. Chinese animus occupandi 
The Chinese must have completed the necessity of the subjective will to act 
as a sovereign, otherwise named the “animus occupandi”. In other words, this 
means that the Chinese must have had the intent and will to act as a 
sovereign. Even in terms of Western understanding of sovereignty, it must be 
concluded that the Chinese had the “animus occupandi”, the will to 
incorporate the islands into their territory. The Chinese government, 
transliterating the Chinese notion of sovereignty into the Western model, 
lawfully considered the islands to be their territory. Official missions have 
stated unequivocally that the islands were situated on the Chinese side before 
arriving at Kumi hill, the border to the Ryukyu Kingdom. The islands 
integration in the defence system stresses again the will of animus occupandi.  
Given this background of will and intent to act as a sovereign, the specific 
incorporation of the islands must not be expressly recorded. As a 
consequence, the Japanese reproach of a deficient will of incorporation must 
be held as irrelevant. 
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7.5.3. Conferral of Chinese title of sovereignty?  
The author’s contention that the Chinese succeeded in effectively occupying 
the islands has been backed in a recently delivered award. In the 
Eritrea/Yemen award the inhospitable isolated islands Zuquar-Hanish were 
granted to Yemen. The tribunal held a lighthouse, petroleum agreements, 
naval patrol and a logbook as sufficient for an acquisition of title.622 In the 
Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands dispute the islands were accordingly used as 
beacons, the guano concessions are equivalent to the petroleum agreement, 
the naval patrol is analogous to the incorporation in its defence system and 
the logbooks very much resemble to the investiture missions’ records. Taking 
into account the transformed Chinese notion of sovereignty in combination 
with the aforementioned judicial awards there cannot be any other conclusion 
than that the Chinese acquired more than just an inchoate title based on 
discovery in pre-1895 times. The Chinese sovereignty was displayed in 
accordance with the Western states of making their appearance in vicinity of 
small uninhabitable islands. To sum up, there cannot be other conclusion that 
the Chinese obtained a title of sovereignty over the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands 
prior to 1895.   
7.5.4. Loss of title by Japanese surveys? 
Under international law a title will not be lost if another states intrudes on the 
islands without the titleholder’s consent. The Japanese just did not want to 
infuriate the Chinese public; therefore is can be assumed that the surveys 
were conducted in secrecy. The observation of the Japanese that no traces of 
Chinese sovereignty were found must not be equated with the possibility that 
no Chinese sovereignty over the islands existed. A symbolic seizure by the 
Chinese, by for example, hoisting a flag, was by itself not sufficient to 
establish a title, a formal declaration and notification were not required, 
either.623 Thus, the lack of Chinese markers on the islands does not impede 
that the ownership question must be decided in China’s favour. A secretly 
conducted survey never can undermine the other nation’s sovereignty. 
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Acquiescence may only be assumed on the grounds of tacit knowledge, which 
cannot be imputed to the Chinese in this case. As the surveys were 
conducted under secrecy, it is not possible to impute a Chinese 
acquiescence, either.  
 
7.6. Legal evaluation of the Japanese occupation in 1895 
7.6.1. Value of Japanese discovery in 1884 
As a result of the Chinese effective title, the Japanese cannot claim an 
inchoate title on the grounds of their discovery of 1884 made by Koga. The 
Japanese incorporation in 1895 after the Japanese “rediscovery” can only be 
considered as occupation of terra nullius” provided that the Chinese had 
abandoned the islands before the Japanese took them over. This must be 
denied because the Chinese never acquiesced to the abandonment at that 
point of time. Given the fact that the last investiture mission took place in 1867 
and that the Empress Dowager Edict was issued in 1893 the Chinese must 
have considered the islands to be duly theirs. The term “discovery” used by 
the Japanese is already misleading since the islands had already been 
discovered. In conclusion, it must be stated that the discovery of Koga turns 
out to be an “empty shell” for the Japanese.  
7.6.2. Chinese view of acquisition of title by the 1895 Peace Treaty 
The Chinese argue that the disputed islands were an integral part of the 
Treaty of Shimonoseki. In this treaty, the cession of Taiwan and its 
surrounding islands contained as well the transfer of title of the Diaoyu 
Islands. According to the Chinese point of view the Diaoyu islands clearly 
belonged gradually more to the major island Taiwan and not to the Ryukyu 
(Okinawa) islands.624 Therefore, the Japanese received the title of territory by 
the cession treaty.    
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7.6.3. Japanese view of the incorporation by the Cabinet Decision 
Japan puts forward that a title of sovereignty had not been established by any 
other state at the point of time Japan incorporated the islands in 1895.  
Japan’s claim towards the islands fulfilled the prerequisites of discovery / 
occupation of terra nullius in the year 1895. The Senkaku Islands were a) 
terra nullius at that time b) Japan showed its will to act as a sovereign to 
occupy the islands by its Cabinet Decision on January 14th / 21rst, 1895 and c) 
Japan from this point of time on peacefully displayed state authority over the 
islands.625  
7.6.3.1. Japanese view: Islands not part of the Treaty of Shimonoseki 
The Japanese ardently oppose the idea that the Senkaku Islands were part of 
the Treaty of Shimonoseki. The Japanese title of sovereignty is based on 
discovery / occupation of “terra nullius” and not on a cession of territory. As 
they were not included in this treaty, Japan was neither obliged to return them, 
unlike Taiwan, by virtue of the post-war agreements.626    
7.6.3.2. Argument of timing 
The Japanese legal title is not rooted in the clause of the Treaty “all islands 
appertaining or belonging to the said island of Formosa.” The Cabinet 
decision of the incorporation (January 14th 1895) had taken place four month 
prior to the moment when the Sino-Japanese Treaty went into effect in May 
1895. Japan’s claims are thus to be seen independent from the cession 
Treaty of Shimonoseki. The Japanese acquisition of territory of the islands did 
not rely on a cession, but on occupation of terra nullius.627 
7.6.3.3. Wording of the Treaty 
The Shimonoseki Treaty did not entail the Diaoyu Islands because the 
Pescadores (Penghu) Islands when they were ceded they were explicitly 
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identified by its longitudes and its latitudes. As an adverse argument is put 
forward: if the Diaoyu Islands were to be enclosed in the treaty, they would 
have been mentioned at least by their location as well.628 
7.6.4. Assessment of Japanese Cabinet Decision January 14th, 1895 
The Japanese refute that thanks to the January 14th, 1895 Cabinet Decision 
the Senkaku Islands, originally terra nullius, had become Japanese territory by 
the discovery / occupation principle. Why were the Japanese cabinet 
members so reluctant to incorporate the islands just after their “discovery”? It 
may be assumed that they more than likely knew about their status as actually 
not being terra nullius. Therefore, prior to 1895 many requests for the 
incorporation by the Okinawa Prefecture were turned down.629 It must be 
concluded from the Japanese timing that the Japanese had very precise 
knowledge about the legal status of the islands. 
7.6.4.1. Cabinet internal authority 
The Cabinet Decision by itself is problematic on grounds that under the Meji 
government (1867 – 1912) the cabinet disposed of a very limited scope of 
jurisdiction and power. The ultimate power to pass a legal act was within the 
realm of the Japanese Emperor; it was he who had to grant the Japanese 
pendant of the British royal assent to all major legal enactments.630 The 
question emerges whether an international tribunal would be at all cognisant 
to deal with such domestic issues. Contrary to the “act of state doctrine” 
ensuring that no state verifies and judges the legal acts of another state, the 
municipal law might be applied before international tribunals as well. 
Therefore, once this case was taken to Court, the tribunal would be cognisant 
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whether the Japanese Cabinet Decision was in accordance with domestic 
national law.631In such a case, it would be questionable if the Japanese 
Cabinet under Japanese municipal law had the representation on behalf of 
the state. In other words, the Court would analyse, if they had the power of to 
incorporate the Senkaku Islands into domestic territory. 
 
Since 1885, the Japanese had implemented a new political system. At the 
head of the Cabinet stood the Minister President of State (otherwise referred 
to as Prime Minister) with powers and control over the administrative bodies, 
which made him a Japanese counterpart to the German Chancellor. 
Moreover, the ministers are not responsible to the Diet, but to the Emperor 
who also selected the Minister President of State. The Emperor had the 
supreme command over external matters such as the declaration of war and 
of peace; he was the chief commander of the navy and the army.632 In this 
system, the Emperor was the personal despot who could exercise absolute 
powers in accordance with the counselling of the Minister President of 
State.633 Thus, the Japanese cabinet within the state organisation was not the 
actual power bearing political body, which could validate such an act of state.  
7.6.4.2. Imperial Assent required 
Taking the deficient authority of the Cabinet into consideration, one must 
conclude that the Cabinet Decision of January 14th, 1895 could not create any 
legal international bindings since the Japanese municipal law prescribed that 
all formal Japanese acts of state had to be assented by the Japanese Tenno. 
The pro-Japanese scholar Toshio Okuhara endorsed this point of view. He 
stated that the Cabinet Decision plus the Imperial Decree was necessary for 
the legal completion of the incorporation under Japanese domestic law.634 
The incorporation of territory is a major act of state, which can only be made 
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official by the Emperor himself. In this line of reasoning, the Cabinet Decision 
is deficient of the domestic power of representation and cannot create any 
legal bindings in favour of Japan. As a consequence, the decision of the 
erection of national landmarks on April 1rst, 1896 must not be deemed as a 
formally valid act of state.635 
7.6.5. Validation of the Cabinet Decision 
In theory, there are three possible ways by which the premature Cabinet 
Decision could have been validated after its enactment. 
 
aa) It could be possible that the deficient Cabinet decision could have been 
validated by a tacit approval by the Tenno. The temporary silence of the 
Tenno about the incorporation cannot be interpreted as a tacit approval. On 
the contrary, he drafted an (irrelevant) decree about the formation of Okinawa 
Prefecture shortly afterwards. The Tenno’s full Power assent to this Cabinet 
Decision was not granted by tacit approval, either. 
 
bb) The validity of the Cabinet Decision cannot be made on the grounds of 
the legalistic device of apparent authority. The prerequisites of apparent 
authority are a) deficient power of representation, b) continuous 
representational exercise of the agent, c) tacit knowledge of the Tenno. This 
way, he would not personally wield the power, but the administrative organ 
would possess the respective right as entrusted to it by the Tenno. There is no 
known common practice of the Japanese Cabinet known that it was tacitly 
empowered to incorporate alien territories. On the contrary, when the 
Japanese incorporated the Ogasawara (Bonin) Islands in 1892, an Imperial 
Decree also complemented this process.636 The apparent authority cannot be 
instrumental for this conflict.  
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cc) The Cabinet Decision could have theoretically been validated by the 
Imperial Decree No. 13, which it due to the following reasons finally did not 
do. The Japanese refutation is that the conjunction of the Cabinet Decision of 
January 1895 together with the Imperial Decree No. 13 of March 5th, 1896 
gave legal effect to the incorporation. The Imperial Decree nowhere mentions 
the Senkaku Islands because the Senkakus cannot be counted to belong to 
the Yaeyama Island group.637 Therefore, the Japanese contention that the 
Imperial Decree No. 13 provides a legal basis for the Japanese incorporation 
must be considered as false. The Imperial Decree does not help to bolster the 
Japanese refutations, either. 
 
By the virtue of Japanese domestic law the Japanese Cabinet lacked the 
capacity to make a lawful representation for Japan. As a consequence, the 
incorporation of the Senkaku Islands decision must be regarded as null and 
void.  
 
7.7. Japanese Acquisition by the Treaty of Shimonoseki 1895 
As a last resort, the Japanese could have acquired a legal title of sovereignty 
of the islands by a valid Chinese cession of the Senkaku Islands by virtue of 
the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki. The treaty’s wording does not expressly 
state a possible cession of the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands. For this reason, the 
special circumstances of the cession treaty must be highlighted. The question 
remains by which methods of interpretation of international law the issue shall 
be tackled. 
 
The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, which went into legal 
effect in 1980, might be regarded as a possible recourse. According to Art. 4 
of the Vienna Convention the Convention does not retroactively apply for 
treaties signed prior to its entry. A similar problem arose in the Pulau Litigan 
and Pulau Sipidan Case, which made the ICJ state that Art. 31 (I, III) Vienna 
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Convention may be applicable for treaties from 1891 because they just 
represent codified customary laws valid from that time.638  
 
Art. 31 (I, III) being customary law also help to overcome another application 
problem. Japan has accessed the Convention in 1981 and the PRC in 1997 
respectively. The question whether Art. 31 of the Convention may be 
applicable to Taiwan, which signed the Convention in 1970, but not ratified 
it639, becomes superfluous. Neither party of the conflict has been a persistent 
objector to these continuously exercised rules so that the customary rules laid 
down in the Convention may be applied for this conflict.640 For these reasons, 
it is admissible to apply Art. 31 (I, III) of the Convention to a) treaties signed 
prior to 1980, and b) to states, such as Taiwan have not ratified it.  
 
Art. 31 (I) Vienna Convention641 
“A treaty must be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light 
of its object and purpose.” 
 
As a result, the Treaty of Shimonoseki may be construed on basis of Art. 31 of 
the Vienna Convention. Lastly, it should be underlined that the “object and 
purpose” of the treaty is to be referred to in determining the meaning of the 
“terms of the treaty” and that it has no independent basis for interpretation.642 
Instead, they need to be regarded as auxiliary means of interpretation aside 
from the textual approach. 
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7.7.1. Textual Interpretation 
The treaty is without doubt a cession treaty because China cedes territories 
and sovereignty over the said territories to Japan. The crux of this 1895 treaty 
is whether the phrase “all islands appertaining or belonging to the islands of 
Formosa” comprises the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands. The determination of 
whether islands were ceded to Japan depends on the relationship the islands 
had to Taiwan. This can be deduced from the wording of Art.2, which relies on 
“belonging or appertaining to Taiwan.” The relationship of the Diaoyu / 
Senkaku Islands can possibly be determined by geographical, political / 
administrative and historical reasons.643 
7.7.1.1. Historical / Political belonging to Taiwan 
As already stated, China legally effectively occupied the islands prior to 1895. 
It is though questionable whether the Islands historically belonged to the 
Taiwan Province under the Imperial Chinese rule. Pursuant to pro-Chinese / 
Taiwanese scholars, the disputed islands were considered to be under 
Taiwanese jurisdiction under the Qing rule.644 It is hard to find any records or 
documents that clearly demonstrate the Taiwanese ownership of the 
islands.645 From the authors standpoint this makes it hardly impossible to 
create any political or historical bindings between Taiwan and the disputed 
islands.  
7.7.1.2. Economic / Military appurtenance to Taiwan 
In former times, the area around the islands was a fishing ground for Chinese 
fishermen and a destination to collect herbs. There is no historical evidence 
that the Chinese government endorsed these private activities at that time. 
The historical investiture missions were probably also of official economic 
value for China; though from that it remains difficult to impute any economic 
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value to the Taiwanese island. Given the fact that the islands are worthless in 
terms of intrinsic value, it is impossible to create an economic relationship 
between them and Taiwan.  
 
The islands were integrated into China’s military defence system against 
Japanese pirates. This Chinese military security system of 1561 did not aim to 
safeguard the security of Taiwan proper because at that time Taiwan did not 
belong to mainland China. It has to be recalled that since 1683 the Qing 
Dynasty reigned over Taiwan. The island was governed from Fukien Province 
until 1885, when it became a separate province of China.646 As neither 
military device has ever been installed nor any military personnel have been 
stationed on the islands, it is impossible to argue that the islands have ever 
been used to maintain the security of Taiwan Island.   
7.7.1.3. Geographical appurtenance to Taiwan 
The islands lie on the Chinese / Taiwanese continental shelf and they are 
separated from Japan by the Okinawa trench. Although this juridical concept 
only entered into law after WW II, the ICJ manifested in the Greek Aegean 
Case that the doctrine of the continental shelf has to be applied 
retroactively.647 However, this idea is from its beginning ill - fated. In 1895, the 
Diaoyu Islands were regarded to be situated on the mainland China 
continental shelf. Only states can foment a continental shelf. As consequence, 
the continental shelf does not provide a hint whether the Diaoyu Islands were 
accounted to belong to Taiwan or to mainland China. Furthermore, many 
judicial awards held the Continental Shelf doctrine to be too arbitrary in order 
to determine an island’s sovereignty. 
 
Could the appurtenance be scaled in an amount of km? The ICJ ruled in the 
2002 Pulau Litigan and Pulau Sipidan Case that the wording “the islets 
belonging thereto can only be interpreted as referring to the small islands lying 
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in the immediate vicinity of the three islands which are mentioned by name, 
and not islands which are located at a distance of more than 40 nautical 
miles.”648 The distance from the islands to Taiwan is much farther than 40 
nautical miles. Applying this principle of the ICJ on the present conflict and 
having recourse to the a fortiori argument, the only conclusion to be drawn is 
that the argument of vicinity is groundless for establishing any geographical 
relationship between the islands and Taiwan.   
7.7.1.4. Relatively closer to Taiwan than China 
Another idea could be the islands vicinity to Taiwan Island. Without doubt, the 
islands are located much closer (170km) to Taiwan Island than to the People’s 
Republic of China. A possible interpretation of the natural and ordinary 
meaning of “belonging to Taiwan Island” is that the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands 
were relatively closer to Formosa than to mainland China. Therefore, they 
were more often attributed to Taiwan Island than to China. Japanese 
government officials probably created the wording of the unequal treaty from 
the Japanese geographic location (particularly from the city of Shimonoseki); 
the islands almost lie on the way from Taiwan Island to Japan. From the 
Japanese geographic position, the disputed islands appear much closer to 
Taiwan than to Japan. As the islands are the closest to Taiwan, the 
geographic appurtenance permits, together with the textual approach to 
account the disputed islands to belong to Taiwan.      
7.7.1.5. Conclusion of textual interpretation 
As the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands have no genuine, unique relationship to the 
Island of Formosa neither in the historical, military, economic nor in the  
administrative sense, the textual interpretation that the disputed islands 
belong to Taiwan seems inadmissible at first glance. Just the relatively close 
geographical proximity to Taiwan Island allows the surmise that in the course 
of geographical reasons the disputed islands belonged to Taiwan Island in the 
natural textual meaning of the treaty. None of the other claimants is located 
closer to the islands than Taiwan. Thus, the mere textual interpretation neither 
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clearly includes nor excludes the disputed islands in the 1895 treaty. One 
must recall that the wording has to be regarded in its context and in the light of 
its purpose.  
7.7.2. Context and Purpose Interpretation 
7.7.2.1. Contextual Interpretation: mentioning of the Pescadores Islands 
It is striking that the cession treaty mentions the inhabited Pescadores Islands 
whereas it keeps silent about the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands. Art. 2 (c) of the 
Treaty of Shimonoseki explicitly states the retrocession of them: 
 
“The Pescadores Group, that is to say, all islands lying between the 119th and 
120th degrees of longitude east of Greenwich and the 23rd and 34th of north 
latitude.” 
 
The question arises as to why the 23 to 34 nautical mile far away ceded 
Pescadores / Penghu Islands were expressly mentioned? According to Art. 31 
(I) Vienna Convention the treaty must be read in its context and in the light of 
its purpose. The exact location laid down in the treaty provides a hint that the 
parties were very wary about the exact boundary between Japan and China. 
Japan apparently wanted to take advantage of the strategic location of the 
Pescadores towards China. The Pescadores are located 60 km west of 
Taiwan and about 100 km east of mainland China and have a size of 126 sq 
km.649 Japan’s aim must have been to ensure and bolster Taiwan’s security 
by the ownership of the Pescadores.650 One more reason might be that the 
Pescadores Islands are much bigger in terms of territory and for this reason, 
the importance of the biggest islands cession had to be underpinned. The 
omission of the more distant Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands conveys at first the 
idea that they were purposely left out. 
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On the eastern Taiwanese coast are located the Taiwanese Western Pacific 
Orchid Island (65 sq km) and Green Island (roughly 15 sq km), which were 
inhabited by the Taiwanese indigenous Yami people. These islands are about 
33 km and 65 km away from Formosa and were not mentioned in the cession 
treaty, either.651 Thanks to their aboriginal population, they had a proper 
genuine link to Formosa; they are accounted to belong to Formosa. Although 
they were not expressly mentioned in the Treaty of Shimonoseki, Orchid 
Island and the Green Island belonged to the ceded territory as well.652 The 
simultaneous cession of these two islands proves that the question of whether 
the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands belonged to the ceded territory has nothing to 
do with its omission in the Treaty of Shimonoseki, nor with its size or its 
vicinity to the main Taiwanese Island.  
7.7.2.2. Interpretation of Purpose  
Interpreting the treaty using the teleological approach, the legalistic a fortiori 
argument might be instrumental for the decision. As the Japanese were so 
careful to snatch the strategic important Pescadores Islands, the Liaodong 
and Korean Peninsula, it would have been very foolhardy of them not to 
integrate the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands into the cession treaty. The disputed 
islands are much closer to Japan than the Pescadores, it would be 
contradictory within the Japanese stance to be so keen on an exact boundary 
delimitation regarding the Pescadores and be so careless about territories 
close to their own heart, the southern Japanese islands of Okinawa and 
Kyushu. The disputed islands are located between Japan and the newly 
gained Taiwan Island; it would be utterly dangerous for the Japanese to 
tolerate Chinese soil in between them putting the Chinese in a most 
favourable position to interfere with the inter-Japanese naval traffic. The 
purpose of the treaty was to solidify the expansionist warfare of the Japanese, 
which meant all territories close to the Japanese mainland should be stripped 
                                                 
651 “Green Island”; www.answers.com/topic/green-island-taiwan, accessed on May 24th, 2007; 
www.sinica.edu/tw/tit//scenery/1095.scn2.html, accessed on May 15th, 2007;  
ICE Case Studies, “Nuclear Dump Dispute on Orchid Island”; www.american.edu/ted/ice/orchid-
waste.htm, accessed on May 23rd, 2007 
652 they were not integrated in the U.S. naval surveillance area; see: Greg Austin, China’s Ocean 
Frontiers (1rst ed., 1998), p. xxiv 
   
off from China. The Japanese had waited about ten years for the appropriate 
moment of incorporation, which has been postponed a couple of times until 
the most opportunistic moment of the Sino-Japanese War finally arrived. 
Therefore, it would be far-fetched to impute to the Japanese state agents that 
at the time of the treaty negotiations they wanted to exclude the disputed 
islands. From the historical perspective, it must be assumed that the said 
islands were accounted to belong to Taiwan because they are much closer to 
Taiwan than to mainland China. The Japanese probably did not have 
knowledge about the domestic Chinese administration of the islands. They 
just took it for granted that the disputed islands belonged to proper Taiwanese 
domestic jurisdiction because of their relatively closer location to Taiwan than 
to China. For this reason, it is just to assume that it was the purpose and the 
original Japanese intention of the cession treaty to include the Diaoyu / 
Senkaku Islands. In the context of expressly including the Pescadores Islands 
and keeping in mind the general purpose of hegemonistic Japan, there cannot 
be any other conclusion than that the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands were an 
integral part of the 1895 Shimonoseki Treaty. 
7.7.3. Principle of good Faith 
The usage of the principle of “good faith” could contribute significantly to 
enlighten the question in favour of either one direction. Being an integral part 
of the textual approach, the sense of this principle possibly lies to restrict an 
excessive literalism. On the other side, it aims to hinder a state from being 
precluded of its rights as a result of an error of the wording.653 The idea of 
good faith in this case underlines the above-depicted textual approach to 
assume an integration of the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands in the 1895 Treaty. 
Taking into consideration Japan’s multiple adjournments of its final domestic 
legislation it is more than fair to state that the Sino Japanese War was the 
long awaited incident to incorporate the islands into Okinawa Prefecture. It 
could be contradictory of Japan and an infringement of the good faith principle 
to claim that although the war had been the key incident for the islands 
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incorporation, the islands were not part of the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki. On 
the other hand, the temporal closeness of these two historical facts could also 
be the result of an unfortunate coincidence. Given the precaution the 
Japanese applied whilst the integration this seems very unlikely.  
 
The omission of the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands is though more than likely an 
error of wording because the Japanese records do not rebut the assumption 
of the Japanese “mala fide” towards the islands ownership. Despite of that in 
conjunction with the other modes of interpretation the principle of good faith 
advocates that the disputed islands were meant to be part of the 1895 Treaty.   
7.7.4. Subsequent conduct of the Parties (Art. 31 III) 
Pursuant to Art. 31 (III, b) Vienna Convention the subsequent conduct of the 
parties regarding the treaty should be taken into account. Fitzmaurice stated 
that: 
 
“ …where this is the case it is so because it is possible and reasonable in the 
circumstances to infer from the behaviour of the parties that the have 
regarded the interpretation they have given to the instrument in question as 
the legally correct one, and have tacitly recognized that in consequence 
certain behaviour was legally incumbent upon them.”654 
 
From 1941 to 1944, the Tokyo High Court reportedly was in charge of 
deciding to whose jurisdiction the disputed islands belonged. The Court 
allegedly held that the islands were appurtenant to Taiwan. The verdict of the 
Tokyo High Court could not be found in the archives; nevertheless, the 
Chinese put forward this argument.655 The lack of documentary evidence 
makes this contention immaterial for a legal consideration because the 
outcome of an unsafe refutation based on the hearsay-principle is 
unpredictable in a Court procedure. Therefore, this argument needs to be 
disregarded.  
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After the Japanese had won the war against China, they put into effect some 
governmental measures, such as the integration into Okinawa Prefecture and 
the erection of land markers. The Senkaku Islands were leased to a private 
Japanese citizen in 1896.656 It is very improbable that the Japanese did not 
have precise knowledge about own domestic law so that by such an 
international valid claim could be made. Knowing possible Chinese claim they 
put into effect the leasehold contract with a private person and the erection of 
land markers. Therefore, this subsequent conduct must be imputed to the 
ratification of the cession treaty and not to the groundless Cabinet Decision. 
These Japanese activities in the wake of the victory of the first Sino-Japanese 
War convey the idea that they were not executed as a result of an 
independent Cabinet Decision. This is an indication that the Japanese in 
former times, contrary to their position today, deemed the islands to be 
included in the Treaty of Shimonoseki. The subsequent Japanese conduct 
does support the author’s conviction that the Japanese originally sought to 
include the islands in the treaty.  
 
From 1895 up to the criticisms of the post-war treaties in 1951 / 1952, the 
Chinese kept silent about the islands. After the downfall of the tributary 
system, the Chinese abstained from any act of state in the area. They ceased 
to collect herbs on them. How may the Chinese silence be interpreted in terms 
of subsequent practice? The wording “practice” does not seem to require an 
active behaviour, but to include all active and passive means of conduct. As 
the erection of Japanese markers on the islands was not notified to the 
Chinese, it is very probable that the Chinese had just forgotten about the 
islands in the meantime. After having been fragmented by unequal treaties, 
the Chinese did not want to interfere with the Japanese sphere of marine 
interest. The subsequent Chinese conduct was that they considered the 
Diaoyu Islands to be taken away by the Japanese.  
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The conclusion to be drawn is that according to Art. 31 (III, b) Vienna 
Convention the subsequent practice of the parties supports the interpretation 
that the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands must have been part of the crucial 1895 
Treaty of Shimonoseki. 
7.7.5. Final Conclusion 
To sum up, although sticking to the mere textual interpretation, a clear 
resolution cannot be presented. Departing from the single textual 
interpretation it is admissible, but it is by no means mandatory, to attribute the 
islands to be part of the cession treaty. The islands were probably too minor to 
be expressly mentioned.657 When using the contextual approach and the 
principle of good faith there cannot be any other conclusion than that the 
Japanese historically considered that they had acquired the islands by virtue 
of the debatable 1895 treaty. This point of view is backed by the auxiliary 
means of interpretation. All in all this must lead to the conclusion that the 
Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands were meant to be part of the Treaty of Shimonoseki.   
 
7.8. Auxiliary Documents  
7.8.1. Chinese Consul’s letter of 1920 
Japanese scholars attach certain importance to the letter of gratitude written 
by the Chinese Consul of Nagasaki in 1920. The Diaoyu Islands were 
reportedly to be imputed to Japanese territory in this letter. Containing the 
official Chinese seal and written in the Consul’s official capacity it is claimed 
that this letter implies recognition of the islands to belong to Japan.658 As 
Taiwan was under Japanese sovereignty at that time, the Chinese Consul in 
Nagasaki was actually a domestic agent of the Japanese state. In this line of 
reasoning, this internal document cannot provide any hints for thorough legal 
assessment. As a result, one should not attribute any legal value to it.  
                                                 
657 S. W. Su, “The Territorial Dispute over the Tiaoyu/Senkaku Islands: An Update”, Vol. 36 Ocean 
Development & International Law, 55 
658 Han-yi Shaw, “Its History And An Analysis Of The Ownership Claims Of The PRC, ROC, And 
Japan“, No. 3 Occasional Papers (1999), 33  
   
7.8.2. Tokyo Court Ruling 1941-44 
According to the Chinese stance, the Japanese implicitly admitted that the 
Diaoyu Islands were appurtenant to Taiwan. In 1944, a Tokyo court ruled in a 
trail between the governors of Taiwan and Ryukyu Islands that the Diaoyu 
Islands were an integral part of Taiwanese jurisdiction.659 Since the verdict’s 
document could not be found in the archives, the Court ruling’s legal value is 
rather doubtful. For the final legal assessment this Tokyo Court ruling 
eventually cannot convey the islands to one of the claimants, either.   
 
7.9. War Time Declarations 
In 1937 the Second Sino-Japanese war commenced. This war led to World 
War II two years later. Special attention must be paid to the War Time 
Declaration on the grounds of their undetermined legal character. It is 
questionable whether the declaration is a mere “Gentlemen’s Agreement” or a 
fully internationally binding treaty.660 Pursuant to the Cairo Conference 
Declaration in 1943, Japan was to be expelled from all the territories, which it 
had taken by violence and greed. It is important to acknowledge that these 
declarations were incorporated into the Japanese Surrender terms of 
September 1945. 
7.9.1. Chinese view of the Declaration of Potsdam and Cairo 
In the Chinese view, the reversion of the Diaoyu Islands to the Japanese 
(even though under a trusteeship of the United Nations) violated the Potsdam 
and Cairo Declarations. In the Cairo Declaration, it has been stated that all 
annexed territories must be returned to the Chinese. The Potsdam / Cairo 
Declaration signed by the Japanese upon their surrender obliged the 
Japanese to execute these stipulations. As a consequence, the islands must 
have been reverted to Chinese rule because the Instrument of Surrender was 
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legally binding for Japan.661 Since the PRC refuses to recognize the San 
Francisco and Taipei Treaty, the only pillar for China / mainland’s claim are 
the Japanese Surrender Terms of 1945. 
7.9.2. Japanese view of the Declarations 
The Japanese do not attach any further importance to the Surrender Terms. 
As the islands were not part of the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki, Japan could 
not be bound to return them on basis of any post-war agreement. The valid 
legal devices determining the islands status are the San Francisco and the 
Taipei Treaty, which the Chinese did not use to lodge any protest.662 
7.9.3. American view about the Declarations 
The Americans actually do not attach any importance to the war - time 
declarations. Their point of view presumably is that the establishment of a 
trusteeship over the Diaoyu / Senkaku islands was not an infringement of the 
war-time declarations because Art. 8 of the Potsdam Declaration expressly 
laid down that Japan’s sovereignty should not be removed from minor islands 
as the Allies will determine. Therefore, the minor disputed islands could still 
enjoy Japanese sovereignty.663   
7.9.4. Legal value of the Declarations 
The Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands were not expressly mentioned in the 
declaration. Particular reference was made to the annexation of Chinese 
territories forcefully stolen. Special referral was made in the enumeration of 
the stolen territories, “such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores”. The 
express mentioning of these territories conveys the idea that the three Allied 
Powers agreed upon a converse declaration laying down the reversion of the 
1895 Treaty of Shimoneseki. The goal of this declaration was very clear: The 
Japanese should be forced to abandon what they had annexed in prior times. 
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As a result, the 1945 Potsdam Proclamation aimed to restrict Japanese 
sovereignty to the four major Japanese islands and to minor islands as the 
Allied wished to determine. 
7.9.5. No transfer of Japanese sovereignty over stolen territories 
It has to be recalled that declarations and proclamation are soft law and only a 
mere declaratory legal effect is attributed to them.664 The question of the 
documents’ legal value is irrelevant because these Allies’ agreements became 
part of the Japanese Instrument of Surrender in 1945. The Surrender Terms 
are more than a mere declaration; they resemble, talking in legal categories, 
more to binational treaties. It is characteristic of international treaties that they 
are legally binding. Strictly speaking, by virtue of the Surrender Terms the 
Japanese obliged themselves inter alia towards the victors that (China was a 
signatory!)665 they will renounce their rights to the territories taken by greed. 
Therefore, the Surrender Terms are legally binding for the Japanese. There 
are several valuable arguments, which deny the PRC’s position that the 
Surrender Terms already incorporated a cession of title. 
 
7.9.5.1. By virtue of the Surrender Terms Japan only agreed to “issue orders 
and take whatever action may be required for the purpose of giving effect to 
the Potsdam Declaration.” Although being bound by their signature, the 
textual interpretation militates against the assumption that this agreement 
functioned as a cession treaty.666 Cession treaties usually avoid equivocal 
wordings.  
 
7.9.5.2. It has to be recalled that the declaration’s and the proclamation’s 
content - despite their legally binding character - entail just an expression of 
intent. The precise text of the two components of the Surrender Terms all the 
wording “shall be restored”. This means in other words, the sovereign 
question is not shelved in the Surrender Terms; it just expresses an 
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agreement to settle this between the victors in the near future. The Instrument 
of Surrender therefore was, technically speaking, only an armistice and did 
not prejudice any question of sovereignty.667 To sum up, the Surrender Terms 
contained an “agreement to agree” on the sovereignty over the stolen 
territories in the future. Therefore, the Taiwanese - Chinese contention that 
the Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands was 
returned to the Chinese by virtue of the Surrender Terms668 is false. 
 
7.9.5.3. Pursuant to international law, a transfer of sovereignty is required for 
a legally effective cession of Taiwan and the islands. Being signatory among 
the Allied Powers, the United Kingdom and Australia held the view that Japan 
is endowed de jure of all powers until the final peace treaty.669  
 
7.9.5.4. The wording of Art. 8 of the Potsdam Declaration that Japan’s 
sovereignty shall be limited to the four major Japanese islands and such 
minor islands as we determine does not rule out the option that the Japanese 
could maintain the title of sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands. The precise 
extent of Japanese islands sovereignty remained clearly undetermined. It is 
possible that the Senkaku Islands were counted to belong to the “minor 
islands as we determine”.    
 
7.9.5.5. The terms of the Cairo and Potsdam Declaration were concluded in 
too vague and equivocal language that one could reasonably assume that the 
Japanese already ceded a title of sovereignty in the Surrender Terms. As a 
consequence, after signing the Surrender Terms Taiwan still was a territory 
occupied by the Allies, which was subject to Japanese sovereignty. As the 
Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands were under Japanese sovereignty at that time, the 
same line of reasoning must be applied to them. Their legal status was altered 
neither by the War Agreement nor by the Surrender Terms.   
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7.10. Analysis of the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1952 
In the course of the oncoming Cold War and the foundation of the People’s 
Republic of China it took some time to settle the sovereignty question over the 
conquest territories. These signatories signed the treaty on September 8th, 
1951 and the document went into effect on the April 28th, 1952.670 In Art. 2 (b) 
of the treaty, Japan had to renounce the territorial title of Formosa and the 
Pescadores.  
7.10.1. The Taiwanese refutations  
Taiwan alleges that the Tiao-yu-tai Islands historically were a part of 
Taiwanese administration. The Taiwanese and Chinese lines of reasoning are 
quite alike. For this reason, Taiwan and China mainly put forward the same 
line of reasoning; both Chinese states claim historical rights on the grounds 
that they are the lawful representative of the Chinese people. The dividing line 
between the two states had to be laid down in the year 1949. The only big 
difference of opinion between the two Chinese countries lies in the Treaty of 
Taipei of 1952, which is without value for the PRC. On the contrary, Taiwan is 
willing to found its refutations on the Cairo- and Potsdam Declarations, the 
Sino-Japanese Treaty of Taipei in 1952 and the San Francisco Treaty.671  
7.10.2. Japanese view of the San Francisco Treaty of 1952 
The Japanese admit that the Senkaku Islands were meant to be included in 
the Treaty of San Francisco despite the fact that they were not explicitly 
mentioned. Under the treaty, the islands were without a doubt included into 
“Nansei Shoto” together with the Ryukyu Islands. Additionally, Art. 3 stipulated 
the establishment of a trusteeship over the islands, which conferred the 
administrative rights to the U.S.A.672 This Japanese interpretation of the 
status of the Senkaku Islands as part of the Ryukyu Islands was also 
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supported by a U.S. court decision in Hawaii relating to the question of 
Japanese sovereignty over the Ryukyu Islands.673 
                                                
7.10.3. Chinese view of the San Francisco Treaty of 1952 
Neither of the two Chinese governments were members of the San Francisco 
Treaty and the PRC consistently denounced the validity of this treaty.674 
Therefore, the Treaty of San Francisco must be deemed ineffective and 
invalid because foreign powers are not entitled to make decision about the 
Chinese territorial “fate”.675 Instead, the PRC bases its claims mainly on the 
Japanese Surrender as the sole legal basis to the disputed islands.676 The 
illegal incorporation of the Diaoyu Islands by the Japanese government could 
conveniently be adopted by the U.S. military while drafting the peace treaty 
conditions. The U.S. thus just solidified an unlawful theft of the islands by 
using them for their own purposes.677        
7.10.4. Chinese auxiliary Interpretation of the 1952 Treaty  
Although the PRC does not recognize the Treaty of San Francisco, their 
scholars nevertheless put forward (as a precautionary action) some 
arguments how to interpret the treaty: The legal relationship between Art. 2 
and Art. 3 of the San Francisco Treaty arguably may not have been set up in 
the clearest way. It is questionable whether the Japanese sovereignty 
pursuant Art. 2 shall be limited to its five major islands or if Art. 3 permits 
further exceptions. The Chinese put forward that the separate Art. 3 aimed to 
prevent Art. 2 from being fully implemented. This article determines just the 
cases where Japanese territory is detached for different reasons than in Art. 
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2.678 The Chinese perspective is that Art. 3 is not a specification in the form of 
a subsection of Art. 2.  
7.10.5. Chinese Position on the U.S. Decree No. 27 of 1953 
According to Chinese interpretations the American Decree No. 27 - as it was 
issued on basis of the provisions of the San Francisco Treaty of 1951- the 
decree was consequently also illegal. In this decree the geographical Ryukyu 
boundary delimitation had to be established pursuant to the stipulations of the 
San Francisco Treaty. Since the Treaty of San Francisco did not include the 
Diaoyu Islands location, the decree must had been changed to provisions 
including only the area northern of 24° degree north latitude and western of 
122° east longitude.679    
7.10.6. Legal Assessment of the Treaty of San Francisco 
The San Francisco Treaty obliged Japan to renounce the title of sovereignty 
over Taiwan. The treaty’s wording made it clear that Japan had to abandon 
the title of sovereignty. It could be refuted that on the grounds of this important 
treaty the Chinese were entitled to recover Taiwan and the minor islands.  
7.10.6.1. Subjective third party’s right of the Chinese? 
Another question is whether the Chinese are entitle to make a legal claim by 
virtue of this peace treaty. The principle of “pacta tertiis nec nocent nec 
prosunt: Res inter alios acta” was a well respected legal principle under 
civilized nations in former times.680 It is also possible that a non-signatory third 
state is entitled to raise the claim.681 The third party’s right must be clearly 
determined. In the case of doubts, no rights can be deduced from the right in 
favour of the third party.682 Art. 36 of the Vienna Convention reflects these 
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ideas, which were applied by the ICJ for legal problems arising from treaties of 
the post-war era.683  
 
Art. 36 Vienna Convention 
“A right arises for a third State from a provision of a treaty if the parties to the 
treaty intend the provision to accord that right either to the third State, or to a 
group of States to which it belongs, or to all States, and the third State 
assents thereto. Its assent shall be presumed so long as the contrary is not 
indicated, unless the treaty otherwise provides.” 
 
The peace treaty was concluded between Japan and the Allies; the Chinese 
were not part of the Allies this time. The Chinese must henceforth be 
considered as a third party of this treaty. It could impossibly be deduced that 
any rights were intended to be conferred to the Chinese.684 The Allies, 
particularly Russia envisaged to encroach some of the Japanese territories. 
Therefore, it must not be assumed that the parties of the treaty intended to 
confer any rights to the Chinese. The subsequent parties conduct (Treaty of 
Taipei) also proves that the Treaty of San Francisco was restricted to the 
removal of Japanese sovereignty over Taiwan without determining its 
recipient. Neither Taiwan nor the PRC as a possible third party may claim any 
rights on the grounds of this treaty. Not knowing which Chinese state was the 
lawful representative of the Chinese people, the negotiators circumnavigated 
the problem of which party became the recipient of the sovereignty over 
Taiwan and the Pescadores. The naming of the cession’s recipient was simply 
omitted. As a result, the San Francisco Treaty has to be regarded as 
immaterial for the Chinese restoration of sovereignty over Taiwan and the 
minor islands.    
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7.10.6.2. Provision for U.N. trusteeship in Art. 3 of the Treaty 
The wording “Formosa and all the islands belonging to it”, as in the 1895 
Shimonoseki Treaty, was not chosen. Instead, another textual approach was 
selected in Art. 3 that Japan was obliged to set the Nansei Shoto south of the 
29 degree northern latitude under a trusteeship of the United Nations. The 
term Nansei-shoto means “south west islands”, thereby doubtlessly 
comprising the disputed islands. The term Nansei Shoto was purposely 
selected to include to Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands in the wording.685 On this 
grounds the United States Civil Administration Proclamation (USCAP), 
Number 27 of December 25th, 1953 could set the disputed islands under their 
administrative control.  
7.10.6.3. Does Art 3 cause an immediate cession of (partial) sovereignty? 
Another interesting question arises as to whether the Japanese were still able 
to return the title of sovereignty over the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands as part of 
the Taipei Treaty after the ratification of the San Francisco Treaty. This could 
be doubtful because by virtue of the Treaty of San Francisco the Japanese 
had to abide to concur on any proposal of an U.N. trusteeship administered by 
the U.S. If the trusteeship obligation over the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands had 
comprised a transfer of title of sovereignty, the subsequent Treaty of Taipei 
would have been depleted of the Diaoyu / Senkaku Island’s sovereignty. The 
title could not be returned to the Chinese, if it was possibly handed over prior 
to the Americans. Therefore, the question must be raised of whether the 
Japanese had lost their sovereignty over the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands by the 
Treaty of San Francisco, which went into effect three month earlier than the 
Taipei Treaty. Japan must respect the principle “nemo dat quod non habet” 
(no donor can give a greater interest than that what he himself has).686 
7.10.6.3.1. Standpoint of Art. 3 causes a transfer of sovereignty 
The San Francisco Treaty’s wording does not expressly state a cession of 
sovereignty: (“Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States”). It could 
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be argued that the contractual obligation for an approval to a trusteeship 
including administrative, legislative and jurisdictional powers already 
represents the cession of sovereignty. This treaty creates the legal obligation 
for Japan to concur on any potential proposal of the United States.687 Japan 
should no longer have power over the disputed islands. It could be argued 
that although the question of sovereignty was not expressly dealt with in the 
stipulations, virtually all typical sovereign rights were transferred from Japan to 
the U.S. From this point of view, Japan must no longer be held as the 
sovereign of the disputed islands after the San Francisco Treaty came into 
effect.  
7.10.6.3.2. Standpoint sovereignty remained Japanese  
It might also be put forward that the obligation to concur on any proposal of 
the U.S. does not comprise the sovereignty question at all. The contextual 
interpretation of the San Francisco Treaty favours this view as well. Japan had 
to renounce all rights and title of Formosa and the Pescadores, whereas 
regarding the Okinawa and Senkaku Islands they only had to concur on any 
proposal made by the U.S. on behalf of the United Nations. The treaty’s 
wording “Japan will concur” does not cause the limitation of sovereignty to 
simultaneously come into effect with the treaty. The final proposal of the U.S. 
towards the United Nations must be seen as the legal grounds for the 
limitation of sovereignty because Art. 3 only stipulated Japan’s obligation to 
follow any U.S. proposal. Given this background Japan still holding the title of 
sovereignty could return the disputed islands to the former owner China by 
virtue of the Taipei Treaty.  
7.10.6.3.3. Author’s point of view 
Conversely to most other analysts, the author refutes that Art. 3 does not 
directly affect the Japanese sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands. It is the 
final U.S. proposal to the U.N. that will influence the extent of Japanese 
sovereignty over the disputed islands. Art. 3 expressly lies down that pending 
the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon the U.S. will 
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have administrative rights. In other words, until this proposal was not made, 
Japan could retain its entire sovereignty.  
7.10.6.4. Conferral of contingent right in Art. 3 
It could be argued that Art. 3 of the San Francisco Treaty, albeit not putting 
into effect an immediate transfer of title, grants a so-called contingent right to 
the U.S. In some codified civil law countries, such as Germany688, the legal 
order recognized certain rights could develop during the performance of 
contractual obligations. According to Art. 38 (III) of the ICJ Statute legal 
principles of other civilized nations are recognized as a valid source of law. In 
such a case, where the transferor of title has done everything required for the 
transfer so that the completion lies solely within the decision leeway of the 
transferee, the latter has acquired a legal position, which cannot be 
invalidated against the will of the transferee. This legal position is of lesser 
status than, but similar in nature to the full right. The transferor Japan was 
therefore incapable of frustrating the U.S. legal position after the ratification of 
Art. 3. The U.S. legal position must therefore be held as comparable to one of 
a contingent right. As a consequence, this contingent right is to be dealt with 
like the full right in most regards.689  
7.10.6.5. Optional clause 
It could also be refuted that the terminology of Art. 3 lays down an optional 
clause in favour of the U.S.. To be effective, the option must set out the terms 
of the agreement. In other words, an option will only give rise to a contract, 
provided that it does not reserve matters for a future agreement and that the 
option has been exercised within the scope of its precise terms.690 In such a 
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clause, the optionee (U.S.) is not bound to any obligation, but the offeror 
(Japan) is obligated to it as long as the optionee has not rejected it.     
7.10.6.6. Final Conclusion and Summary 
The U.S. was in a “master-servant legal position” vis-à-vis Japan because 
Japan had to concur on any proposal of the U.S. towards the U.N.  Art. 3 did 
not confer a contingent right to the U.S.A. because the feature of a contingent 
right does not allow for the entry into force of the full right to be determined by 
only one party’s subjective decision. 691 The German legalistic device of the 
contingent right (“Anwartschaftsrecht”) does not really correspond to Art. 3 
either because a condition in the sense of § 158 (I, Alt. 1) German Civil Code 
(BGB) does not comprise an option whose exercise is based on one party’s 
will. The drafters of Art. 3 presumably, instead of granting a contingent right to 
the U.S., wanted rather to convey an optional clause to the U.S. To sum up, 
up to the final establishment of the trusteeship, the U.S. was the beneficiary of 
an optional clause, which did not immediately affect the disputed islands 
sovereignty.    
 
7.11. Legal Situation under the trusteeship 
Shortly afterwards the U.S. incorporated this disputed islands under their U.N. 
trusteeship system.692 As the 1972 Reversion Agreement between Japan and 
the U.S. clearly does not comprise a transfer of title, the question about 
Japan’s legal position under the trusteeship must be raised. As a result of a 
lack of transfer to Japan in this agreement, it is important for Japan’s claim 
that Japan could maintain a certain degree of residual sovereignty in order to 
claim today’s title of sovereignty over the islands. Could the Japanese 
withhold a certain degree of residual sovereignty within the U.S.-run 
trusteeship? Was it possible to divide the sovereignty between the U.S. and 
Japan?  
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7.11.1. Taiwanese Position towards “residual sovereignty” 
The Taiwanese refuse that any residual sovereignty remained to Japan. 
Taking this into consideration the Chinese government felt no urgency to 
make any objections towards the administration based on an U.N. trusteeship. 
As a reversion of the islands would contradict the terms of the Japanese 
Surrender, there was no necessity to grant residual sovereignty to the 
Japanese.693 The Taiwanese government considered the U.S. administration 
of the Okinawa islands to have no genuine link to the question of sovereignty. 
Instead, the Taiwanese government uttered a statement clarifying that the 
arrangement of military presence needs to be detached from the question of 
sovereignty and that it has no impact on it, either.694  
7.11.2. Japan’s stance about Japanese residual sovereignty 
Japan is in favour of the U.S. assumption of residual sovereignty under their 
administration. The inhabitants of the Okinawa Islands were still Japanese 
nationals. Japan maintained the right to issue passports to its citizen on the 
Okinawa Islands. The Japanese Courts held e.g. that Japanese nationals still 
were to abide by the personal sovereignty’s jurisdiction of Japan.695 The U.S. 
could not determine the final fate of the territory. The provisions assured that 
once the U.S. withdrew from the islands, the territory ipso facto falls back on 
Japan. The islands’ sovereignty was stripped off except that the “territorial 
sovereignty” remained to the Japanese.696 Additionally, the Power (U.S.A.) 
exercising sovereignty on the islands  paid an annual rent to the Japanese 
private proprietor of the islands what they had not done if the sovereignty 
would be duly theirs.697 The U.S. accommodated the Japanese residual 
sovereignty. The Executive Order from President J. F. Kennedy reaffirmed 
this: 
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“I recognize the Ryukyu to be a part of Japanese homeland and look forward 
to the day when the Security interest of the Free World will permit their 
restoration to full Japanese sovereignty. In the meantime, we face a situation 
which must be met with a spirit of forbearance and mutual understanding”698   
 
At the same time, it was the U.S. position that the San Francisco Treaty alone 
did not represent the final determinant of the sovereignty issue.699  
7.11.2.1. Legal Construction of the U.N. trusteeship 
The trusteeship system is part of the U.N. Charta, which does not clearly 
determine the question of sovereignty, either. 
 
Art. 75 Charta of the United Nations 
“The United Nations shall establish under its authority an international 
trusteeship system for the administration ad supervision of such territories as 
may be placed there under by subsequent individual agreements. These 
territories are hereinafter referred to as trust territories.” 
 
The introductory paragraph does not provide any indications to assume that 
the sovereignty of former enemies’ territories shall be stripped off, either. The 
legal construction of a “trust”, borrowed from the Anglo Saxon common law 
system, makes one assume that the core sovereignty should remain with 
Japan. In Anglo-Saxon law, the trustee is under a fiduciary obligation imposed 
by the contractual terms or by law so that they cannot take advantage of their 
position detrimental to the beneficiaries.700 This legalistic device ascertains 
that the beneficiary (Japan) remains the owner (sovereign) and the trustee 
(U.S.A.) has the fiduciary (administrative) rights. Today it is well-recognized 
under scholars that a state’s sovereignty, although it is not divisible in the 
eyes of most academics, it is limitable. As Crawford indicates, “sovereignty is 
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not to be confused with the exercise of sovereignty and a state may continue 
to be sovereign even though important government functions are carried out, 
by treaty or otherwise, by another state.”701 Notwithstanding this 
brainstorming the various legal ideas shall be briefly sketched out.  
                                                
7.11.2.2. Allies and associated Powers Sovereignty  
It is refuted that the trustee’s territories sovereignty lies in the hands of the 
Allies and the associated powers. This theory is quite far-fetched because 
there is no indication in the terms of the trusteeship that any sovereignty 
should be delegated to the common exercise of the Allies. Additionally, as the 
trusteeship itself was never regarded as a state entity, the nationality of an 
Okinawa citizen would have in this case been divided into five.702  
7.11.2.3. United Nations Sovereignty 
Some advocates back the idea that the Allies wanted to attribute sovereignty 
to the United Nations. Although the U.N. may be considered as subject to 
international public law these days, they rely too much on the consent of the 
administering authority (U.S.A.) for making decisions. Hans Kelsen stated that 
the U.N. could not establish itself as the administering authority or confer the 
administrative charge to a third state by a unilateral act.703  
7.11.2.4. Joint Sovereignty 
The supporters of this theory argue that the sovereignty is subdivided with the 
United Nations and the administering authority.704 This position is contrary to 
the well-recognized principle of indivisible sovereignty. This concept must be 
declined as a shared sovereignty leads to a total confusion of the concept of 
sovereignty. In the interest of the reliability of public international law the legal 
title of sovereignty must not be subject to any joint tenure of such.    
 
701 John Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (1rst ed., 1979), 27 
702 R.N. Chowdhuri, International Mandates and Trusteeship Systems (1rst ed., 1955), 231; Chairmian 
Edwards Toussaint, The Trusteeship System Of The United Nations (1rst ed., 1956), 91 
703 Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations (1rst ed., 1950), 693 
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7.11.2.5. Administering agent has sovereignty 
It could also be held plausible that the administering authority, in this case the 
U.S., is the sole owner of the title of sovereignty. The agents’ national flags 
were flying in the territories.705 This must be doubtful on grounds that the 
administering authorities are not entitled to transfer or to cede the territory to a 
third state. The agents were legally bound by the trust agreement; if the agent 
wanted the agreement to be amended, then they had to seek the consent of 
the U.N. organs. They had to submit annual reports to the U.N. and they were 
obliged to undergo U.N. supervisory inspections.706 The U.N. still was 
empowered to revoke trusteeship agreements, although in this particular 
case, the U.S. could have vetoed any attempt of revocation.707 In the 
theoretical case that the agent abandoned its prerogatives in the trusteeship 
administration, the territories would not become “terra nullius”, either. All these 
arguments lead to the conclusion that at least the entire sovereignty could not 
have layn in the hands of the agents.  
7.11.2.6. The inhabitants of trust territories retain residual sovereignty 
One should bear in mind that the de jure sovereignty remains in the hands of 
the inhabitants of the territories. United States courts ruled that the Ryukyu 
Islands were foreign territories and its inhabitants were not American nationals 
so American decrees and statutes were not to be applied on the Okinawa 
Islands under the trusteeship.708 The wording of the Treaty of San Francisco 
supports this stance. It only mentions the U.S. right to exercise all powers of 
administrative, legislative and jurisdictional power. The 1972 Reversion 
Agreement expressly returns the administrative rights to Japan. 
7.11.2.7. Author’s Conclusion    
The last position seems the most consistent with the practical terms of the 
setting up of the trusteeship. The trustee’s agent, in this case the U.S., did not 
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dispose of the power of alienation over the administered territory. The right of 
alienation though is one of the key rights of the sovereign if total sovereignty is 
held. As this is not the case and since the concept of shared or joint 
sovereignty must be discarded, there cannot be any other conclusion than 
that it was Japan, which held a certain residual degree of sovereignty over the 
Okinawa / Senkaku Islands from 1951-1972.  
 
7.12. Analysis of the Taipei Treaty of 1952 
Neither the conferral of a contingent right to the U.S. (by virtue of Art. 3 of the 
San Francisco Treaty), nor the final U.S. proposal to the U.N. could entirely 
eliminate Japanese sovereignty over the disputed islands. It is possible that 
Japan lost its title of (residual) sovereignty by virtue of this Taipei Treaty. In 
Art. 4  of the Taipei Treaty, the Japanese conceded that all treaties prior to 
1941 became void as a consequence of the war.  
7.12.1. Taiwanese view towards the Treaty of Taipei 
Taiwan argues that the islands’ sovereignty was restored in favour of Taiwan 
by virtue of the Treaty of Taipei in 1952. After the conquest of Taiwan in 1895, 
the Japanese government annexed the disputed islands as well. As Art. 4 of 
the Taipei Treaty declared all Japanese wartime acquisitions prior to 1941 to 
be void. From their point of view; the islands fell back to Taiwan.709 
7.12.2. PRC’s view of the Treaty of Taipei of 1952 
As the People’s Republic of China does not recognize Taiwan and rejects its 
capacity to conclude legally binding agreements under international law, the 
PRC considers as well the Treaty of Taipei as void.710 Interestingly, the 
Taiwanese argue that in the Treaty of Shimonoseki “Taiwan, together with all 
islands appertaining to Taiwan” was ceded to Japan. Consistently, it was 
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illegal to hand over the Diaoyu and other islands appertaining to Taiwan to the 
United States.711  
7.12.3. Japan’s view of the Treaty of Taipei 
The Japanese staunchly disagree that the Taipei Treaty refers in some way to 
the Senkaku Islands because the islands were incorporated as terra nullius in 
1895.712 The islands were already envisaged to be put under a trusteeship 
and the Treaty of Shimonoseki did not include the disputed islands.  
7.12.4. Legal assessment of Taipei Treaty 
The Japanese renounced all rights to the territories illegally snatched by greed 
prior to 9th December 1941. Does Art. 4 of the Taipei Treaty include the 
Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands, too? As stated above, the disputed islands 
arguably formed an integral part of the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki. This 
treaty was unquestionably signed prior to 1941 and was a treaty securing the 
territorial greed of Japan. Therefore, it must be logically deduced that this 
treaty was to include the disputed islands in Art. 4.713 Therefore, the Taipei 
Treaty caused a nullification of the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki. As a result, 
the sovereignty of the Diaoyu / Senkaku islands must have been reverted to 
the “Chinese” by virtue of the Taipei Treaty. In a case of a renunciation of 
sovereignty, the recipient of it does not have to be expressly mentioned 
because a renunciation automatically restores the ownership of the former 
(Chinese) sovereign.714 This means that the “Chinese”, in case of a Japanese 
renunciation of sovereignty, received the legal title already as early as in 
1952.715 The Taipei Treaty caused a legal situation, which was incoherent 
with the practical terms of the trusteeship set up by virtue of the San 
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Francisco Treaty. On the one side, “China” was the recipient of the islands 
sovereignty and on the other hand Japan held the de-facto marginal legal 
control over them. From today’s perspective, the holder of title of territory over 
the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands has been alienated of its rights since 1952. 
                                                
 
7.13. Legal Situation after creation of the Continental Shelf 
1958 
7.13.1. Chinese Geological argument 
One of the Chinese refutations recurs on the principle of contiguity and of the 
Continental Shelf. As the islands are separated from Japan’s Okinawa islands 
by an approximately 2200-meter deep sea trench (Ryukyu trough), they are 
geologically located on the Chinese side.716 This cannot mean but that the 
Diaoyu Islands are a natural extension of China’s land territory.717  
 
Even if the islands were adjudged one day to China, the legal dispute over 
maritime space would remain in existence. China claims the broad margin of 
the continental shelf refuting that the shelf actually terminates at the trough 
close to the Ryukyu Islands at depth of 2,000 metres.718 China’s claim is 
based on Art. 76 UNCLOS. This article lays down that an extended 
continental shelf in certain circumstances can go up to 350 nm or 100 nm 
beyond the 2,500-metre isobath.719    
7.13.2. Japanese position: Equidistance Principle  
Japan’s position consists of denying any legal importance to the up to more 
than 2700-meter deep Okinawa trench. Japan considers the entire East 
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719 Chris Carleton, “Maritime Delimitation in Complex Island Situation”, in: Rainer Lagoni, Daniel 
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Chinese Sea as one single area of Continental Shelf.720 Not having signed the 
1958 Convention of the Continental Shelf, the Japanese government still 
acclaims the technical exploitability clause of this Convention. This clause 
states that the continental shelf may extend to a territory measuring a depth 
exceeding the 200-meter margin.  
 
Japan favours the principle of equidistance. The maritime boundary therefore 
shall be drafted by using the Senkaku islands as baselines. As a 
consequence, the delimitation shall be made by an agreement and by the 
usage of equitable principles taking into account the special circumstances of 
the case, just as the ICJ observed in the North Sea Continental Shelf Case.721   
7.13.3. Taiwanese ratification of the Continental Shelf Convention of 
1958 
After the natural resources were discovered, the Taiwanese government 
hastened to sign to Continental Shelf Convention of 1958. The Taiwanese 
made the following reservation to the Convention:  
 
a) that the boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to two or more 
States whose coasts are adjacent to and/or opposite each other shall be 
determined in accordance with the principle of the natural prolongation of their 
land territories 
b) that in determining the boundary of the continental shelf of the Republic of 
China, exposed rocks and islets shall not be taken into account.  
 
Given the temporal proximity of the signing of the treaty in 1970 to the oil 
discovery, it may be reasonably assumed that the reservations refer to the 
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Tai-yu-tai Islands. For the Taiwanese government was important to clarify that 
the boundary delimitation should not be affected by islands.722 
7.13.4. Legal Assessment of the 1958 Continental Shelf Doctrine 
Analysing the geological surroundings of the Eastern Chinese Sea there is no 
denying that the Diaoyu Islands are located within the area of the Chinese 
continental shelf. Nevertheless, it must be concluded that the Diaoyu / 
Senkaku Islands’ location on the verge of the Chinese Continental Shelf must 
be held immaterial under public international law. The principle of the 
Continental Shelf is predominantly restricted to exploitation rights and not for 
the settlement of islands’ sovereignty disputes. The principle is useless for 
determining the ownership of off-sea islands.  
 
7.14. Estoppel by historical records 
All claimant states could be estoppeled (venire contra factum proprium) to lay 
claim on the islands because they displayed a previous behaviour, which was 
contradictory to their claims today.     
7.14.1. Japanese position towards Chinese textbooks and maps 
After the World War II, some school textbooks and yearbooks were published 
in Taiwan and a world atlas edited in Beijing were published using Japanese 
place names. The Chinese put forward that as the islands were administered 
by the U.S., these books simply took over the names used by the former 
Japanese Empire. The publications just mirror this historical fact.723 
7.14.2. Chinese position of Japanese historical documents 
The first recorded Japanese documentation dates back to 1785 when the 
Japanese cartographer Li Tzu Pin published the book “A general and 
illustrated map of the three countries”. This map not only used the Chinese 
word of “Diaoyutai”, but also used the same red colour for the Chinese Fujian 
Province as for the islands. On the contrary, the Japanese Kumi Mountain 
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was indented in a yellow colour just like the other Ryukyu Islands. This proves 
that the Japanese at that time agreed that the Diaoyu Islands were Chinese 
territory.724  
7.14.3. Legal Assessment of the geographic maps 
7.14.3.1. Comparison to the Preah Vihear Case 
In the 1962 Temple of Preah Vihear Case, the ICJ attributed the disputed area 
to Cambodia because Siam (Thailand) accepted a map as an annex of an 
interpretation agreement concerning a treaty of 1904 where the disputed 
territory was imputed to be French (Cambodian) territory. The Court ruled that 
Siam was precluded from claiming the territory because it had accepted the 
map’s interpretation for many decades.725 The Preah Vihear case exemplifies 
the high prerequisites of an estoppel in conjunction with the publicising of 
maps. In this present dispute, the maps were not annexed to an interpretation 
of an international agreement. The maps were not part of any binational 
agreement so that they are not comparable to the maps of the above-
mentioned case.  
7.14.3.2. Comparison to the Nuclear Test Case 
A second argument can be put forward that the documents do not express a 
state’s will to create legal bindings. In the East Greenland Case, a statement 
of the Norwegian Foreign Minister in response to a request of the Danish 
government was held as capable of making an international legally binding 
declaration.726 On the other hand, in the Nuclear Test case (Australia v. 
France) the ICJ ruled that a unilateral public announcement of the French 
Foreign Minister to stop nuclear tests in the Pacific did not create any legal 
bindings on France. The Court denied that the French Minister had any 
intention to enter into an international obligation.727 The documents’ value is 
more similar to the circumstances of the Nuclear Test case. The international 
value Chinese schoolbooks or newspaper articles in the Renmin Ribao, 
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although they were probably approved by the Cultural Ministry, is not so far-
reaching as to impute a state’s will to enter into any obligations.  
 
7.15. Legal Situation after the 1972 Reversion Agreement 
7.15.1. Chinese Position towards the Okinawa Reversion Agreement  
According to the Chinese, the Okinawa Reversion Agreement of 1972 does 
not affect the legal status of the islands. The U.S. administration over the 
Okinawa Islands in tandem with the Diaoyu Islands was unlawful anyhow. 
This Chinese stance was backed by the U.S. interpretation affirming the strict 
neutrality of the U.S. in this dispute and stating that the agreement does not 
prejudice the ownership of the islands.728   
7.15.2. Japanese refutation about the Reversion Agreement 
The Japanese put forward that after a period of residual sovereignty their 
state regained full sovereignty over the Okinawa Islands and the Senkaku 
Islands by virtue of this agreement. As the Treaty of Taipei’s nullification of the 
pre-war thefts of territory does not include the Senkakus, Japan considers 
itself as the permanent holder of the title of sovereignty since 1895.729 
7.15.3. Legal Assessment of the Reversion Agreement 
Thanks to the Reversion Treaty, which came into effect on May 15th, 1972, the 
Japanese regained full administrative, legislative and jurisdictional powers 
over Okinawa including the Senkaku Islands.730 This time, the American 
expressly mentioned the Senkaku Islands that they were to be included in the 
agreement.731 The agreement’s wording nowhere refers to a transfer of 
sovereignty. It just states that the U.S. relinquishes all rights they have 
received by virtue of Art. 3 of the San Francisco Treaty.  
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Within the line of assumption that the Treaty of Taipei restored the Chinese 
juridical sovereignty over the disputed islands it must be concluded that 
America reverted only the political control to a recipient (Japan), which did not 
own the title of territory over the Senkakus. The U.S. was apparently rather 
poorly knowledgeable about the real legal status of the islands. They just 
equated the legal situation of the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands with the one of the 
Okinawa islands.  
 
The author agrees that the Japanese snatched the islands in 1895, but he 
contends that the de jure sovereignty was returned to the Chinese by 1952. 
The Chinese / Taiwanese are thus the de jure sovereign of the disputed 
islands since 1952. The Chinese regained the title of sovereignty in this year.  
 
7.16. Japanese Prescription of the title of sovereignty 
Despite their unfavourable position, the Japanese might have acquired a legal 
title by the principle of prescription. Most of the legal analysis of this conflict 
set the time range for the question of Japanese prescription between 1895 up 
to today. It is the author’s contention that Japan was the lawful sovereign of 
the islands from 1895 until 1952 because a coerced territorial cession must be 
held as legal at that time. Thus, up to the time of World War II a possible 
Japanese prescription must not be discussed.  
 
However, the only period of time where the Japanese could have prescribed 
the title is from 1952 – 1970. The Japanese enjoyed a peaceful residual 
political control for less than twenty years. The Chinese, being the holder of 
the territorial title, forgot to protest against the Japanese tenure of the islands 
up to the beginning of the 1970s. Afterwards the Chinese consecutively 
lodged protest against the Japanese ownership in multiple ways.  
7.16.1. Chinese explanation of failure of protest 
During the Cold War no Chinese protest of residual Japanese political control 
could be observed. China’s first protest was lodged shortly after oil resources 
   
had been discovered within the proximity of the islands. The spokesman of 
the Taiwanese Foreign Minister, Yu-Sun Wei, explained the Chinese inertia in 
the following terms: 
 
“China’s sovereign rights over Tiaoyutai do not permit any doubt historically or 
legally…It should be explained that when the islands were placed under the 
U.S. military control after WW II, the Chinese Government regarded this as a 
necessary measure based on the maintenance of regional security. China and 
the United States have reached an agreement on demarcation of area of 
patrol”732  
 
According to the Chinese interpretation of international law, the failure to 
protest may never invalidate a valid title to territory. According to some 
Chinese scholars, the “shixiaoqude” principle is not considered as a legal 
principle recognized by the majority of international legal academics. For this 
reason, the Japanese acquisition cannot be consolidated by prescription.733 
As the Japanese might lay their claim on an acquisitive prescription one day, 
the Chinese Ministry of foreign affairs has turned down this doubtful principle.  
7.16.2. Japanese stance to Chinese failure of protest 
From 1945 to 1969, both Chinese state entities entirely forgot about the 
islands. Regarding this time - period no Chinese objection of the U.S. 
administration could be recorded. It is true that neither of the two Chinese 
systems was allowed to take part in the San Francisco Peace conference. 
Despite their absence their protest would have been be recorded. The 
Japanese put forward that the lack of Chinese objection means that the 
Chinese acquiescence to the Japanese residual sovereignty.734 
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7.16.3. Legal Assessment of a Japanese Prescription 
It must be concluded that the Chinese protest in the 1970s interrupted the 
peaceful possession of political control. The international tribunals have never 
determined the exact length of time necessary for a title acquired by 
prescription. Although in all cases pondering seriously upon the assumption of 
prescription, the international tribunals had to decide about a minimum time 
length of at least 50 - 100 years.735 A time - period of less than 20 years is 
certainly not sufficient for the prescription of a title. Thus, the possibility of the 
Japanese acquisition of a title by the mode of prescription must be refused. 
 
7.17. Conclusion of the sovereignty question 
The question of the legal historical sovereignty must be decided in China’s / 
Taiwan’s favour albeit Japan maintains the entire factual sovereignty since 
1972. The Japanese refutation of having incorporated terra nullius in 1895 
cannot be backed by the legal facts. Looking at the legal situation by 
interpreting the international treaties, the position of Japan seems to be rather 
weak in the light of the 1952 retrocession of the islands to the Chinese. The 
Chinese regained the formal legal title by the Treaty of Taipei.  
 
As aforementioned, under international law the ownership is not only about 
“rightful or wrongful” possession. It must be remembered that the permanent 
effective territorial control is another key factor in determining the ownership of 
islands. Japan has exercised full political, legal and administrative control over 
the islands since 1972 and some nominal control between 1952-1972. The 
legal and factual sovereignty of the islands will remain split between the 
parties of the conflict. In lieu of taking legal action before the international 
tribunals the claimant states will probably accept the current status-quo as it 
has the least inroads on their interest. Finally, it must be stated that China 
owns the title, but it is questionable, if this historical title in the light of 
continuous exercise of Japanese control still bears any material value in an 
unpredictable court procedure.  
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8. Suggestions for a resolution of the islands dispute       
 
The diverging opinions about the islands ownership nowadays exist for more 
than 110 years. Given this background a prospective resolution of the islands 
dispute has to be found by recurring on peaceful channels. From the author’s 
perspective, it is very likely that the conflict will drag on for quite a long time. 
The only realistically viable solution that could be found one day is the one of 
a joint development of the maritime resources.  
 
8.1. Diplomatic Methods 
8.1.1. Claimants standpoints towards negotiation 
The claimants’ points of view concerning the final solution of the conflict are 
not favourable either. Regarding island disputes, the partys’ official positions 
are very much alike. Whenever they are administering the islands they even 
deny the existence of a dispute. Japan, which administers the islands today, 
boldly puts forward that no conflict over the Senkakus exists.736 On the 
contrary, Japan does not administer the Takeshima Islands; in this case, it 
proposed a procedure before an international tribunal.737 China strongly 
disagrees on the point that no dispute over the Diaoyu Islands exists. At the 
same time, it has to be recalled that China adopts a very similar position in the 
South China Sea dispute. Regarding the Nansha Islands, the Chinese leader 
Deng Xiaoping said in 1988 that the Philippines and China should put the 
issue aside for the time being and take the approach of pursuing a joint 
development.738 Wherever China upholds the administration of a certain 
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island it is reluctant to negotiate over the sovereignty. If this is not the case, its 
position towards negotiations is much more lenient.739  
 
To sum up, China and Japan follow a rather similar pattern. Whoever is in the 
weaker position proposes ways for a final resolution; whenever the particular 
state is already in governmental control, the standpoint towards negotiations 
is very much the contrary. 
8.1.2. Diplomatic resolution of the conflict 
A comparison to other former conflicts outlines that most of them could be 
resolved by the means of diplomatic channels. The most logical idea would be 
to transfer this experience made by other states to the current conflict. The 
major advantage of a diplomatic solution is that each party would have to 
concede something and no party will entirely lose a court procedure.  
 
In fact, this particular conflict has periodically given rise to some trouble. The 
diplomats’ task in previous times did not cover the goal of a final solution of 
the conflict. Instead, they were forced to deal with secondary consequences 
such as for example, the installation of a permanent telephone hotline. The 
claimants do not dare to concede anything because each of them considers 
itself as the sole legitimate owner of the islands.  
8.1.2.1. Negotiations 
Negotiations are the handiest device to solve territorial disputes with 
neighbouring states. In the past, China successfully settled its boundary 
delimitations with Russia or India for example. The Kingdom of Denmark and 
Germany successfully complemented their boundary delimitations based on 
the 1969 ICJ award by an agreement.740 As a mutual cession of territory is 
able to grant a transfer of sovereignty, this method is also a very convenient 
one.  
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8.1.2.2. Mediation 
Mediation is the prolonged annex of negotiation. The important difference lies 
in the involvement of a third party, which channels the communication, 
advances his own proposals, transmits and interprets each party’s proposal to 
the other party. The prerequisite for mediation is that the disputants can agree 
upon a common mediator who must enjoy the credibility of both sides. The 
down side of mediation is that the result might be incomplete in the end and 
that failure is sometimes unavoidable.741  
8.1.2.3. Conciliation 
Conciliation is very similar to mediation; there is no clear line between the two 
dispute settlement structures. In the conciliation process, the third party role is 
a more semi – judicial one in evaluating the factual and legal issues. In other 
words, conciliation puts the third party intervention on a more formal footing 
and institutionalises the mediation process. Contrary to arbitration, the result 
of conciliation is not binding to the parties. 742 
8.1.2.4. Inquiry 
Under Art. 50 of the ICJ Statute, the principle of inquiry was laid down so that 
parties may set up an impartial and independent body to determine the facts. 
In the past states only rarely resorted to inquiries.743  
8.1.3. Reasons against a diplomatic settlement in these days 
From the author’s perspective, the inducement of a settlement of the conflict 
by the means of mediation, compromise or negotiations is in this case not 
very probable, either. In these days, the power distribution in the area is 
undergoing some considerable shifts. Some other factors also have an 
adverse effect obstructing a possible resolution. Firstly, all parties of the 
dispute publicised a firm and non negotiable stance of their rights. The claims 
based on historic rights downsized the leeway for a compromise. Second, all 
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states’ political relationships are imbued with distrust, if it is not hostile. The 
mutual dependencies cannot conceal that the historical pain inflicted on the 
other side exacerbated the distrust and impedes a peaceful resolution. 
Political congeniality has been found to be very conducive towards finding a 
boundary limitation in other conflicts.744 The relationship between the two 
Chinese states is even less congenial than the historically strained ties with 
Japan in this case. The PRC does not recognize the Taiwanese government 
as an equal partner. China still threatens to attack the islands should Taiwan 
declare itself independent.745 Thirdly, if the knowledge about the hydrocarbon 
reserves cannot be measured exactly, it is difficult to divide the territory 
among the claimants because each party is afraid of giving something away. 
Fourthly, there is a wide benchmark of diverse legal opinions on the 
relationship between old and new Marine Law, between the 1985 Convention 
of the Continental Shelf and the 1982 U.N. Convention and between the 
customary and the conventional compounds in the new laws of the sea.746  
 
8.2. Institutionalised Means for a resolution of the conflict 
8.2.1. Solution by the Security Council of the United Nations 
None of the claimants has referred to the United Nations so far in order to 
shelve the dispute. The expulsion of Taiwan out of the U.N. at the beginning 
of the 1970s does not impede the U.N. from theoretically being put in charge 
of the dispute. Art. 2 (VI) U.N. Charter expressly provides that the U.N. should 
take care that states who are not members of the U.N. act in accordance with 
the principles laid down in the Charter. The enforcement measures can also 
be used against non-members, who are unwilling to abide by the principles.747 
In recent times, the number of UN-brokered peace settlements has declined in 
proportion to other methods.748  
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8.2.1.1. Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter 
The basic provision of the Charter relating to the authority of the Security 
Council is Art. 39. U.N. Charter. The prerequisites for the Security Council to 
be in charge of maintaining international peace and security in the case of a 
conflict are a) any threat of peace b) any breach of the peace c) any act of 
aggression. Among the three possibilities, the least severe infringement of 
peace represents the threat of peace.749 The conflict has not escalated to a 
threat of peace so far. A threat of peace is prevalent when a state uses force 
or the threat to force to compel another state to meet its demands. The 
majority of the Charter commission members held that the support or 
forbearance to prevent armed bands crossing into the territory of another has 
to be considered as a threat to peace.750 Chinese armed fishery boats 
intruded the area surrounding the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands in the past. As the 
Chinese government consistently denies that these actions were state-
sponsored, it is impossible to legally impute these intrusions to the Chinese 
state. There has been neither the use nor the menace to use state violence in 
the conflict.  
8.2.1.2. Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter 
The authority of the Security Council to settle conflicts as a body of peaceful 
dispute settlement are regulated in Art. 33 - 38 of the U.N. Charter. Pursuant 
to Art. 33 the maintenance of international peace and security must be 
endangered. As mentioned above, the conflict has not yet escalated to a point 
where one may assume that there is a threat to international peace. Art. 33 (II) 
U.N. Charter makes it clear that the Council should only call upon the parties 
to shelve the dispute when it is “likely to endanger” peace and security. As this 
dispute does not have such a feature, the Council must remain passive.751   
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8.2.1.3. No legal cognisance of the U.N. Security Council 
It must be stated that since the parties keep the dispute at a non-military level 
the Security Council does even have the authority to make suggestions. 
According to Art. 27 (III) U.N. Charter the PRC has a permanent seat in the 
Council. Upholding this position, it has the power to veto any detrimental 
decision against Chinese interests. As a consequence, if the parties sought to 
resolve the dispute by the means of the Security Council, Japan never can 
meet the PRC on equal footing because it does not have a permanent seat in 
the Security Council.  
8.2.1.4. Mediation by Secretary General of the United Nations 
The “secretary-generals missions” on behalf of the U.N. may take pride in 
having successfully mediated the 1948-1949- crisis between Israel and 
Egypt.752 In the strict sense, Art. 99 has been invoked overtly only in the 1960 
Congo crisis and in the 1979 occupation of the American embassy in 
Tehran.753 Art. 99 of the U.N. Charter emphasizes the cognizance of the 
Secretary General for such preventive diplomacy stating that he may bring 
any matter, which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international 
peace and security to the attention of the Security Council.754  
 
As depicted above, the claimants have to first accept mediation at the highest 
political level. It is hardly imaginable that the parties would agree on a 
mediation effort under the supervision of the U.N. Secretary-General. All in all, 
the idea of shelving the issue by the means of the U.N. must be ruled out. 
8.2.2. International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
Similar to many territorial conflicts before, one could submit the conflict for a 
final award to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague. The 
problem is that in no international stipulation is the mandatory cognisance of 
the ICJ laid down. First, the potential parties have to agree upon a Court 
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procedure before the ICJ. This will most likely not take place in the 
foreseeable future.  
8.2.2.1. Compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ (Art. 36 II Statute) 
All members of the U.N. are automatically parties of the ICJ Statute. Access to 
the ICJ cannot be equated with any state being is ipso facto subject to the ICJ 
jurisdiction. The principle of sovereignty requires that a state cannot be 
brought before court against its express will.755 Only Japan accepted the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ laid down in Art. 36 (II) of the ICJ Statute on 
15th September 1958. This means that other countries can take Japan to trial 
without further Japanese consent.756 The Taiwanese National government 
signed the faculty clause of Art. 36 (II) on 26th October 1946, which laid down 
the cognizance of the ICJ under the condition that the other state also ratified 
the compulsory clause.757 On September 5, 1972 the PRC stated that it would 
not recognize this legal obligation established by Taiwan. Up to today, the 
PRC has made no efforts to give its consent for a compulsory jurisdiction that 
international disputes shall be shelved before the ICJ. The PRC’s attitude 
towards the ICJ implies that a resolution of the territorial conflict on the 
grounds of an adjudication of the ICJ is not possible.  
8.2.2.2. The consensual basis of jurisdiction on Art. 36 (I) ICJ Statute 
A peaceful resolution could be perceivable by a consensual submission of the 
case to the ICJ. Art. 36 (I) determines that the tribunal can deal with cases 
referred to it by agreement of the parties.758 Notwithstanding Taiwan virtually 
being an independent state, neither Japan nor the PRC recognize Taiwan as 
a legally sovereign state. Being neither a member of the U.N. nor the ICJ 
Statute759, Taiwan could become a party of a Court procedure by virtue of Art. 
35 (II) of the ICJ Statute. This specific legal provision requires the (very 
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unlikely) consent of the Security Council.760 Given the tense China / 
Taiwanese relation the PRC will probably veto any proposal in the Security 
Council. In any case, the PRC will never be willing to call upon an 
international tribunal against Taiwan because this could lead to an implicit 
recognition of Taiwan.  
8.2.2.3. Advisory Opinions of the ICJ 
Under Art. 65 of the ICJ Statute the Court is entitled to give an advisory 
opinion on “any legal question at the request of whatever body may be 
authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make 
such a “request.” An advisory opinion is not binding on the parties of the 
conflict.761 The ICJ has made clear that this legalistic device does not allow 
the states to circumvent the necessity of the other state’s consent for a court 
procedure.762 Again, the unresolved Taiwan question impedes a request for 
an advisory opinion.  
8.2.3. Jurisdiction of the ITLOS 
China and Japan are members of the 1982 UNCLOS Treaty. Given this 
background it sounds reasonable to find a solution on the basis of the 1982 
UNCLOS convention. Art. 279 UNCLOS obliges the parties to seek a solution 
of their legal issues only by peaceful means.  
 
If the parties could not agree upon a common resolution, a member state of 
UNCLOS is entitled to seize several court procedures, which are laid down in 
Art. 287 (I) UNCLOS. Under Art. 287 (I) it is possible for the parties to resort to 
the ITLOS, the ICJ or a special arbitration chamber.763  
 
According to Art. 21 of the ITLOS Statute the tribunal has, unless the parties 
confer special authority to it, the only power to judge legal question in regard 
to legal questions arising in a context of the UNCLOS Convention. An 
important principle of maritime sovereignty is that “land reigns over the sea”. 
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Primarily, the islands dispute is a conflict about land and not about the sea. 
The question of sovereignty over land territory is not regulated in UNCLOS. It 
has to be clearly understood that the UNCLOS Convention only provides 
legalistic assistance in the case of, e.g. maritime boundary delimitation. It has 
been pointed out that the parties of the conflict are not claiming the islands for 
its territory, but for the economic value of the islands’ Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ). The UNCLOS Convention does not provide any legal devices to 
resolve territorial land disputes. On the contrary, Art. 298 (I,a,i) UNCLOS 
provides that any signatory state may declare at any time that it does not 
accept a court procedure in regard to the sovereignty over insular land 
territory.764  
 
For this reason, the UNCLOS Convention must be regarded as a worthless 
recourse for the islands sovereignty question.  
8.2.4. Arbitration 
In a case where a diplomatic dispute settlement structure fails, the parties of a 
conflict may opt to refer the case to an arbitrational tribunal. Contrary to other 
forms of settlements, an arbitration award is always binding to the parties.765 
The main difference between arbitration and a judicial settlement lies in the 
method of selecting the members. The privilege of appointing the arbitrators 
ensures that the states feel a certain degree of confidence.766 The arbitration 
experience proved that dissenting opinions of national arbitrators against their 
state are very rare. The major advantage of arbitration towards the rules of the 
ICJ is that an arbitration award can be kept secret.767 As it is important for 
Asian nations to save face, this might be a very conducive way to resolve the 
case.  
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8.2.5. ASEAN  
One needs to raise the question of whether there is a multilateral organization, 
which is comparable to the OSCE in the western world and which could 
secure the dangers that possibly could arise from a military clash. The answer 
is not very affirmative: In the entire region of Asia there is no regional 
multilateral entity capable of handling security questions at the highest political 
level. 
8.2.5.1. 1992 Manila Declaration 
Fearing a military clash in the South China Sea the ASEAN organisation 
issued the Manila Declaration in 1992 ”urging all parties concerned to 
exercise restraints in order to create a positive climate for the eventual 
resolution of all disputes.” The sad truth about the declaration is that the 
disputants could not agree upon a binding treaty. Despite this code of 
conduct, many incidents occured in the past.768 Adverse Chinese military 
actions, for example the destruction of the Philippine military structure on the 
Mischief Reef rendered the 1992 declaration null and void.769  
8.2.5.2. Regional Forum (ARF) 
Both Japan and China are not member of the ASEAN group.770 Although not 
ASEAN member, China and Japan joined the annexed Regional Forum 
(ARF), which comprised a total of 25 member states. This forum aims to 
promote confidence building, to enhance preventive diplomacy and to 
elaborate the approaches to conflicts.771 There are many prevailing factors 
causing that a viable multinational effort to establish such a political structure 
is doomed to failure from its beginning. First, the idea of the creation of such a 
multinational entity is not deeply entrenched in Asian mentality. As result of a 
lack of common values and common political philosophy, the concept of a 
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regional community applies only in the most limited sense in Asia.772 
Secondly, past Japanese imperialism committed in  the entire Asian region is 
not forgotten. This makes it difficult for other states to accept Japan as an 
equal security partner. Thirdly, as China expects to play the leading role in 
Asia, it is also very reluctant to line up with less significant countries on the 
same diplomatic level. Fourthly, the final amount of ASEAN members is 
disputed. Establishing an East Asian Community China insists that the 
ASEAN body should be limited to the ASEAN+3 (China, Japan, South Korea) 
so that it may ensure its leadership.773 Fifthly, the states disagree on the U.S. 
military presence in the region.774 Last but not least, China emphasised that 
the forum is for exchanging views for negotiating and not a forum to negotiate; 
it resisted expanding the purview of ARF to include the Spratly dispute.775  
 
8.3. Obstacles of a formal resolution based on maritime 
delimitation  
8.3.1. China / Taiwan question overshadows the islands dispute 
China and Japan have upheld mutual diplomatic ties since 1972. Taiwan as 
the third claimant is an isolated member of the international community. China 
does not at all recognize the virtually existing state Taiwan; Japan stays in 
rather unofficial contact with the ROC. Unlike other territorial conflicts, this 
dispute is overshadowed by the unresolved China-related issue of, which 
state is to be considered the lawful representative of the Chinese people. The 
PRC would never upgrade Taiwan’s political status by ratifying a bilateral 
treaty with the ROC. Unless the China / Taiwan question is shelved, a 
diplomatic solution seems to be impossible because no Chinese state entity 
would accept a resolution stipulated by the other one. The two political 
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systems are too opposed to each other for a reunification under the formula 
“one country, two systems” (like in Hong Kong) to be reached.776  
8.3.2. Asian mentality is very face-loving 
Generally, nations seem to consider it convenient to resort to third party 
adjudication, whenever well-established rules of international law can control 
the matter and whenever the subject matter is of a lesser, more secondary 
importance to the disputants’ vital national interests.777 In respect to the 
islands these two preconditions have to be denied on the grounds that any 
legal interpretation, no matter in whose favour, will remain rather shaky since 
the dispute concerns vital interests (oil, nationalism) of the claimants. 
 
Despite the abstract possibility of a Court procedure before an international 
tribunal it must be stated that presumably all claimants are very resentful 
towards such an idea. As a judicial decision would emanate from the 
international jurists, Asian political leaders could easily divert the blame of an 
unfavourable result to the Court. There is no chance that the islands could be 
distributed among the claimants; the judicial award is a “zero-sum game”. As 
the conflict is entwined with other factors (nationalism, oil), each party of the 
potential case has too much to lose in comparison to what it has to put at risk. 
Given that Asian countries stick very much to face-loving ideas, a defeat 
before an international tribunal would result into a too unpredictable domestic 
turbulence.778 From this perspective, it is understandable that the claimants 
lack the necessary political will to take legal action against the other states. 
8.3.3. Summary why all methods possibly will fail 
Given the political background it is not possible to find a solution on the basis 
of territorial repartition. The only possible viable solution is that of a joint 
development of the natural resources. In this proposal the crux of the matter is 
that the territorial status of the disputed islands must be circumnavigated. 
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8.4. Joint Development 
In September 2005, Japan proposed a joint development in the gas fields of 
Tianwaitian, Chunxiao, Duanxiao and Longjing. China did not make any 
efforts towards such a cooperation fearing that such a project would imply a 
tacit recognition of the Japanese EEZ. China insists that it did not accept the 
median line and that the Chunxiao field was located on the Chinese side of 
the boundary.779 As claimant states will not overcome their fretfulness in the 
near future, this represents the only realistic resolution. This presumably easy  
to manage task still faces some predicaments.  
8.4.1. Different Conceptions of the claimants  
First, the parties must overcome their different understandings of the term 
joint development. Japan thinks that China is to make the first step by 
stopping its exploitation in the Chunxiao / Shirakaba field, which is situated on 
the Japanese side of the median line as claimed by Japan. On the other hand, 
China believes that Japan will interfere with the exploitation of fields on its 
side of the median line. The Chinese hold that a joint development is only 
feasible in the area between the median line and the claimed continental shelf 
maritime space.780 
8.4.2. Important factors of an equitable solution for a JDZ 
Maybe it is possible to transfer the principle of equity developed for the 
delimitation of maritime sea space to the model of a joint development zone. 
In previous ICJ precedents, equity in regard to the continental shelf was 
determined by geological and by geomorphologic factors beyond the 200 nm 
zone.781 Within the 200 miles from each coast natural prolongation, geology 
and geomorphologic factors only play a minor role. Equidistance, which has 
been adjusted by the proportionality of the coast length and access to natural 
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resources were the decision-making factors.782 The 1985 Malta / Libya case 
was the first award, in which the court significantly adjusted the median line 
solution in favour of state with the longer coast. The coast length ratio 
between Libya and Malta (distance between the coasts: 195 nm) was 8:1, 
which resulted in an adjustment of 18 miles of the maritime boundary.783 As a 
result, one should not attribute too much attention to the different coast length 
ratio between Japan and China (36:64) because the two/thirds ratio of the 
present case may only slightly dislocate the maritime boundary. To conclude, 
the principle of equity does not present the ultimate resolution for a precise 
maritime area distribution, either. 
8.4.3. How much effect has been granted to the islands? 
Hence, one must shed light on the question how much effect has been 
granted to remote offshore islands in previous cases. Actually, of the 157 
maritime agreements signed up to the year 2000, 124 (79%) contained in 
some form the principle of equidistance.784 About 270 boundaries remain to 
be delimited.785 On the contrary, state practice varies considerably on the 
question of how much effect is granted to remote offshore islands. If a state 
used remote islands as base-points for its Continental Shelf, then the 
delimitation vis-à-vis an adjacent state was put into practice by different 
means. Depending on the case, islands were a) completely ignored (North 
Sea Continental Shelf Case) b) given half effect (Scilly Islands between the 
U.K. and France)786, c) granted full effect (Barbados / Trinidad and Tobago 
award or the agreement between Spain and Italy in regard to Minorca) and d) 
a twofold method evolved in the Channel islands. In this case, the Channel 
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Islands were ignored, but at the same time an enclave was adjudged to 
them.787  
8.4.4. Extra - territorializition of the conflict 
The only viable solution is the ex-territorializition of the islands dispute; in 
other words the parties must agree upon evading and circumnavigating the 
question of the islands’ sovereignty and must lay their focus on the repartition 
of exploitation rights.788 The first step would be to agree on a 12 nautical mile 
territorial sea enclave around the islands and to declare them to be a neutral 
zone. This implies that the territorial and jurisdictional questions are separable 
and that the latter maybe resolved before the first one.789  
8.4.5. Taiwanese claims  
Taiwan and China do not regard themselves as foreign countries, but each 
legal entity is entitled to its own maritime rights.790 As the relations between 
the two Chinese state will probably remain at an irresolvable impasse in the 
foreseeable future, the only realistic option is for Taiwan to be forced to 
renounce its specific Taiwanese claims. From today’s point of view, only the 
U.S., possibly be supported by Japan, might be capable to induce Taiwan to 
do so. Under such a joint development proposal, Taiwan would not repeat its 
claims to the seabed beyond the median line based on its claim of jurisdiction 
over the mainland.791  
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8.4.6. Sino Japanese Fishery Agreement a model for solution? 
Up to today, China has signed three bilateral fishery agreements with Japan, 
South Korea and Vietnam. The most important for this case is the 1997 
fishery agreement between China and Japan to cooperate in the East China 
Sea.792 In this agreement, China and Japan agreed on three different zones. 
The principle of coastal jurisdiction applies to 52 miles from their respective 
baselines in the area between 27° N and 30, 40° N latitude. Beyond that line 
joint regulations apply; a certain number of fishing boats of both states may 
pursue their business without prior approval of the other state’s 
government.793  
 
The island-affected area is omitted to safeguard the status-quo.794 Art. 7 
stipulates that a provisional measure zone south of and parallel to 27°N 
(proximate to the disputed islands) is set up in the Eastern Chinese Sea, 
where both parties will refrain from exercising their jurisdiction towards 
fishermen of the other state.795 
8.4.7. Korean-Japanese Joint Development Agreement 
In this agreement, the boundary line in the northern section was delineated 
that it pushes slightly more to the Korean coastline along the equidistance line 
between the two states. The Joint Development Zone is divided into 
geographical subzones, where each state should authorize one or more 
concessionaires to explore and exploit the resources.796 The concessionaires 
of both states shall enter into operating agreements, determining the sharing 
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of the profits and the expenses.797 Jurisdiction is regulated as follows: a) the 
share of a concessionaire of one party is considered as natural resources 
extracted from the continental shelf of that party, b) each subzone is governed 
by the laws of the state, which has granted concessions and c) neither state is 
entitled to impose taxes or other charges on profits of the other party.798  
8.4.7.1. Proposal of a Chinese -  Japanese Joint Development Zone 
So far, a ratification of such a joint development does not seem very probable. 
The region is looking impatiently towards continuing economic growth in order 
to grant a higher standard of living to its citizen. The size of a state’s territory 
has lost its value in determining the state’s power position in the global 
community. A military clash would do more harm to the PRC than it could 
possibly grant benefit to it because economic growth needs a peaceful and 
stable environment. If the exploitation rights are distributed in favour of the 
rising giant China one day, the more powerful China might be satisfied with a 
formally “extra-territorialized” status of the islands, which will remain 
administered by Japan.  
8.4.7.2. Proposal of a third line in the northern zone 
One option consists of the establishment of a zone north of the approximate 
27° N latitude, whose delineation would be consistent with the one of the 
Japanese Chinese Fishery Agreement. As the question of the Diaoyu / 
Senkaku Islands’ ownership did not affect the delimitation above 27° northern 
latitude, the parties were able to agree on common fishery stipulations. 
According to the jurist Valencia the equidistance principle should be applied 
between China and Japan in this zone.799  
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Source: Marc J Valencia; see footnote 915 
 
From the author’s perspective, this proposal is an unrealistic option. The 
continental shelf claim and the Japanese median line also overlap in the area 
north of 27° degrees. The author therefore contends that the median line 
between the isobath (Ryukyu trough) and the equidistance line between 
China and Japan should be the maritime border between the disputants. 
Consequently, the author’s contention lies in a compromise between the 
continental shelf and the median line principle. This so-called “third line” shall 
be fixed up by using exact geographic coordinates.   
8.4.7.3. Southern Zone  
Valencia proposes several modes to do a joint development in the southern 
zone, which comprises the area of the disputed islands. While ignoring the 
contested islands, the repartition of territory could be done either by the 
equidistance principle or by a median line, which would have been adjusted 
according to the ratio of the length of the states (China and Taiwan) coastlines 
   
(64:36). The Japanese median line and the Chinese isobath boundary are 
connected via a dividing line subdividing the area according to this ratio.800  
8.4.8. Author’s point of view 
From the author’s perspective, this cannot be held as a political viable option. 
It will not be politically viable because of the following reasons. As may be 
deduced from previous awards the ratio of the coastline length is not an exact 
parameter how maritime space should be divided; it is just an auxiliary tool to 
complete an equitable result. The length of the coastline has so far never 
been the only determining factor for a repartition of sea space, but only played 
a reasonable degree of relevance.801 The largest resources were discovered 
on the Chinese side of the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands. No matter which 
scenario is applied, the Japanese will have either to concede the loss of the 
islands or a tremendous loss of exploitation capacity. As the Japanese 
currently administer the islands, they had to abandon too much whilst being 
able to gain too little in such a deal.  
8.4.9. Condominium settlement in the southern zone 
A condominium means that the area would be administered jointly with a dual 
jurisdiction. The exploitation of the resources in the condominium would be 
administered by a committee of China and Japan, which will enable it to 
operate. The profit distribution must be established according to the ratio how 
the seabed is delimited among the claimants. The most delicate point of such 
a project is the distribution of the profits. As the resources are not entirely 
explored and as current data contains un- predictabilities, it is rather 
imaginable that the dispute will continue under a different setting.802 The idea 
of a condominium still may be conducive on the grounds that a common 
exploitation of the resources is the only viable way in this dispute.  
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8.4.10. Only conceivable solution: Subzones in the southern zone 
From the author’s perspective, any current attempt to resolve the dispute on 
the basis of distributing the sea area will fail. It is not possible to award or 
adjudicate the islands to neither of the claimants. Therefore, the disputed 
islands regime shall be left for a future resolution. With this background, the 
only conceivable solution might be of adopting the Joint Development model 
of multiple subzones (JDZ) in the southern zone. Thus, the subzone model of 
the Japanese Korean JDZ should be transferred to the southern zone. The 
zone’s delimitation shall be as following: The JDZ borders shall enclose the 
Japanese median line claim on the eastern side and the Chinese continental 
shelf claim on the western side. The territory of these two overlapping claims 
is almost equal to each other so that each disputant will concede about the 
same amount of sq miles to the JDZ. In this scenario, the two states enjoy a 
equal rights and obligations. Each party is required to nominate at least one 
concessionaire for each subzone; the respective concessionaires of both 
parties will enter an agreement. In this contract, the concessionaires must 
agree on a sharing of revenues, the profits of either concessionaire will be 
taxed in the respective state. It shall be stipulated that the JDZ does not 
prejudice each party’s sovereign rights over the overlapping claims.803  
 
Any proposal for a joint development in this area needs to keep in mind that 
the vast part of supplies is situated towards the Chinese side and on the 
Chinese continental shelf. At the same time the exact extend of the resources 
is beyond the scientists’ knowledge. Therefore, any stringent demarcation of 
the area will be doomed to failure. The major advantage of such a model is 
that the disparate supplies in each subzones would be shared equally and 
that the risk of unpredictability of the quantities of supplies is equally 
balanced. If any concessionaire should seek to siphon the other subzone’s 
resources, this act will at least harm the own national company’s interest as 
well. 
                                                 
803 Zhiguo Gao, Jilu Wu, “Key Issues In The East China Sea”, 3 
www.wilsoncenter.org/topic/docs/Zhiguo_Gao_and_Jilu_wu.pdf, accessed on. July 23rd, 2007 
   
8.4.11. Probability of implementation  
It is very likely that the conflict will drag on for a while. An implementation of a 
negotiation / mediation effort will be largely dependent upon the claimants’ 
balance of power as well on the claimants’ economic performance in the 
foreseeable future. Given the oil price level reaching a peak of $90 US per 
barrel in mid-2007 a political and peaceful solution may be found more quickly 
than anticipated. The Japanese are probably right in suspecting that the 
Chinese will play on the factor of time, which doubtlessly runs in favour of the 
PRC. Although the Japanese possess the disputed islands today, they might 
be very happy one day to implement a joint agreement, which does not 
allocate the entire resources up to the median line in favour of Japan.  
 
This contention is based on previous experiences of negotiations. In the past, 
a disputant’s perception of equal power among negotiators tended to result in 
more effective and quicker resolutions than negotiations between unequal 
powers because the disputants were less resilient to “damage tactics” that 
were used.804 One day, when the PRC’s economic performance has caught 
up to the Japanese level, each side will perceive the bilateral relations from 
the perspective of its own merits rather than serving exogenous and extrinsic 
political purposes.805 In order to conclude, the time factor runs in favour of an 
equal partnership resolution.  
 
 
 
 
9. Conclusion 
So far many states involved in disputes have been able to resolve a large 
number of maritime boundary conflicts through negotiation. The states’ 
practice of resolving disputes is not reflected in the current legal situation of 
1982 UNCLOS, which does not permit ready resolutions of extant boundary 
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disputes.806 As a mandatory legal regime does not exist between the 
disputants, a pure legal solution will not be implemented in the Diaoyu / 
Senkaku Islands conflict. Concerning the possession of the islands, no party 
will concede the ownership of the islands to the opposite party because the 
islands are too closely linked to other soft factors, such as nationalism and 
retaliation of former humiliations. A military solution is not very probable either 
because China has espoused the peaceful rise tactics. Its ascendancy 
requires a peaceful international environment so that access to supplies still 
can boost their economic growth. Given China’s domestic instability it would 
be foolhardy for the CCP regime to put this supportive environment at risk.807 
 
On these grounds the only viable solution is from the author’s point of view a 
joint development. Similar to the Japanese-Korean joint development, the 
question of the islands sovereignty should be discarded and the emphasis laid 
on an equal repartition of the resources. In order to ensure this goal the 
parties should establish many subzones south of 27° northern latitude and 
east of the Chinese / Japanese continental Shelf. From today’s perspective, 
the bilateral ties between Japan and China seem to be too strained for a 
common solution and the conflict will presumably drag on for a while. Being 
aware of the claimants’ leeway, the author contends that the factor of time and 
the dwindling supplies may make the disputants alter their standpoints in the 
near future and that Deng Xiaoping’s foresight will become reality.  
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